Pratt v. State of Maine

Superior Court of Maine·Decided June 14, 2022·No. AROcr-21-30059·Unpublished

Opinion

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT AROOSTOOK, ss DOCKET NO. CR-21-30059

MEGGAN PRATT )

Petitioner )

)

)

)

vs ) DECISION )

)

)

STA TE OF MAINE )

Respondent )

INTRODUCTION

Pending before the court is Meggan Pratt's (hereafter "Petitioner") Petition for Post­ Conviction Review. Hearing on the petition was held on April 8, 2022. Testimony was received from Attorney Richard Rhoda and Attorney Jeremy Pratt. The court admitted Petitioner's Exhibits PXI through PX12 into evidence, without objection. The record also includes, and the court has considered, the docket sheets and file contents of the underlying criminal charge, the transcript of trial proceedings, and the appellate decision at State v. Pratt, 2020 ME 141. The parties were permitted to file post-hearing briefs in accordance with M.R.Un.Crim.P. 73(c). After consideration of the record presented and the arguments of counsel, the court finds and orders as follows:

ISSUES IDENTIFIED

By complaint dated June 12, 2019, Petitioner was charged with having committed on or about May 25, 2019 the offense of domestic violence assault against "MP". A jury trial was held on November 15, 2019. The evidence at trial reflected that MP was the child of Petitioner.

Petitioner raised the issue of self-defense during the trial. The jury was instructed on the elements of self-defense. The jury returned a verdict of guilty to domestic violence assault, and Petitioner was sentenced to 60 days with all of that time suspended and probation for a period of 1 year, along with a $300.00 fine.

In her initial petition dated January 26, 2021, Petitioner alleges ineffective assistance of counsel in that counsel failed to investigate the case, prepare her to testify at trial, did not understand applicable law, and did not make appropriate objections. By way of her amended petition dated May 3, 2021, Petitioner alleges that her counsel failed to provide effective assistance by: a) opening the door to testimony and argument about Petitioner's parenting; b) failing to object or seek redress for the prosecutorial misconduct; and c) neglecting to call MP's eye doctor and the woman who helped MP select eyeglasses as witnesses.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel raised on post-conviction review are governed by the two-part test outlined in Stricklandv. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Applying that test, a petitioner bears the burden, at the post-conviction trial, of proving the following: (1) counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) the deficient representation resulted in prejudice. Philbrook v. State, 2017 ME 162, ,r 6. The second prong of the test is also described as whether errors of counsel actually had an adverse effect on the defense. Fahnley v. State, 2018 ME 92, ,r17; Hodgdon v. State, 2021 ME 22, ,rI I.

As to the first prong of the test, counsel's representation falls below the objective standard of reasonableness if it falls below what might be expected from an ordinary fallible attorney. "Judicial inquiry into the effectiveness of representation is 'highly deferential.' ... 1[AJ court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable

professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.u' Watson v. State, 2020 ME 51, P20, 230 A.3d 6, 12 (Quoting, Middleton v. State, 2015 ME 164, if 13, 129 A.3d 962 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689)). The court is mindful that trials play out in real time and the post-conviction court "must make every effort to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight." Philbrook v. State, 2017 ME 162, ,r 6.

In order to prove that counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient,

a defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of 11

reasonableness. The question is whether the counsel's performance fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance that a competent criminal defense counsel could provide under prevailing professional norms. The Strickland test compels us to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time." (Internal citations and punctuation omitted.)

Meggans v. State ofMaine, 2014 ME 125, if23,103 A.3d 1031,1039 (Emphasis added).

As to the second part of the Strickland test, "to establish prejudice-that counsel's e1Tors had an adverse effect on the defense-a petitioner 'must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result ofthe proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.' Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; see Watson, 2020 ME 51, ,r 29, 230 A.3d 6." Hodgdon v. State, 2021 ME 22, Pl2, 249 A.3d 132, 136.

DISCUSSION

Petitioner advances two challenges to trial counsel's conduct that she contends fall below an objective standard of reasonableness: (1) raising a parental-discipline justification defense and (2) failing to object to three instances of prosecutorial misconduct. Regarding the other matters raised in her pleadings, Petitioner has failed to produce any credible evidence or develop any

argument related thereto. Therefore, the court will address each challenge advanced by the Petitioner in turn.

Parental-discipline Justification A defendant's choice of whether or not to testify rests solely with the defendant. A defendant does not have to make that decision until the State has rested. Accordingly, although trial counsel may have a belief as to whether or not the defendant will testify at the outset of the trial, until the decision has finally been made by a defendant, there is no certainty. Even if there were a high probability of that decision in the mind of trial counsel, based upon representations by the defendant which was not shown here, there is still a level of uncertainty. As of the time of the opening statement in the Petitioner's trial, it was unknown for certain whether the defendant would testify.

In order to generate a defense for the jury's consideration, the court must dete1mine whether the evidence would have allowed the jury to find facts to make the defense a "reasonable hypothesis." State v. Gagnier, 2015 ME 115, P13, 123 A.3d 207,211 (Quoting, State v. Doyon, 1999 ME 185, P 7, 745 A.2d 365). Based upon the State's case in chief which consisted only of the testimony of MP, a defense of self-defense was not a reasonable hypothesis. See, Trial Transcript Page 42, Lines 16-20. However, based upon the testimony of MP, a defense of parental-discipline justification was a reasonable hypothesis. The genesis of the dispute between MP and Petitioner related to a haircut. MP exhibited a failure to comply with Petitioner's instructions in that regard and she was "crying because I knew I was going to get in trouble.... for telling my mother no." See, Trial Transcript Page 42, Lines 20-25.

Had the Petitioner elected not to testify, the only viable defense of the two presented during her opening statement would have been a defense based upon the parental-discipline justification.

A reasonable trial strategy might very well have been to focus on what the jury could have found to be insolent behavior of the child as well as the child's intentional disrespect of the Petitioner, based upon the child's testimony. See, Id.; Trial Transcript Page 32, Lines 8-17. Even after knowing she was going to be in trouble for her misbehavior, including talking back to her mother, the child dialed it up a notch by insulting her mother. See, Trial Transcript Page 32, Lines 16-17.

The jury could reasonably have found that the Petitioner's slap in response to the child's insult to ~-­

be for the purpose of exercising parental control related to the misbehavior. 1 Maine Jury

Instruction Manual§ 6-59 (2022).

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Related

Strickland v. Washington
466 U.S. 668 (Supreme Court, 1984)
State v. Doyon
1999 ME 185 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1999)
Daniel P. Roberts v. State of Maine
2014 ME 125 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2014)
State of Maine v. Christal N. Gagnier
2015 ME 115 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2015)
Mark J. Theriault v. State of Maine
2015 ME 137 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2015)
Jed R. Middleton v. State of Maine
2015 ME 164 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2015)
John Fahnley v. State of Maine
2018 ME 92 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2018)
Richard Watson v. State of Maine
2020 ME 51 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2020)
State of Maine v. Meggan M. Pratt
2020 ME 141 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2020)
Benjamin H. Hodgdon II v. State of Maine
2021 ME 22 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2021)
Philbrook v. State
2017 ME 162 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2017)