Preston Eugene Richardson v. Whatcom County Jail, et al.

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: November 5, 2025
• Docket: 2:25-cv-00206
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 5 AT TACOMA 6 PRESTON EUGENE RICHARDSON, Case No. 2:25-cv-00206-DGE-TLF 7 Plaintiff, v. REPORT AND 8 RECOMMENDATION WHATCOM COUNTY JAIL, et al., 9 Noted for November 20, 2025 Defendants. 10 11 BACKGROUND 12 The District Court has referred this action to United States Magistrate Judge 13 Theresa L. Fricke. On April 14, 2025, plaintiff filed a motion to proceed in forma 14 pauperis (IFP) and a proposed civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. 19831. Dkt. 15, 15- 15 1. 16 After screening the proposed complaint, the Court ordered plaintiff to show cause 17 how he stated a claim against defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Dkt. 18. The 18 Court ordered plaintiff to either show cause by June 6, 2025, why the complaint should 19 not be dismissed without prejudice, or file an amended complaint. Id. 20 21 22 1 Plaintiff filed his original complaint on January 27, 2025. Dkt. 1. Because he did not properly file the application to proceed IFP, the Court did not process that complaint. Dkt. 5, 12. Plaintiff requested to 23 amend his complaint. Dkt. 9, 15-4. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint, and properly submitted his application for IFP on April 14, 2025. Dkt. 15. That complaint is the operative complaint analyzed in this 24 Order to Show Cause. Dkt. 15-2. 1 The Court’s Order was returned to the Court as undeliverable on June 16, 2025. 2 Dkt. 19. Plaintiff submitted a letter to the Court on April 11, 2025, indicating he may 3 have a new address soon, but he did not provide a new address in the letter or 4 thereafter. Thus, the Court, on June 27, 2025, ordered plaintiff to notify the court of his

5 current mailing address by August 18, 2025. Dkt. 20. He was informed that if the Court 6 was not notified of his currently mailing address, the undersigned would recommend 7 dismissal of his action without prejudice. 8 On July 9, 2025, plaintiff wrote a letter to the Court stating that he anticipated 9 being able to file an amended complaint soon thereafter, but he did not receive “any 10 documents statin what to file for the amended complaint.” Dkt. 21. The Clerk’s Office 11 resent the Court’s Order to Show Case (Dkt. 18) to plaintiff. Dkt. 21. The plaintiff has 12 failed to respond to the Court’s order to show cause or communicated with the Court. 13 DISCUSSION 14 i. Failure to Prosecute

15 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) provides that “[f]or failure of the plaintiff to 16 prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order of court, a defendant may move for 17 dismissal of an action.” In Link v. Wabash Railroad Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629-31 (1962), 18 the Supreme Court recognized that a federal district court has the inherent power to 19 dismiss a case sua sponte for failure to prosecute, even though the language of Rule 20 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure appears to require a motion from a party. 21 Moreover, in appropriate circumstances, the Court may dismiss a complaint for failure to 22 prosecute even without notice or hearing. See id. at 633. 23

24 1 In determining whether plaintiff's failure to prosecute warrants dismissal of the case, 2 the Court must weigh the following five factors: “(1) the public's interest in expeditious 3 resolution of litigation; (2) the court's need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice 4 to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and

5 (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions.” Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440 (9th 6 Cir. 1988) (quoting Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir. 1986)). “The 7 first two of these factors favor the imposition of sanctions in most cases, while the fourth 8 factor cuts against a default or dismissal sanction. Thus, the key factors are prejudice 9 and availability of lesser sanctions.” Wanderer v. Johnson, 910 F.2d 652, 656 (9th Cir. 10 1990). 11 Here, the first and second factors favor dismissal of the case. The third factor weighs 12 against dismissal because the defendants have not been served in this case. The fourth 13 factor, as always, weighs against dismissal. The fifth factor requires the Court to 14 consider whether a less drastic alternative is available. The Court has already ordered

15 plaintiff to show cause why this matter should not be dismissed and has given plaintiff 16 an opportunity to amend the complaint. Plaintiff has not responded to the Court’s most 17 recent order. One less drastic sanction is realistically available. 18 Rule 41(b) provides that a dismissal for failure to prosecute operates as an 19 adjudication upon the merits “[u]nless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise 20 specifies.” In the instant case, a dismissal with prejudice would be unnecessarily harsh. 21 The complaint and this action should therefore be dismissed without prejudice pursuant 22 to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 23

24 1 ii. Failure to State Claim 2 Additionally, plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint (Dkt. 15), and this action, 3 should be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim. 4 The Court must dismiss the complaint of a prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis “at

5 any time if the [C]ourt determines” that the action: (a) “is frivolous or malicious”; (b) “fails 6 to state a claim on which relief may be granted”’ or (c) “seeks monetary relief against a 7 defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); 28 U.S.C. § 8 1915A(a), (b). A complaint is frivolous when it has no arguable basis in law or fact. 9 Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1228 (9th Cir. 1984), abrogated on other grounds 10 by Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989). 11 Before the Court may dismiss the complaint as frivolous or for failure to state a 12 claim, though, it “must provide the [prisoner] with notice of the deficiencies of [the] 13 complaint and an opportunity to amend the complaint prior to dismissal.” McGuckin v. 14 Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds by WMX

