Premium Financing Specialists, Inc. v. Hullin

90 S.W.3d 110, 2002 Mo. App. LEXIS 1806, 2002 WL 2001550
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals
DecidedSeptember 3, 2002
DocketWD 60708
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 90 S.W.3d 110 (Premium Financing Specialists, Inc. v. Hullin) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Missouri Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Premium Financing Specialists, Inc. v. Hullin, 90 S.W.3d 110, 2002 Mo. App. LEXIS 1806, 2002 WL 2001550 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002).

Opinion

PAUL M. SPINDEN, Judge.

Premium Financing Specialists, Inc., sued Cougar Enterprises, Inc., and Cougar’s two officers for misrepresentation, conversion, and “money had and received” 1 to recover money that one of the officers swindled from PFS. One of the officers, President Corwyn Kristie defaulted on the action, and PFS dismissed its action against the other officer, Secretary-Treasurer Robert Hullin. This appeal deals only with Cougar’s liability to PFS.

The circuit court rendered judgment for Cougar on all three counts. PFS appeals only on its misrepresentation and “money had and received” counts and not on its conversion count. PFS asserts that Cougar was vicariously hable for Kristie’s misdeeds. We agree that the circuit court erred in rendering judgment for Cougar for misrepresentation and, therefore, reverse the circuit court’s judgment.

This dispute arose after PFS discovered that Kristie submitted a false loan application to it on behalf of TCAA, a nonexistent entity. PFS had provided loans to Cougar’s insurance clients for many years so the clients could finance their insurance purchases. PFS agreed to lend $41,120 to TCAA so it could purchase insurance through Cougar, a Nevada insurance agency. Kristie fabricated the scheme to obtain the money for his own use. He took advantage of Cougar’s longstanding, trusting relationship with PFS in which Cougar had acted as a liaison between its clients and PFS.

PFS deemed Cougar to be a “good agent” with a “good history,” so it provided Cougar with blank finance agreements and bank drafts. Cougar typically submitted the agreements to PFS on which Cougar’s agent signed, along with the insured, representing that the information set out was correct and that the insured’s signature was genuine. When PFS approved the agreement, it typically paid the loan proceeds directly to Cougar, and Cougar forwarded the funds to the insurer. During 1997, 1998, and 1999, Cougar submitted 154 premium finance agreements to PFS, and PFS loaned $905,000 to Cougar’s customers.

In reviewing the circuit court’s judgment for Cougar, we must affirm it unless it is not supported by substantial evidence or it is against the weight of the evidence or erroneously declares or applies the law. Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. *113 banc 1976). In conducting our review, we must view the evidence in a light most favorable to Cougar, the prevailing party. Ewing-Cage v. Quality Productions, Inc., 18 S.W.3d 147,149-50 (Mo.App.2000).

PFS argues that Cougar was liable vicariously for Kristie’s tortious conduct because Kristie acted with authority apparently conferred by Cougar. 2 Cougar does not deny that Kristie was its agent. A principal is hable vicariously for his agent’s acts if the principal manifests his consent to, or knowingly permits, the agent’s exercise of authority, and if the third party believed, with a reasonable, good faith basis for doing so, that the agent had authority and relied on the agent’s apparently having authority to act. The third party also must show that not holding the principal liable for the agent’s acts. Hefner v. Dausmann, 996 S.W.2d 660, 667 (Mo.App.1999).

Cougar responds that it was not liable for Kristie’s acts because he acted wholly out of personal motive and with the purpose of defrauding PFS and Cougar. Cougar accurately portrays Kristie’s motives, but, in this action seeking to impute liability for the fraudulent acts of an agent acting within his apparent authority, Kristie’s motives are of no consequence. 3 When a principal cloaks his agent with apparent authority, the principal can be vicariously liable to wronged third parties even when the agent acts wholly out of personal mo-five or with the purpose of defrauding his principal and even when the principal is innocent and deprived of any benefit. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 249, cmt. a (“principal may be hable for the acts of ... an apparent servant who acts wholly for his own purposes”), § 257, cmt. d (principal liable “although the agent [acts] from a motive other than that of serving the principal, or acts with a purpose of defrauding him”), § 261, cmt. a (“principal is subject to liability ... although he is entirely innocent, has received no benefit from the transaction, and ... although the agent acted solely for his own purposes”), and § 265, cmt. a (“motive of the apparent agent is immaterial unless known”) (1957).

Indeed, our supreme court declared long ago, “A corporation is hable for a fraud perpetrated on a third person by its agent within the apparent scope of his authority or the course of his employment even where the wrongful acts are ultra vires or in fraud of the corporation itself, and despite the fact that the corporation did not authorize, concur in, or know of, the fraud.” State on Inf. Taylor v. American Insurance Company, 355 Mo. 1053, 200 S.W.2d 1, 40 (banc 1946). See also 37 Am.JuR.2d Fraud and Deceit § 311 (“principal may be responsible for his or her agent’s fraud or misrepresentation even though he or she may have personahy received no benefits therefrom, and it is of no consequence that the agent acts entire *114 ly for his or her own purposes and commits a fraud solely for his or her own benefit, if it is within the actual or apparent scope of his employment”), and § 316 (“corporation is not relieved from liability for the fraudulent acts of its officer within the apparent scope of his or her authority by the fact that the officer, in committing the fraud, is acting for his or her own benefit and the fact that the corporation does not profit by it”) (2001). The Supreme Court has also explained:

“There is a wide distinction to be drawn between the authority of an agent to commit a fraudulent act, and his authority to transact the business in the course of which the fraudulent act is committed. * * * Tested by reference to the intention of the principal, neither negligence nor fraud is within the ‘scope of the agency; ’ but tested by the connection of the act with the property and business of the agency, fraud in taking the very property is as much “within the scope of the agency’ as negligence in allowing others to take it. The proper inquiry is, whether the act was done in the course of the agency and by virtue of the authority as agent. If it was, then the principal is responsible, whether the act was merely negligent or fraudulent.”

Tietjens v. General Motors Coloration, 418 S.W.2d 75, 84 (Mo.1967) (quoting Globe Indemnity Company v. First National Bank in St. Louis, 133 S.W.2d 1066, 1071 (Mo.App.1939)).

Cougar granted Kristie authority to act on its behalf.

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90 S.W.3d 110, 2002 Mo. App. LEXIS 1806, 2002 WL 2001550, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/premium-financing-specialists-inc-v-hullin-moctapp-2002.