Pratt v. Commissioner of Social Security

• Court: District Court, N.D. New York
• Decided: March 3, 2025
• Docket: 3:23-cv-01621
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ________________________________________

CARL P.,

Plaintiff,

v. 3:23-CV-1621 (ML) COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant. ________________________________________

APPEARANCES: OF COUNSEL:

MEGGESTO, CROSSETT & VALERINO, LLP KIMBERLY SLIMBAUGH, ESQ. Counsel for the Plaintiff 511 East Fayette Street Syracuse, New York 13202

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION JASON PECK, ESQ. Counsel for the Defendant Special Assistant U.S. Attorney 6401 Security Boulevard Baltimore, Maryland 21235

MIROSLAV LOVRIC, United States Magistrate Judge

ORDER Currently pending before the Court in this action, in which Plaintiff seeks judicial review of an adverse administrative determination by the Commissioner of Social Security, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), are cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings.1 Oral argument was heard in connection with those motions on February 25, 2025, during a telephone conference

1 This matter, which is before me on consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), has been treated in accordance with the procedures set forth in General Order No. 18. Under that General Order once issue has been joined, an action such as this is considered procedurally, as if cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings had been filed pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. conducted on the record. At the close of argument, I issued a bench decision in which, after applying the requisite deferential review standard, I found that the Commissioner’s determination was not supported by substantial evidence, providing further detail regarding my reasoning and addressing the specific issues raised by Plaintiff in this appeal. After due deliberation, and based upon the Court’s oral bench decision, which has been transcribed, is attached to this order, and is incorporated herein by reference, it is ORDERED as follows: 1) Plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. No. 8) is GRANTED. 2) Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. No. 12) is DENIED. 3) The Commissioner’s decision denying Plaintiff Social Security benefits is REVERSED. 4) This matter is REMANDED to the Commissioner, without a directed finding of disability, for further administrative proceedings consistent with this opinion and the oral bench decision, pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 5) The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to enter judgment, based upon this determination, REMANDING this matter to the Commissioner for further administrative proceedings consistent with this opinion and the oral bench decision, pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and closing this case. Dated: March 3, 2025 Binghamton, New York | > Miroslav Lovric United States Magistrate Judge Northern District of New York

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ---------------------------------------------------x CARL L. P., JR.,

vs. 3:23-CV-1621

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant. ---------------------------------------------------x Transcript of DECISION February 25, 2025 the HONORABLE MIROSLAV LOVRIC, Presiding

APPEARANCES (by telephone) For Plaintiff: MEGGESTO, CROSSETT & VALERINO, LLP 511 East Fayette Street Syracuse, NY 13202 BY: KIMBERLY A. SLIMBAUGH, ESQ.

For Defendant: SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION Office of the General Counsel 6401 Security Boulevard Baltimore, MD 21235 BY: JASON P. PECK, ESQ.

