President of City Bank v. Bangs

2 Edw. Ch. 95
CourtNew York Court of Chancery
DecidedJuly 9, 1833
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 2 Edw. Ch. 95 (President of City Bank v. Bangs) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Court of Chancery primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
President of City Bank v. Bangs, 2 Edw. Ch. 95 (N.Y. 1833).

Opinion

The Vice-Chancellor:

All the parties who are defendants in this cause have taken exceptions to the master’s report. Those, of the defendant Henry Bangs, go to exclude the defendants Jacob Hays, Zebulon Homan, Benjamin J. Hays and Maria Van Riper from any participation in the reward which had been offered by the complainants; claiming, for himself alone, the whole of the amount. The exceptions taken by Hays, Homan and Benjamin J. Hays, jointly, do not extend to the entire exclusion of Bangs, for they admit his right to participate, but insist that á greater sum is reported in his favor than he ought to be allowed ; that his allowance ought to be diminished and their own increased ; while as respects the defendant Maria Van Riper, that she is not entitled to any part. And the defendant Maria Van Riper excepts, on the ground of the smallness of the sum reported in her favor, insisting upon her right to a much larger amount, in common with the defendant Mr. Bangs, alleging how the other defendants, from being public officers, were not entitled to any share or participation in the reward.

Hence none of the exceptions taken adversely to Henry Bangs entirely deny his right. They only go in diminution [97]*97©f his claim; while those taken by him extend to the whole ¡right as set up by the other parties. If, therefore, his ex•ceptions are found to be well taken, there will be an end of •the controversy: for it will follow, as a matter of course, that he is entitled to the whole of the fund.' And, consequently, in this stage of the case, the question is whether the •other claimants are entitled to any thing—and if so, to how much?

I shall first consider the joint claim of Jacob Hays, Benjamin J. Hays and Zebulon Homan. These persons were public officers attached to the police department. Their general duties, as such, are to arrest persons chargeable with of-fences of a criminal nature and to bring them before a magistrate for examination. They are also to search for stolen property, and, when discovered, to take possession thereof, with a view to its being restored to the righful owner. For their services in the discharge of such duties, they are entitled to a stated compensation ,or to certain fees allowed by law. It has been contended that public officers ought not to -be permitted to receive gratuitous rewards, because they are bound to a prompt and vigilant discharge of their duties, without the hope or expectation of being thus compensated; the policy of the law, which has in view the safety of the | .-community, is said to be against it; and self-interest, if they 1 -are allowed to participate in rewards as a remuneration for f services, will cause them to be indifferent and even remiss, | until prompted by what they, themselves, may deem a sufficiently liberal offer ; so that no active exertion will be made to arrest felons or to recover stolen property, without an incentive of this sort. There is considerable force in this argument; and some illustrations have been given which show how the practice of allowing public officers to participate in rewards may lead to abuse. Still, I am not prepared to say, they should be entirely excluded. Rewards are offered only when?! it is supposed the ordinary means of discovery and detection! would prove ineffectual. They are voluntary offerings and! adapted to what the party making the offer deems to be the t necessity and urgency of the occasion. The object is, to \ awaken public attention to the subject, excite vigilance, and call forth extraordinary individual efforts for the accomplish- i [98]*98ment of the end proposed to be gained. All who choose to engage in it are at liberty to do so ; and he who succeeds becomes entitled to the reward, upon the ground of his superior vigilance or sagacity or of his having .used greater exertions or encountered dangers which others were disinclined or not in a situation to hazard. When, therefore, we view the object of rewards, offered thus publicly, in their true light, a participation in their benefits or in the receipt of them cannot be considered wholly incompatible with the duties of public officers or against the policy of the law.

The case of Weaver v. Whitney, Hopk. 11. was widely different from the present; and the principles upon which it was decided do not apply. In Hatch v. Mann, 9. Wend. 262. there is a principle bearing more directly upon this subject. It was held that an officer whose duty it was to serve process might recover compensation over and above the fees allowed by law when, on a promise of reward, he uses extraordinary efforts beyond those which an officer is .strictly bound to make or whfclí*ceuld'legally be required ,of |him. -

y Then, since the law does not exclude public officers from extra rewards, I shall proceed to examine the merits of the 8claim made by these parties, through the facts and testimony in .the cause.

The City Bank had been entered by means of false keys and robbed of a large amount of bank notes and money. The directors advertised the same; and publicly offered a reward, in the first instance, of five thousand dollars, but which was increased in a few days afterwards to ten thousand dollars, “for the recovery of the property and a proportionate sum “ for any part.” On Monday, morning when it was first discovered the Bank had been robbed, one of the police magistrates and three of the officers of the police, being the persons before named, were sent for, and upon being informed .of the manner in which the robbery had been committed, the ((suspicions of the justice and officers were immediately fixed yupon Smith and Murray, the two persons who, it was eventually proved, were the perpetrators—indeed, Jacob Hays expressed a confident belief of their being the parties. He and Homan then proceeded to Smith’s dwelling-house in Divi[99]*99sion street, and searched it, but without discovering any trace of the stolen property. Smith was from home. The 1 1 2 same morning, Benjamin J. Hays was despatched to the south; and, in the afternoon", Homan set out eastward in search of the robbers. The bank advanced money to defray the expenses. In the mean time and during the week Jacob Hays appears to have continued the search in New-York. He called once or twice more at Smith’s house and inquired for him of his wife, who, either' couldn of or would not give any information as tq where he was ; and this officer’s efforts, whatever they were, did not lead to any discovery of the robbers or.of the property. While Benjamin J. Hays and Homan returned with no better suceéss.

During this time, suspicions were excited in the minds of Mr'. Bangs and his wife (and especially by the latter)' in relation to a stranger, calling himself Jones, who had come to their house as a boarder on the same Monday morning on which the robbery was known; and his conduct was closely observed by Mrs. Bangs. A variety' of circumstances transpired from' day to day, having a tendency to increase these suspicions; and, finally, on the following Saturday" evening, she became so thoroughly Convinced of hisbeing the bank robber, and that his trunks Contained the stolen property (and which, appearances indicated he was about to remove) that she insisted upon her husband’s taking measures to arrest him. Mr. Bangs accordingly determined to do so. He called upon one of his neighbours, a Mr. Hollingshead, to whom he had, the day before, communicated his suspicions, and inquired where he could get an- officer to- arrest Jones; whereupon Hollingshead went with him to Jacob Hays’ house and introduced him to the latter person. Mr.

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Bluebook (online)
2 Edw. Ch. 95, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/president-of-city-bank-v-bangs-nychanct-1833.