Precon Development Corp. v. United States Army Corps of Engineers

603 F. App'x 149
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
DecidedMarch 10, 2015
Docket13-2499
StatusUnpublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 603 F. App'x 149 (Precon Development Corp. v. United States Army Corps of Engineers) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Precon Development Corp. v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 603 F. App'x 149 (4th Cir. 2015).

Opinion

Affirmed by unpublished opinion, Judge DIAZ wrote the opinion, in which Judge SHEDD and Judge FLOYD joined.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

DIAZ, Circuit Judge:

This appeal is the latest installment in a thirteen-year battle between Precon Development Corporation and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers about whether the Corps has jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act over Precon’s Edinburgh development 1 in Chesapeake, Virginia. This episode involves 4.8 acres of wetlands that Precon wants to fill to build ten homes. The Corps asserted jurisdiction over these wetlands and denied Precon’s permit application. 2 We previously remanded this case after concluding that the Corps had not provided sufficient evidence to support its jurisdiction. Finding that the Corps has now amassed adequate evidence, we affirm.

I.

Our opinion in Precon Development Corp. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Precon I), 633 F.3d 278 (4th Cir.2011), provides a detailed account of the law and facts of this case. We briefly recap here only what is necessary to resolve the current appeal.

In Precon I, we found that the applicable law for evaluating the Corps’ assertion of jurisdiction over Precon’s wetlands was the significant nexus test from Justice Kennedy’s opinion concurring in the judgment in Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 126 S.Ct. 2208, 165 L.Ed.2d 159 (2006). 3 When wetlands, such as Precon’s, are adjacent to tributaries of traditional navigable waters, the Corps must make a case-specific showing that a “ ‘significant nexus’ exists ‘between the wetlands in question and navigable waters in the traditional sense.’ ” Precon I, 633 F.3d at 288 (quoting Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 779, 782, 126 S.Ct. 2208 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment)). A significant nexus exists when “the wetlands, either alone or in combination with similarly situated lands *151 in the region, significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of’ traditional navigable waters. Id. at 289 (quoting Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 780, 126 S.Ct. 2208). No significant nexus exists when the “wetlands’ effects on water quality [of traditional navigable waters] are speculative or insubstantial.” Id. (quoting Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 780, 126 S.Ct. 2208).

Here, the relevant geographic region encompasses 448 acres of similarly situated wetlands, including Precon’s 4.8 acres. We previously upheld this aggregation. Id. at 293. The relevant traditional navigable water is the Northwest River. The path from the wetlands to the river is as follows: Precon’s 4.8 acres are adjacent to a 2,500-foot long man-made drainage ditch. The 2,500-foot Ditch connects to the Saint Brides Ditch. 4 About three miles downstream, the Saint Brides Ditch joins another tributary. Together, these tributaries form a channel that flows into the Northwest River. The distance from the 4.8 acres to the Northwest River is about seven miles. 5

During our first review of this case, we found that the Corps adequately established a nexus between the 448-acre wetlands and the Northwest River. Id. at 295 & n. 14. But we nonetheless remanded because the Corps’ administrative record lacked evidence of significance. Id. at 295.

We identified two deficiencies in the administrative record. First, while the record contained evidence of water storage capacity and potential flow rates, it lacked any that although the record showed that “the wetlands and their adjacent tributaries trap sediment and nitrogen and perform flood control functions,” the record was silent on whether “the Northwest River suffers from high levels of nitrogen or sedimentation, or it if is ever prone to flooding.” Id. at 295.

On remand, the Corps expanded its administrative record and again concluded that it had jurisdiction. Precon appealed this conclusion administratively and then to the district court. The district court granted the Corps’ motion for summary judgment, and Precon appealed.

We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment. Id. at 289. We also review de novo the Corps’ compliance with the significant nexus test, but apply Skidmore 6 deference to the extent that the Corps’ interpretation of the test is persuasive. Precon I, 633 F.3d at 289-90, 291, 296. We defer to the Corps’ factual findings unless they are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” Id. at 292 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)).

II.

Precon argues that the Corps’ administrative record still fails to show a significant nexus between the wetlands in question and the Northwest River. We disagree.

A.

Before evaluating the new evidence of significance, we begin with some general observations that inform our approach to this case. First, the significant nexus test is a “flexible ecological inquiry.” Id. at 294 (citing Rapanos, 457 U.S. at 799-80, *152 126 S.Ct. 2208). Quantitative or qualitative evidence may support the Corps’ jurisdiction. Id. at 294. Thus, we find unpersuasive Precon’s repeated argument that the Corps cannot meet its burden because the 448-acre wetlands make up a small percentage of the Northwest River watershed. As the Corps points out, this would destroy the Corps’ jurisdiction through “death by a thousand cuts.” Appellee’s Br. at 54.

Second, Precon relies heavily on the report of one of its experts, Dr. Lawrence B. Cahoon, in which he opined that none of the wetlands’ functions has a significant effect on the Northwest River. However, Dr. Cahoon framed significance as something approaching statistical significance. This sets the bar too high, as purely qualitative evidence may satisfy the significant nexus test.

Third, although we evaluate the functions of the wetlands individually, the ultimate inquiry is whether the collective effect of these functions is significant. In Precon I, we approved of the Corps’ holistic approach to its jurisdictional determinations.

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603 F. App'x 149, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/precon-development-corp-v-united-states-army-corps-of-engineers-ca4-2015.