Eileen McDonough, RPR, CRR Official United States Court Reporter P.O. Box 7367 Syracuse, New York 13261 (315)234-8546 1 THE COURT: The Court is going to begin then by 2 issuing the following decision. 3 First, plaintiff has commenced this proceeding 4 pursuant to Title 42, United States Code, Section 405(g) to 5 challenge the adverse determination by the Commissioner of 6 Social Security finding that he was not disabled at the 7 relevant times and therefore ineligible for the benefits that 8 he sought. 9 By way of background, the Court states the 10 following. 11 Plaintiff was born in 1969. He is currently 12 approximately 55 years of age. He was approximately 52 years 13 old on the date of this application for benefits. At the 14 time of his administrative hearing on November 16, 2022, 15 plaintiff lived with his 14-year-old son. Plaintiff stands 16 approximately 5 feet, 11 inches in height and weighs 17 approximately 270 pounds. Plaintiff is a high school 18 graduate who attended regular education classes. 19 Between 1986 and 2021, plaintiff worked for various 20 companies in the sprinkler fitting industry. The work 21 required lifting and carrying pipes ranging from 15 pounds up 22 to 200 pounds, with a significant amount of overhead 23 reaching. Over the course of his career, plaintiff suffered 24 a number of neck and back injuries, including a fall from a 25 ladder in the year 2000. Plaintiff testified that the 1 physical functional limitations imposed by his chronic neck, 2 back and hip pain as well as carpal tunnel syndrome forced 3 him to stop working in April of 2021. 4 Procedurally the Court states the following. 5 The plaintiff applied for Title II benefits on 6 October 20, 2021, alleging an onset date of April 1 of 2021. 7 In support of his application for benefits, plaintiff claims 8 disability based on a number of physical impairments 9 including neck pain that radiates into his shoulder and 10 chest; carpal tunnel syndrome that impedes the use of his 11 hands; as well as back and hip pain that is aggravated by 12 walking, bending and twisting. 13 Administrative Law Judge Kenneth Theurer conducted 14 a hearing on November 16, 2022 to address plaintiff's 15 application for benefits. ALJ Theurer issued an unfavorable 16 decision on December 1 of 2022. That decision became the 17 final determination of the agency on November 2nd, 2023, when 18 the Appeals Council denied plaintiff's request for review. 19 This civil action was commenced on December 26, 20 2023 and it is timely. In his December 1, 2022 decision at 21 issue in this case, the ALJ first determined that plaintiff 22 met the insured status requirements of the Social Security 23 Act through December 31, 2025, and then the ALJ commenced the 24 familiar five-step test for determining disability. 25 At step one, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff had 1 not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged 2 onset date of April 1 of 2021. 3 At step two, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff had 4 the following severe impairments, those being cervical spine 5 degenerative disc disease, lumbar spine degenerative disc 6 disease, bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, and a left hip 7 disorder. 8 At step three, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff did 9 not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met 10 or medically equaled the severity of any listed impairments. 11 In making this determination, the ALJ expressly considered 12 the following listings: Listing 1.15 dealing with disorders 13 of the skeletal spine, and listing 1.18 dealing with an 14 abnormality of a major joint. 15 Next, the ALJ determined that plaintiff has the 16 residual functional capacity, also referred to as RFC, to 17 perform less than the full range of light work. 18 Specifically, the ALJ found that plaintiff can occasionally 19 lift and carry 20 pounds; frequently lift and carry 20 10 pounds; sit for up to six hours; and stand or walk for 21 approximately six hours in an eight-hour workday with normal 22 breaks. 23 The ALJ further found that plaintiff can 24 occasionally climb ramps or stairs and can never climb 25 ladders, ropes or scaffolds. The ALJ found that plaintiff 1 can perform occasional balancing, stooping, kneeling and 2 crouching but can perform no crawling. The ALJ also found 3 plaintiff should avoid overhead reaching; can have no more 4 than frequent handling or fingering bilaterally; and should 5 avoid work that requires rapid, repetitive flexion, extension 6 or rotation of the cervical spine. 7 At step four, the ALJ relied on the vocational 8 expert testimony to determine that plaintiff is unable to 9 perform any past relevant work. Again relying on the 10 vocational expert testimony, the ALJ found that, considering 11 plaintiff's age, education, work experience, and RFC, the ALJ 12 concluded that there were jobs existing in significant 13 numbers in the national economy that plaintiff can perform. 14 Accordingly, the ALJ found that plaintiff was not 15 disabled from his alleged onset date of April 1, 2021 through 16 the date of the ALJ's decision. 17 The Court now turns to the plaintiff's arguments. 18 First I begin by indicating, as you know, this Court's 19 functional role in this case is limited and extremely 20 deferential. The Court must determine whether correct legal 21 principles were applied and whether the determination is 22 supported by substantial evidence, which is defined as such 23 relevant evidence as a reasonable mind would find sufficient 24 to support a conclusion. As the Second Circuit noted in 25 Brault v. Social Security Administration Commissioner, found 1 at 683 F.3d 443, a 2012 case, the circuit therein indicated 2 this standard is demanding, more so than the clearly 3 erroneous standard. The Court in Brault also noted that once 4 there is a finding of fact, that fact can be rejected only if 5 a reasonable factfinder would have to conclude otherwise. 6 Now, the plaintiff raises primarily three 7 contentions in this proceeding. 8 First, plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in 9 determining that plaintiff should, quote, "avoid work that 10 would require rapid, repetitive flexion, extension, or 11 rotation of the cervical spine," because such specific and 12 narrow findings are not supported by any record evidence. 13 Secondly, the plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred 14 in evaluating the medical opinion of plaintiff's treating 15 physician, Dr. Darlene Denzien, particularly her opinion 16 regarding plaintiff's ability to sit or stand for extended 17 periods, his need to change positions, his ability to use his 18 hands, and the estimated time plaintiff would be off task 19 during the workday. 