NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3217-19
PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH OF THE PALISADES, INC., a New Jersey religious corporation, EASTERN KOREAN PRESBYTERY, a New Jersey religious corporation, and THE ADMINISTRATIVE COMMISSION OF THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH OF THE PALISADES, INC.,
Plaintiffs-Respondents/ Cross-Appellants,
v.
ROBERT H. HWANG and JONG KIL JEUNG,
Defendants-Appellants/ Cross-Respondents. ________________________________
244 OLD TAPPAN ROAD, LLC,
Intervenor-Respondent. _________________________________
Argued November 9, 2021 – Decided November 29, 2021 Before Judges Haas and Mawla.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Bergen County, Docket No. C-000068-19.
Evan L. Goldman argued the cause for appellants/cross- respondents (Goldman Davis Krumholz & Dillon, PC, attorneys; Evan L. Goldman, Mark D. Ygarza, and Kristen Ragon, on the briefs).
Ellen O'Connell argued the cause for respondents/cross-appellants (Inglesino, Webster, Wyciskala & Taylor, LLC, attorneys; Ellen O'Connell, of counsel and on the briefs).
Graff Silverstein, LLP, attorneys for intervenor- respondent 244 Old Tappan Road, LLC, join in the brief of respondents/cross-appellants Presbyterian Church of the Palisades, Inc., Eastern Korean Presbytery, and The Administrative Commission of the Presbyterian Church of the Palisades, Inc.
PER CURIAM
Defendants Robert Hwang and Jong Kil Jeung appeal from the Chancery
Division's August 22, 2019 order granting summary judgment to plaintiffs
Presbyterian Church of the Palisades, Inc. (Church), Eastern Korean Presbytery
(EKP), and the Administrative Commission of the Presbyterian Church of the
Palisades in this dispute over the ownership of Church property located in Old
Tappan. The trial court determined that the Presbyterian Church USA
A-3217-19 2 (PC(USA)), as represented by the Administrative Commission and the EKP,
properly held title to the Church's property, and to the proceeds from the sale of
that property to intervenor Old Tappan Road LLC. Plaintiffs cross-appeal from
the court's March 11, 2020 order compelling them to escrow the sale proceeds
pending appeal.
Having considered the parties' respective arguments in light of the record
and the applicable law, we affirm the August 22, 2019 order, vacate the March
11, 2020 order, and remand to the trial court for the entry of an order directing
the release of the escrowed funds to plaintiffs.
I.
We begin by reciting the most salient facts. The Presbyterian
denomination is a hierarchical church. It consists, in descending order, of a
General Assembly, a Synod, a Presbytery, and the individual congregation,
represented by a Session. The Session is a group of seven "elders" elected by
the congregation which constitutes the governing body of the church.
Presbyteries have the authority over the sessions and congregations that fall
within each of their geographical mandates, including requiring compliance with
the General Assembly's Book of Order. The Synod is a regional entity that has
authority over the presbyteries. The General Assembly covers the entire United
A-3217-19 3 States and has authority over the synods and presbyteries. The PC(USA) is
considered the General Assembly.
Hyon Kim, Executive Presbytery of the EKP, stated in a certification that
the EKP is a New Jersey religious corporation affiliated with the PC(USA). It
is the governing body of the Korean-speaking PC(USA) churches in the
metropolitan New York area.
The Book of Order is the Constitution of the PC(USA) and governs the
temporal and spiritual affairs of all the governing bodies. As to real property,
the Book of Order provides:
The provisions of this Constitution prescribing the manner in which decisions are made, reviewed, and corrected within this church are applicable to all matters pertaining to property.
All property held by or for a congregation, a presbytery, a synod, the General Assembly, or the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) . . . is held in trust nevertheless for the use and benefit of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.).
....
A congregation shall not sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber any of its real property and it shall not acquire real property subject to an encumbrance or condition without the written permission of the presbytery transmitted through the session of the congregation.
A-3217-19 4 A congregation shall not lease its real property used for purposes of worship, or lease for more than five years any of its other real property, without the written permission of the presbytery transmitted through the session of the congregation. [(subsection headings omitted).]
The Church was formed in March 1984, and incorporated in May 1984, as
amended in February 1993. Its articles of incorporation, as contained in the
record, do not state anything regarding the holding and disposition of real
property. The Church's property was held in trust by a corporation, the
Presbyterian Church of the Palisades, Inc., formed under Title 16, specifically,
N.J.S.A 16:11-1 to -24. The Church was originally organized as part of the
Korean Presbyterian Church in America.