15 Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997); see also Sparling v. Hoffman 16 Construction, Co., Inc., 864 F.2d 635, 638 (9th Cir. 1988); Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 17 1446, 1449 (9th Cir. 1987). On the other hand, leave to amend need not be granted 18 “where the amendment would be futile or where the amended complaint would be 19 subject to dismissal.” Saul v. United States, 928 F.2d 829, 843 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing 20 Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 291, 296 (9th Cir.1990); Moore v. Kayport 21 Package Express, Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 538 (9th Cir.1989)). 22 The Court liberally construes pro se documents. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 23 (1976). Yet, Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that in order for

24 1 a pleading to state a claim for relief it must contain a short and plain statement of the 2 grounds for the court’s jurisdiction, a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 3 the pleader is entitled to relief, and a demand for the relief sought. The statement of the 4 claim must be sufficient to “give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is

5 and the grounds upon which it rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). 6 To avoid dismissal, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as 7 true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 8 662, 664 (2009). The factual allegations must be “enough to raise a right to relief above 9 the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The 10 complaint may be dismissed if it lacks a cognizable legal theory or states insufficient 11 facts to support a cognizable legal theory. Zixiang v. Kerry, 710 F.3d 995, 999 (9th Cir. 12 2013). A complaint is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. 13 Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Wainscott v. San Diego Cty., 9 F.3d 1555 (9th Cir. 14 1993).

15 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a complaint must allege: (1) the conduct 16 complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law, and (2) the 17 conduct deprived a person of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution 18 or laws of the United States. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), overruled on 19 other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). The first step in a § 1983 claim 20 is therefore to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. 21 Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994). To satisfy the second prong, a plaintiff must allege 22 facts showing how individually named defendants caused, or personally participated in 23 causing, the harm alleged in the complaint. See Arnold v. IBM, 637 F.2d 1350, 1355

24 1 (9th Cir. 1981). Section 1983 is the appropriate avenue to remedy an alleged wrong 2 only if both of these elements are present. Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, 1354 3 (9th Cir. 1985). 4 Here, plaintiff’s complaint is more than 90 pages, he also includes a letter explaining

5 some of the claims, and he filed 268 pages of attachments, which he incorporates by 6 reference into the complaint. Dkt. 15-2, 15-3, 15-4. 7 Many pages in plaintiff’s complaint are illegible because the scanned image is faint 8 and unreadable. See, e.g., Shuster v. Oppelman, 962 F. Supp. 394, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 9 1997) (holding that a partially illegible pro se complaint does not comply with Rule 8); 10 Knutson v. Lucky Store, Inc., No. CIV S-07-0981-LKK-EFB-P, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11 116353, 2008 WL 4167076, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2008) (dismissing a pro se 12 complaint that was mostly illegible and did not comply with Rule 8). 13 Further, the readable portion of the proposed complaint shows plaintiff is alleging 14 that the individual defendants violated his constitutional rights by subjecting him to

15 solitary confinement after receiving “false allegations” under the Prison Rape 16 Elimination Act and denying him the opportunity to be removed from solitary 17 confinement. 18 It appears plaintiff’s primary claim is that the defendants deprived him of procedural 19 and substantive due process, and equal protection of law, under the Fifth and 20 Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiff names several defendants, yet the readable portion 21 of the complaint contains no allegations identifying each defendant’s personal action(s) 22 or inaction(s) that resulted in plaintiff’s continued isolation. Dkt. 15-2. 23

24 1 Plaintiff does not provide sufficient context or factual details to “nudge[] [his] claims 2 across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 3 544, 547 (2007); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680. Accordingly, plaintiff does not state his 4 claims in a manner that plausibly alleges the personal participation of each defendant,

5 in individual or official capacity. 6 Plaintiff further names Whatcom County Jail as a defendant. The Jail is not a 7 proper defendant in a Section 1983 lawsuit. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 applies to the actions of 8 “persons” acting under color of state law. This definition includes municipalities, such as 9 counties. Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). 10 To bring an appropriate § 1983 action, a plaintiff “must name the county or city itself as 11 party to the action, and not the particular municipal department or facility where the 12 alleged violation occurred.” Osborne v. Vancouver Police, 2017 WL 1294573, at *9 13 (W.D. Wash. 2017). In this case, Whatcom County is the proper party. 14 In sum, plaintiff fails to state a claim for which relief may be granted as to the

15 participation of defendants in violation of the Fourteenth Amendments and 42 U.S.C. § 16 1983. As such, because plaintiff has failed to state a claim, his IFP motion should be 17 denied, and his complaint should be dismissed. 18 CONCLUSION 19 Plaintiff’s IFP motion should be DENIED, and his proposed amended complaint (Dkt. 20 15) should be DISMISSED without prejudice. 21 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), the parties shall have 22 fourteen (14) days from service of this report to file written objections. See also Fed. R. 23 Civ. P. 6. Failure to file objections will result in a waiver of those objections for purposes

24 1 of de novo review by the district judge, see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), and can result in a 2 waiver of those objections for purposes of appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 3 142 (1985); Miranda v. Anchondo, 684 F.3d 844, 848 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). 4 Accommodating the time limit imposed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), the Clerk is directed to

5 set the matter for consideration on November 20, 2025, as noted in the caption. 6 7 Dated this 5th day of November, 2025. 8 9 A 10 Theresa L. Fricke 11 United States Magistrate Judge

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