Prescott v. Bayer HealthCare Pharmaceuticals Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. California
DecidedApril 29, 2021
Docket5:20-cv-00102
StatusUnknown

This text of Prescott v. Bayer HealthCare Pharmaceuticals Inc. (Prescott v. Bayer HealthCare Pharmaceuticals Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Prescott v. Bayer HealthCare Pharmaceuticals Inc., (N.D. Cal. 2021).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9

10 STEVEN PRESCOTT, et al., Case No. 20-cv-00102-NC 11 Plaintiffs, ORDER DENYING WITHOUT 12 PREJUDICE MOTION FOR v. PRELIMINARY APPROVAL 13 BAYER HEALTHCARE LLC, et al., Re: Dkt. No. 81 14 Defendants. 15 16 17 Plaintiffs Mike Xavier and Steven Prescott (“Plaintiffs”) bring a putative class 18 action against Bayer Healthcare LLC and Beiersdorf, Inc. (“Defendants”). Defendants 19 manufacture, market, and sell Coppertone sunscreen products throughout the United 20 States. Plaintiffs allege that the “mineral-based” label on Defendants’ products deceive 21 consumers into believing they contain only mineral active ingredients when they contain 22 chemical active ingredients as well. See Dkt. No. 1. Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ motion 23 for preliminary approval of class action settlement. Dkt. No. 81 (“Mot.”). The Court held 24 a hearing on this motion on April 21, 2021. Having considered the Plaintiffs’ motion, the 25 arguments of counsel at the April 21, 2021, hearing, and the record in this case, the Court 26 DENIES without prejudice Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary approval of class action 27 settlement. 1 I. LEGAL STANDARD 2 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) provides that “[t]he claims, issues, or 3 defenses of a certified class . . . may be settled . . . only with the court’s approval.” Fed. R. 4 Civ. P. 23(e). “The purpose of Rule 23(e) is to protect the unnamed members of the class 5 from unjust or unfair settlements affecting their rights.” In re Syncor ERISA Litig., 516 6 F.3d 1095, 1100 (9th Cir. 2008). Accordingly, in order to approve a class action 7 settlement under Rule 23, a district court must conclude that the settlement is 8 “fundamentally fair, adequate, and reasonable.” Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 9 1026 (9th Cir. 1998) overruled on other grounds by Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 10 U.S. 338 (2011). In determining whether the proposed settlement meets this standard, the 11 Court does not have the ability “to delete, modify, or substitute certain provisions . . . The 12 settlement must stand or fall in its entirety.” Id. at 1026. 13 Where “the parties negotiate a settlement before the class has been certified, 14 settlement approval requires a higher standard of fairness and a more probing inquiry than 15 may normally be required under Rule 23(e).” Roes, 1–2 v. SFBSC Mgmt., LLC, 944 F.3d 16 1035, 1048 (9th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In such cases, 17 the Court must apply “an even higher level of scrutiny for evidence of collusion or other 18 conflicts of interest than is ordinarily required under Rule 23(e) before securing the court’s 19 approval as fair.” In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 946 (9th Cir. 20 2011). Signs of potential collusion include: 21 “(1) when counsel receive a disproportionate distribution of the settlement; 22 (2) when the parties negotiate a ‘clear sailing’ arrangement” (i.e., an 23 arrangement where defendant will not object to a certain fee request by class 24 counsel); and (3) when the parties create a reverter that returns unclaimed 25 fees to the defendant.” 26 Allen v. Bedolla, 787 F.3d 1218, 1224 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting In re Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 27 947) (internal quotations omitted). “The Court may grant preliminary approval of a 1 serious, informed, non-collusive negotiations; (2) has no obvious deficiencies; (3) does not 2 improperly grant preferential treatment to class representatives or segments of the class; 3 and (4) falls within the range of possible approval.” Harris v. Vector Mktg. Corp., No. 08- 4 cv-05198-EMC, 2011 WL 1627973, at *7 (N.D. Cal. 2011); In re Tableware Antitrust 5 Litig., 484 F. Supp. 2d 1079–80 (N.D. Cal. 2007). 6 II. DISCUSSION 7 The Court denies without prejudice the motion for preliminary approval of the class 8 action settlement for the following reasons: (1) the proposed release in the settlement 9 agreement is overbroad, (2) the parties lack an explanation regarding a non-collusive 10 relationship to the cy pres beneficiary, (3) the justification for the exceeding administrative 11 expenses and attorneys’ fees request is inadequate, (4) the parties’ proposed notice is 12 incomplete, and (5) the settlement fails to comply with Northern District procedural 13 guidance regarding claim forms. 14 A. The Proposed Release Is Overbroad 15 1. Release of Claims 16 The Court concludes that the release contained within the proposed settlement 17 agreement conflicts with Ninth Circuit precedent, which only allows release of claims 18 “where the released claim[s] [are] based on the identical factual predicate as that 19 underlying the claims in the settled class action.” Hesse v. Sprint Corp., 598 F.3d 581, 590 20 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotations and citation omitted); see also Chavez v. PVH Corp., 21 No. 13-cv-01797-LHK, 2015 WL 581382, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2015) (“District courts 22 in this Circuit have declined to approve settlement agreements where such agreements 23 would release claims based on different facts than those alleged in the litigation at issue.”). 24 Here, the releases contained in the settlement agreement contain sweeping language 25 and are not consistently reflected in the motion for preliminary approval or the proposed 26 order seeking final approval. Under the settlement agreement, “Released Claims” is 27 defined as claims arising out of, or “relat[ing] in any way to: (a) allegations, claims, or 1 including but not limited to, their performance as well as any advertising, labeling . . . of 2 any type whatsoever regarding such Products;” and “(c) all labels or packaging for the 3 Coppertone sunscreen products that conform to the terms of the Settlement.” Dkt. No. 81- 4 4 “Settlement Agr.” § 2.35 (emphasis added). In contrast, the proposed order for final 5 approval attached to the settlement agreement specifies that the claims to be released must 6 arise out of, or relate in any manner to “the purchase of Coppertone sunscreen products 7 that contain a ‘mineral-based’ label on or before [Notice Date].” Dkt. No. 81-4, Ex. D 8 (emphasis added). 9 In light of the sweeping language in the agreement itself, the settlement releases 10 claims that are not “based on the identical factual predicate as that underlying the claims in 11 the settled class action.” Hesse, 598 F.3d at 590. The parties must narrow the scope of the 12 release in the settlement agreement to be more specific about the claims being released to 13 specify that it only pertains to claims about the purchase of Coppertone sunscreen products 14 that contain a “mineral-based” label. 15 2. Release of Parties 16 Furthermore, under the settlement agreement, the released parties are defined as 17 “Defendants and each and all of their predecessors in interest, former, present and future 18 direct and indirect subsidiaries . . . successors . . . whether specifically named and whether 19 or not participating in the settlement by payment or otherwise.” Settlement Agr. § 2.36. 20 Similarly, the language of the release is too broad for class members to ascertain which 21 party is released from future claims.

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Prescott v. Bayer HealthCare Pharmaceuticals Inc., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/prescott-v-bayer-healthcare-pharmaceuticals-inc-cand-2021.