In 1991, the Church purchased three acres of property in Old Tappan for
$750,000 on which the church sanctuary was constructed. Construction of the
church cost $4 million. The Church purchased an additional five acres of nearby
property for $1,050,000 in April 2000. In December 2004, the Church took out
a $3.2 million mortgage on the property of the constructed church from Valley
National Bank.
In March 2006, the Church voted to affiliate with the PC(U.S.) and it
thereafter belonged to the EKP. The Church's Bylaws, adopted on August 26,
2007, said nothing about the Church property beyond authorizing the board of
A-3217-19 5 trustees to decide on matters involving the acquisition and disposal of property.
The bylaws further stated that all matters not specified in this bylaw follow the
Book of Order of the PC(USA).
In June 2016, the Church defaulted on the Valley National Bank mortgage
loan. The bank subsequently obtained a judgment of foreclosure and writ of
execution. The outstanding mortgage, plus interest and penalties, was
approximately $2.7 million. On July 17, 2017, the Church applied for a $2.5
million loan from PC(USA). In December 2017, intervenor purchased the
judgment of foreclosure and writ of execution.
At a meeting on January 22, 2018, the EKP approved a resolution
permitting it to assume jurisdiction over the Church's Session through the
appointment of an Administrative Commission. In support, the resolution cited
the fact that there was only one Session member instead of seven, the Church's
financial situation, and alleged misconduct in the handling of the mortgage on
the property. The Administrative Commission was authorized to be the sole
authority to manage the Church's affairs and assets, including real estat e and
bank accounts.
According to Kim, on December 16, 2018, he and the chair of the
Administrative Commission, Hu Nam-Nam, attempted to enter the Church
A-3217-19 6 property but defendants physically prevented them from accessing it.
Subsequently, the Administrative Commission warned defendants not to enter
Church grounds, but defendants continued to do so, resulting in "unpleasant
confrontations during a meeting of the congregation." Nam-Nam stated that as
a result of defendants' behavior, he brought disciplinary charges against them,
which resulted in defendants' dismissal from both Church membership and the
PC(USA). Defendants nonetheless held a board of trustees meeting, with just
the two of them present. Because of what Kim described as this "fraudulent"
meeting, the Church's account at Bank of America was frozen.
In March 2019, defendants filed a bankruptcy petition on the Church's
behalf in an effort to save the Church's assets and, according to defendant Jeung,
due to a very steep decline in membership revenue. The bankruptcy action was
ultimately dismissed. On September 12, 2019, intervenor purchased the Church
property.
Defendant Hwang claimed in his certification that the majority of the
seventy members of the Church did not want the EKP to make decisions
affecting the Church's finances, and no longer wanted to be affiliated with the
PC(USA). Hwang further alleged that the Church did not seek the PC(USA)'s
A-3217-19 7 approval when it entered into negotiations for the sale of the five-acre parcel in
August 2017. The sale was not consummated.
In addition, according to Hwang, the Church permitted a Korean language
school and an adult education program to operate at the site, without the Church
seeking approval from the PC(USA). The Church also rented its site for choir
performances, weddings and funerals without the PC(USA)'s approval. In
addition, it rented space to an unaffiliated church to conduct services without
approval. The Church also did not seek approval for fundraisers it held and
donations it made.
On March 13, 2019, plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Chancery Division
seeking a judgment declaring that the minutes of the annual meeting of the
Church were fraudulent, that defendants had no right to represent that they were
trustees, directors, officers, or agents of the Church, and that the Administrative
Commission was the sole legal representative of the Church. In addition,
plaintiffs alleged fraud, trespass, attempted conversion, tortious interference
with contractual relations, and civil conspiracy.
On the same date, the trial court issued an order to show cause restraining
defendants from representing that they were trustees, directors, officers, or
agents of the Church, and from entering Church property and contacting
A-3217-19 8 members of the Administrative Commission. On April 29, 2019, the court
declared that the members of the Administrative Commission were the sole
individuals authorized to serve as signatories for all Church accounts.
As part of their May 9, 2019 answer, defendants filed what they called a
"third-party complaint" 1 seeking a judgment declaring that the Church was the
sole owner of the real property and the bank accounts in dispute, and
disassociating the Church from the EKP and the PC(USA).
The parties thereafter filed cross-motions for summary judgment.
Following oral argument, the trial court entered an order declaring that the
Administrative Commission was the sole authority for purposes of the
ownership and control of Church property, both real and personal, and
dismissing defendant's third-party complaint for failure to state a claim.
