Prestige Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Baldwin

2025 Ohio 1395

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: April 18, 2025
• Docket: 2024-CA-30
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as Prestige Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Baldwin, 2025-Ohio-1395.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MIAMI COUNTY

PRESTIGE FINANCIAL SERVICES, : INC. : : C.A. No. 2024-CA-30 Appellee : : Trial Court Case No. 17 CV 00334 v. : : (Civil Appeal from Common Pleas LATASHI A. BALDWIN : Court) : Appellant :

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OPINION

Rendered on April 18, 2025

LATASHI A. BALDWIN, Pro Se Appellant

JOHN E. JOSEPH, Attorney for Appellee

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EPLEY, P.J.

{¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant Latashi A. Baldwin appeals from a judgment of the

Miami County Court of Common Pleas that granted a default judgment to Plaintiff-

Appellee Prestige Financial Services, Inc. in this collection matter. Although the default

judgment was granted six years prior, the judgment entry did not include Civ.R. 58(B) -2-

language, and thus this appeal is timely. For the reasons that follow, the judgment of the

trial court will be affirmed.

I. Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 2} In February 2015, Baldwin entered into a retail installment contract with

Joseph T of D Co. for the purchase of a 2012 Toyota XD. Baldwin agreed to pay $359.98

per month for 72 months beginning in March 2015. She defaulted on the terms and

conditions of the contract by failing to make her monthly payments, and in October 2017,

Prestige filed its complaint. At that time, Baldwin owed $16,797.46 plus interest and fees.

{¶ 3} According to the record, service on Baldwin was first attempted by certified

mail but was unsuccessful. Service was then completed by regular mail.

{¶ 4} After not getting a response from Baldwin, Prestige demanded that the

vehicle be surrendered. Again, it got no response from Baldwin. In January 2018, Prestige

moved for default judgment. The trial court granted the default judgment, and garnishment

proceedings began in April 2018. The court received garnishment deposits from Baldwin’s

employer in March, April, and May 2020. After Baldwin went through bankruptcy

proceedings, garnishment proceedings began again in September 2024.

{¶ 5} In November 2024, Baldwin filed a notice of appeal claiming that the trial

court had lacked personal jurisdiction because she had not been properly served.

II. Service of Process and Jurisdiction

{¶ 6} In her lone assignment of error, Baldwin argues that she “was not personally

served or otherwise notified” that there was a lawsuit pending against her and therefore

the trial court did not have personal jurisdiction over her. We disagree. -3-

{¶ 7} A court can obtain personal jurisdiction over a party through service of

process pursuant to the Civil Rules, voluntary appearance, or waiver. In re S.A., 2013-

Ohio-3047, ¶ 10 (2d Dist.). Without personal jurisdiction, though, a court is without

authority to render judgment against a party to an action. Id.

{¶ 8} Civ.R. 4.1 details the types of service permitted in Ohio courts. Civ.R.

4.1(A)(1)(a) allows the clerk to serve process by United States certified mail with return

receipt requested. The delivering postal employee is to “show to whom delivered, date of

delivery, and address where delivered.” Id. If the certified mail is unclaimed, the serving

party may then request ordinary mail service. Civ.R. 4.6(D). “[S]ervice by ordinary mail is

deemed complete when (1) the clerk enters the fact of mailing upon the record, and (2)

the ordinary mail envelope is not returned to the court with an endorsement showing

failure of delivery.” Kirner & Boldt Co., L.P.A. v. Alman, 2020-Ohio-1505, ¶ 6 (8th Dist.).

{¶ 9} In this case, the record shows that on August 8, 2017, Prestige attempted to

serve Baldwin by the Miami County Sheriff and by certified mail; those attempts were

unsuccessful (the certified mail was unclaimed). The next attempt at service was August

20, 2017, this time by regular U.S. mail. The clerk’s “certificate of mailing,” filed August

23, did not indicate that the service by mail was returned, and according to the caselaw,

we must presume that Baldwin was successfully served. See Carter-Jones Lumber Co.

v. Meyers, 2006-Ohio-5380, ¶ 11 (2d Dist.) (“In those instances where the plaintiff follows

the Civil Rules governing service of process, courts presume that service is proper unless

the defendant rebuts this presumption with sufficient evidence of non-service.”).

{¶ 10} To challenge the presumption that she was served, Baldwin has attached -4-

to her appellate brief a document which is purportedly a “new service order issued by the

City of Troy Water department.” This document, she claims, proves that she was not a

resident of the address that was served. Even if it is what Baldwin suggests, we cannot

consider it because the rebuttal of service had to be done in the trial court. “[W]hen a

party claims a trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over them due to improper service

of process, the appropriate method to challenge such void judgment is through a common

law motion to vacate.” Chuang Dev., L.L.C. v. Raina, 2017-Ohio-3000, ¶ 29 (10th Dist.);

James v. Top of the Hill Renovations, 2016-Ohio-1190, ¶ 9 (10th Dist.) (“A common law

motion to vacate is utilized to set aside a judgment rendered by a court that has not

acquired personal jurisdiction over the defendant.”).

{¶ 11} It is important that a party challenging service presents evidence of

improper or non-service in the trial court because a court of appeals is limited to the record

before it. Edwards v. Galluzo, 2024-Ohio-2005, ¶ 31 (2d Dist.). That means an appellant

may not present new evidence on appeal. Hackworth v. Charlton, 1994 WL 590651, *2

(2d Dist. Oct. 26, 1994). See also Mangan v. Morocho and Garcia Constr. LLC, 2024-

Ohio-2241, ¶ 13 (10th Dist.) (“We are limited to the record before us, which contains no

evidence to support the assertion in [the party’s] brief on appeal that he did not receive

the certified mail containing the summons and complaint.”).

{¶ 12} With the record before us, we must conclude that service was proper.

Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it granted the default judgment in favor of

Prestige. The assignment of error is overruled.

III. Conclusion -5-

{¶ 13} The judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.

HUFFMAN, J. and HANSEMAN, J., concur.