To place the Chancery Division's decision in context, we briefly
summarize the law concerning a court's consideration of intra-church disputes.
"To ensure that judicial adjudications are confined to their proper civil sphere,
the United States Supreme Court has developed two approaches to church
disputes: the deference rule and the rule of 'neutral principles.'" Solid Rock
1 Because defendants only named plaintiffs as defendants in this "third -party complaint," it appears they intended to file a counterclaim for the declaratory relief they sought in the pleading. A-3217-19 9 Baptist Church v. Carlton, 347 N.J. Super. 180, 191 (App. Div. 2002) (citing
Maryland & Virginia Eldership v. Church of God of Sharpsburg, 396 U.S. 367,
367-68 (1970); Kleppinger v. Anglican Cath. Church, 314 N.J. Super. 613, 621-
22 (Ch. Div. 1998)).
When applying the deference rule, a court must "accept the authority of a
recognized religious body in resolving a particular doctrinal question." Elmora
Hebrew Ctr., Inc. v. Fishman, 125 N.J. 404, 414 (1991). In disputes involving
a church with a hierarchical structure, a court "must defer to the authoritative
ruling of the highest church authority in the hierarchy to have considered the
religious question at issue." Solid Rock Baptist Church, 347 N.J. Super. at 192
(citations omitted). In resolving disputes within a congregational, rather than
hierarchical, church, a court "should defer to resolutions by a majority (or other
appropriate subgroup) of the church's governing body." Elmora Hebrew Ctr.,
125 N.J. at 414 (citing Chavis v. Rowe, 93 N.J. 103, 108 (1983)).
A "neutral principles" approach may be applied regardless of the
governing structure of a particular church. Solid Rock Baptist Church, 347 N.J.
Super. at 192. Under this approach, a court applies neutral principles of law to
"disputed questions not implicating religious doctrine or practice" and
"examin[es] and interpret[s] . . . church documents such as deeds, constitutions,
A-3217-19 10 by-laws, and the like in accordance with wholly secular legal rules whose
applications do not entail theological or doctrinal evaluations." Ibid. (citations
omitted).
Analyzing the intra-church property dispute question presented in this
case under the deference approach, the trial court concluded:
In establishing the Administrative Commission and granting it original jurisdiction of the Session, the Presbytery acted under the denomination's rules of polity and review of the decision on [sic] Presbytery are outside the jurisdiction of this court. The Court must also defer to the decision of the Presbytery establishing the Administrative Commission and giving the Commissioners the authority to control the assets of Palisades Church. Thus, the precedents require deference to the Presbytery's decisions concerning polity and the Trust Clause.
Applying the neutral principles of law approach, the trial court found the
Church's voluntary affiliation with PC(USA) in 2006 to be significant,
particularly the provision in the Church's Bylaws adopting the Book of Order
and its trust clause. The Church thereby agreed that its property and assets were
held in trust for the Presbytery. The court also held that the Church was
governed by Title 16 which, under N.J.S.A. 16:11-4, requires that Church
property be used only for the purposes set forth by the PC(USA).
A-3217-19 11 In addition, the trial court rejected defendants' argument that the
Administrative Commission's actions conflicted with the will of the Church
congregation because deciding the "will" of a congregation would violate the
First Amendment under a neutral principles analysis. The court further found
there was not "even a scintilla of evidence . . . indicating [d]efendants' clear and
unambiguous desire to remain an independent congregation when they joined
[PC(USA).]"
Thereafter, the trial court granted Old Tappan Road's motion to intervene
in the matter. After this court dismissed defendants' premature notice of appeal
as interlocutory, the court dismissed the remaining counts of plaintiffs'
complaint on March 11, 2020. On that same date, the court granted defendants'
motion to require that plaintiffs escrow the proceeds of the sale of the Church
property pending appeal. This appeal and cross-appeal followed.
II.
In Point I of their brief, defendants contend that the trial court should not
have used the deferential approach to the intra-church dispute, and that it
incorrectly applied the neutral principles of law approach in granting plaintiffs'
motion for summary judgment and determining that the Church did not lawfully
own the property. In Point II, defendants argue that the Church's
A-3217-19 12 acknowledgment of the Book of Order related solely to spiritual matters and not
to Church property.
Our review of a trial court's grant of summary judgment is de novo,
applying the same legal standard as the trial court. RSI Bank v. Providence Mut.
Fire Ins. Co., 234 N.J. 459, 472 (2018) (citing Bhagat v. Bhagat, 217 N.J. 22,
38 (2014)). Under that standard, summary judgment will be granted when "the
competent evidential materials submitted by the parties," viewed in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party, show that there are no "genuine issues
of material fact" and that "the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as
a matter of law." Grande v. Saint Clare's Health Sys., 230 N.J. 1, 24 (2017)
(quoting Bhagat, 217 N.J. at 38); see also R. 4:46-2(c).
"An issue of material fact is 'genuine only if, considering the burden of
persuasion at trial, the evidence submitted by the parties on the motion, together
with all legitimate inferences therefrom favoring the non-moving party, would
require submission of the issue to the trier of fact.'" Grande, 230 N.J. at 24
(quoting Bhagat, 217 N.J. at 38). We owe no special deference to the motion
judge's legal analysis. RSI Bank, 234 N.J. at 472 (citing Templo Fuente De Vida
Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 214 N.J. 189, 199 (2016)).
A-3217-19 13 Applying these standards, we are satisfied that the trial court correctly
applied both the deference and neutral principles of law approaches and held
that the Church property was owned by plaintiffs as set forth in the Book of
Order. As noted above, the Book of Order states:
All property held by or for a congregation, a presbytery, a synod, the General Assembly, or the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) . . . is held in trust nevertheless for the use and benefit of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.).
In the absence of an express trust provision, courts should defer to a
hierarchical church's determination of a church property dispute. Protestant
Episcopal Church v. Graves, 83 N.J. 572, 575 (1980). "[I]n a hierarchical
situation where there [is] a property dispute between a subordinate local parish
and the general church, civil courts must accept the authoritative ruling of the
higher authority within the hierarchy." Id. at 577. Where the resolution of a
church property dispute may be a consequence of an ecclesiastical
determination, courts "must accept that consequence as the incidental effect of
an ecclesiastical determination that is not subject to judicial abrogation, having
been reached by the final church judicatory in which authority to make the
decision resides." Id. at 578 (quoting Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v.
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 720 (1976)).
A-3217-19 14 As noted above, the Presbyterian Church is a hierarchical church. See
Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church,
393 U.S. 440, 446 n.5 (1969). Therefore, under the deference approach, courts
must accept the authoritative ruling of the higher authority within that hierarchy.
Accordingly, the determination of the EKP and the Administrative Commission,
as that higher authority, controls. Under these circumstances, we conclude, as
did the trial court, that the Church property was owned by the PC(USA).
Defendants argue that New Jersey has discarded the deference approach
in favor of the neutral principles of law approach, citing Scotts Afr. Union
Methodist Protestant Church v. Conf. of Afr. Union First Colored Methodist
Protestant Church, 98 F.3d 78, 92-94 (3rd Cir. 1996). In that case, the Third
Circuit found a "decided progression of New Jersey court decisions toward
adoption of a neutral-principles approach in resolving intra[-]church property
disputes . . . ." Id. at 94.
Contrary to defendants' contention, however, the New Jersey Supreme
Court has not discarded the deference approach in cases involving hierarchical
churches. Indeed, our Court has stated that "[o]nly where no hierarchical control
is involved[,] should the neutral principles of law principle be called into play."
Graves, 83 N.J. at 580. Nonetheless, the Elmora Court, 125 N.J. at 414,
A-3217-19 15 commented that "a court may, when appropriate, apply neutral principles of law
to determine disputed questions that do not implicate religious doctrine."
Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that while the New Jersey Supreme
Court may favor neutral principles of law, it has not abandoned the deference
approach entirely. In any event, an application of the neutral principles of law
approach clearly demonstrates that the trial court was correct in holding that the
Church's property was subject to the provisions in the Book of Order.
In Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 597 (1979), the United States Supreme
Court addressed the question of whether civil courts may address a dispute over
the ownership of church property without becoming entangled in religious
doctrine in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The case
involved a dispute between factions of a local Presbyterian church. Id. at 597-
98. Noting that the First Amendment severely circumscribes the role that civil
courts may play in resolving church property disputes, the Court nonetheless
held that application of "neutral principles of law" to resolve such disputes is
permissible. Id. at 602-03.
That method relies exclusively on secular, objective, and well-established
concepts of trust and property law familiar to lawyers and judges, thereby
avoiding entanglement in questions of religious doctrine, polity, and practice.
A-3217-19 16 Id. at 603. However, in undertaking such an examination, the civil court must
take special care to scrutinize the relevant documents in purely secular terms.
Id. at 604. Thus, where the corporate charter incorporates religious concepts in
the provisions relating to the ownership of property, if its interpretation would
require the civil court to resolve a religious controversy, the court must leave
resolution of that issue to the authoritative ecclesiastical body. Ibid.
In Kelly v. McIntire, 123 N.J. Eq. 351, 354 (Ch. 1938), a local
Presbyterian church declared its severance from the parent church and
repudiated the parent's authority. Members of the local church who remained
loyal to the parent church brought an action to prevent the local church from
using its property in a manner inconsistent with the rules and custom of the
parent church. Id. at 352-53. The court stated: "The principle seems to be
firmly established that a congregation belonging to a religious denomination and
subject to the constitution, faith and doctrines thereof cannot use its property for
a purpose other than that sanctioned by the denomination." Id. at 361. Thus,
the court found in favor of the members loyal to the parent church. Id. at 366.
In Scotts, 98 F.3d at 79-82, the national conference of the denomination
in question adopted a church property resolution as part of its bylaws whereb y
title to church property held by its affiliates was to be held in trust for the
A-3217-19 17 conference. The affiliated church in question had been incorporated some
seventy-five years prior to the adoption of the resolution and its certificate of
incorporation provided that the church's trustees could not dispose of any real
estate except by a two-thirds vote of its membership. Id. at 82. The Third
Circuit held that, under New Jersey law, the provisions of a church's charter or
articles of incorporation had priority over contradictory or inconsistent bylaws.
Id. at 95. Thus, the resolution regarding title to property could not ov erride the
certificate of incorporation's two-thirds vote requirement. Id. at 96.
Here, the Church was incorporated after the Book of Order had been
issued, and the Book of Order was in effect at the time of the Church's affiliation
with the PC(USA). Moreover, there is nothing in the Church's articles of
incorporation that specifically conflicts with the Book of Order as to the
Church's property, and its bylaws stated that it follows the provisions in the
Book of Order unless otherwise specified. No property exception was contained
in the bylaws. Thus, under the neutral principles of law approach, plaintiffs
clearly controlled the Church property.
In an attempt to avoid this result, defendants cite our recently unpublished
opinion2 in Wisseh v. Aquino, No. A-4767-18 (App. Div. Dec. 9, 2020) (slip op.
2 Unpublished opinions do not constitute binding precedent. R. 1:36-3. A-3217-19 18 at 2), which also involved a dispute over the control of property between a local
Presbyterian church and the PC(USA). In that case, we held that control of the
church property lay with the local church board based on a Royal Charter
granted to the church in 1753 that invested control of the property in the local
church. Id. at 20. Because the Royal Charter predated New Jersey statutory law
and was saved from repeal under N.J.S.A. 16:1-28, we held that its provisions
remained in effect and could not be altered by the Book of Order. Id. at 17-20.
The present case is clearly distinguishable from Wisseh. Here, the Church
was not created by a Royal Charter that predated the creation of a national
Presbyterian church or invested it with control of the Church's property. That
the Church was formed and acquired the subject property prior to affiliating with
the PC(USA) does not warrant application of the Wisseh holding. Defendants
do not cite to any precedent supporting the proposition that the Book of Order's
property provision does not apply to church property acquired prior to a local
church's affiliation with the PC(USA), absent a charter similar to Wisseh.
Defendants also seek to bring this case within the holding in Wisseh by
pointing to actions the Church took regarding its property without approval of
the higher levels of the denomination. These actions included the
unconsummated sale of the property, renting space, letting a school operate on
A-3217-19 19 the site, and holding weddings and other functions. However, we noted in
Wisseh that the local church in that case had been involved in property
transactions for over eighty years, including leasing property that was part of
the Prudential Center Arena complex Id. at 8-9. Thus, Wisseh is clearly
distinguishable from this case, where the Church's board of trustees did not
complete even one property transaction.
Defendants also rely on two other unpublished opinions, New St. John
Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc. v. Collier, No. A-689-04 (App. Div.
Feb. 9, 2006), and New St. John Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc. v.
Collier, No A-3372-06 (App. Div. June 9, 2008). However, in the former case,
the court merely held that a neutral principles of law analysis applied to the
intra-church dispute, while in the latter the court summarily found that
substantial credible evidence supported the trial court's determination that the
church conference's Book of Discipline did not create an implied trust of the
local church's property on behalf of the conference. Thus, neither case aids
defendants' argument.
Defendants next cite a pair of non-precedential Pennsylvania cases,
Presbytery of Donegal v. Calhoun, 513 A.2d 531 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986) and
Presbytery of Beaver-Butler v. Middlesex Presbyterian Church, 489 A.2d 1317
A-3217-19 20 (Pa. 1985). However, in Presbytery of Donegal, the local church had
disaffiliated from the national church prior to the appointment of an
Administrative Commission and the latter's effort to impress a trust on the local
church's property. 513 A.2d at 536. Therefore, that case is distinguishable.
The same distinguishing feature is present in Presbytery of Beaver-Butler.
In addition, in that case, the local church disaffiliated from the p arent church
prior to the amendment to the Book of Order with respect to affiliated churches.
489 A.2d at 1323-24.
Therefore, under a neutral principles of law analysis, as with the deference
approach, the Book of Order's provision that all property of an affiliated church
is to be held in trust for the use and benefit of the PC(USA) is controlling.
Accordingly, the trial court properly held that the PC(USA) was entitled to title
of the Church property.
III.
In Point III, defendants argue that the trial court erred in relying on Title
16, specifically N.J.S.A. 16:11-4, to support its holding that the Church property
could only be used for the purposes set forth in the PC(USA)'s Book of Order
because the statute does not apply to the PC(USA), does not apply because the
Church has an incorporated board of trustees, and does not apply because
A-3217-19 21 application of the statute would violate the neutral principles of law analysis.
These contentions lack merit.
N.J.S.A. 16:11-4 provides:
In the exercise of any power necessary to the proper care of the property held for the uses of the congregation, such corporation shall be subject to such authority over . . . the uses to which the church buildings and other properties may be put, as may be committed by the constitution of the United Presbyterian Church in the United States of America to the session of the church or to any other spiritual officers, and shall have no power to make by-laws or exercise any power with respect to matters so committed.
Initially, defendants claim that this statute does not apply because it refers
to the United Presbyterian Church in the United States of America rather than
the PC(USA). See N.J.S.A. 16:11-1. Because the former church no longer
exists as a result of a 1983 merger, defendants contend that N.J.S.A. 16:11-4 is
not relevant to the current dispute.
Here, however, defendants elevate form over substance. The statutes in
Chapter 16 governing the Presbyterian denomination, N.J.S.A 16:11-1 to -24,
were intended to apply to the highest Presbyterian church in America that
encompassed New Jersey. Prior to 1983, that was the United Presbyterian
Church in the United States of America. After 1983, it was the PC(USA). To
A-3217-19 22 accept defendants' argument would result in the negation of N.J.S.A. 16:11-4.
A statute should not be interpreted so as to render any portion of it a nullity.
Smith v. Dir., Div. of Tax'n 108 N.J. 19, 27-28 (1987) (citing Peper v. Princeton
Univ. Bd. of Trs., 77 N.J. 55, 68 (1978)). Therefore, we reject defendants'
contention.
Defendants next argue that Chapter 11 of Title 16 does not apply to the
Church because it has an incorporated board of trustees. Again, we disagree.
N.J.S.A. 16:11-1 prescribes the manner in which a congregation affiliated
with the Presbyterian Church, not having an incorporated board of trustees,
"may elect and incorporate a board of trustees . . . ." It does not state that Chapter
11 only applies to Presbyterian churches without an incorporated board of
trustees. Thus, N.J.S.A. 16:11-6 provides for the succession of trustees of a
church that has an incorporated board, and N.J.S.A. 16:11-7 permits a change in
the number of trustees. Therefore, defendants' argument lacks merit.
Finally on this point, defendants claim that application of Title 16 would
violate the neutral principles of law analysis. However, they offer no support
for the proposition that applying statutes specifically addressed to a
denomination violates those principles. To the contrary, our courts have
consistently held that resort to state statutes to determine ownership of church
A-3217-19 23 property is consistent with the neutral principles of law approach. See, e.g.,
Graves, 83 N.J. at 578; Odatalla v. Odatalla, 355 N.J. Super. 305, 310 (Ch. Div.
2002).
Therefore, we affirm the Chancery Division's August 22, 2019 order.
IV.
In their cross-appeal, plaintiffs contend that in the event of an affirmance
of the trial court's August 22, 2019, the March 11, 2020 order escrowing the
funds from the sale of the property should be vacated, and the funds released to
them. We agree.
Because we have affirmed the trial court's order granting summary
judgment to plaintiffs, we vacate the March 11, 2020 order and remand the
matter to the trial court for the prompt entry of an order directing the release of
the escrowed funds to plaintiffs.
Affirmed in part; vacated in part; and remanded. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
A-3217-19 24