20 Third, plaintiff argues that the ALJ's step five 21 determination is not supported by substantial evidence 22 because the ALJ failed to resolve a conflict between the 23 Dictionary of Occupational Titles, also referred to as DOT, 24 and the vocational expert testimony regarding the amount of 25 overhead reaching required for the representative jobs that 1 plaintiff could purportedly perform. 2 The Court begins its analysis as follows. 3 First, the Court finds that remand for further 4 administrative findings in this case is required to properly 5 evaluate the record evidence related to the functional 6 limitations imposed by plaintiff's cervical spine impairment, 7 particularly the ability to turn his head, for the following 8 reasons. 9 This Court recognizes that ALJs are not required to 10 reconcile every conflicting shred of evidence in their 11 decisions. However, it is equally true that ALJs must 12 discuss the evidence and factors crucial to the disability 13 determination with sufficient specificity to enable this 14 Court to decide whether the determination is supported by 15 substantial evidence. Put another way, an ALJ must build an 16 accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to his 17 conclusion to enable a meaningful review. 18 With that in mind, courts have consistently found 19 that a very specific or narrowly tailored RFC assessment must 20 be based on evidence in the record and not on the ALJ's own 21 surmise. See case of Cosnyka versus Colvin, 576 Fed.App'x 22 43, at page 46, that is a Second Circuit 2014 case. It's a 23 summary order, and therein the Second Circuit remanding where 24 there was no record evidence to support very specific RFC 25 finding that plaintiff would be off task for just six minutes 1 every hour. See also case of Mariani versus Colvin, 567 F. 2 Appendix 8 at page 10. That's also a Second Circuit 2014 3 case. And in that summary order, the Second Circuit remanded 4 where the record contained no evidence to support ALJ's 5 determination that plaintiff's carpal tunnel syndrome still 6 allowed use of his dominant hand for half the workday. 7 Here, the ALJ cited record evidence from multiple 8 physical examinations supporting plaintiff's claim that he 9 experienced pain and limited range of motion in his neck, 10 particularly when turning his head from side to side. Then, 11 without further explanation, the ALJ included a very specific 12 and very narrow functional limitation in the RFC, namely, 13 that plaintiff, and I quote, "should avoid work that requires 14 rapid, repetitive flexion, extension or rotation of the 15 cervical spine." Such a determination suggests that 16 plaintiff could still frequently perform other repetitive 17 head movements, expanding the number of light work jobs 18 available to plaintiff. 19 In their brief, the Commissioner acknowledges that 20 no medical opinion in the record directly corresponds to the 21 ALJ's RFC determination regarding plaintiff's ability to turn 22 his head. 23 In particular, Dr. Rita Figueroa, who performed 24 plaintiff's consultative examination, opined that plaintiff 25 had, quote, "moderate to severe limitation for turning 1 movements of the neck," language that the ALJ characterized 2 as vague. 3 Dr. Shoshanna Miller, who examined plaintiff in 4 connection with his workplace injuries, opined that plaintiff 5 cannot perform repetitive bending or twisting. This broad 6 restriction was not confined to rapid movements of the head 7 and neck. 8 Treatment notes from plaintiff's pain specialist, 9 Dr. Darlene Denzien, contained a similar general restriction 10 on repetitive bending or twisting, but Dr. Denzien did not 11 address the issue in her September 2022 medical source 12 statement. 13 Two non-examining state agency consultants, those 14 being Dr. A. Periakaaruppan and Dr. S. Ahmed, you can see 15 those at transcript pages 59 through 62, and 74 through 77, 16 reviewed plaintiff's medical records and offered no opinion 17 regarding plaintiff's ability to turn his head. 18 Furthermore, this Court's searching review of the 19 record has identified no other medical or testimonial 20 evidence that would support the ALJ's very narrow assessment 21 of the functional limitations imposed by plaintiff's cervical 22 spine impairment. Almost all the treatment and examination 23 notes in the medical record describe chronic neck pain that 24 restricts plaintiff's range of motion and is aggravated by 25 physical activity. 1 Plaintiff testified regarding his activities of 2 daily living and recreational activities, such as bowling and 3 fishing, that may translate to an ability to perform certain 4 types of light work. However, none of this evidence suggests 5 that plaintiff's neck problems only arise with, quote, 6 "rapid, repetitive" movement. Thus, this court is unable to 7 glean the rationale for the ALJ's very specific RFC 8 determination, and the ALJ has failed to construct the 9 requisite logical bridge between the evidence and his 10 findings. 11 This Court notes the vocational expert's 12 November 16, 2022 hearing testimony that an inability to 13 perform more than occasional turning of the head and neck 14 would preclude most forms of light work. Therefore, the 15 ALJ's error in failing to adequately explain his evaluation 16 of this issue cannot be considered harmless and, therefore, 17 remand is required on this basis. 18 The Court finds that plaintiff's remaining 19 arguments do not present independent grounds for remand, so I 20 will address them in a summary fashion. That being said, 21 reconsideration of plaintiff's cervical spine impairment 22 along with any new evidence introduced on remand may impact 23 other portions of the ALJ's disability determination, 24 including the discrete findings challenged in plaintiff's 25 brief. 1 Dr. Darlene Denzien, plaintiff's pain treatment 2 specialist, provided the most restrictive medical opinion in 3 the record. The ALJ found it only had, quote, "some limited 4 persuasive value." Plaintiff contends that this was error, 5 because it relied on cherry-picked portions of Dr. Denzien's 6 treatment notes. This Court disagrees. 7 The ALJ's analysis considered the supportability 8 and consistency of the opinion by considering not only 9 multiple findings in Dr. Denzien's treatment notes, but also 10 the results of Dr. Figueroa's consultative examination. The 11 ALJ also explained his reasons for finding other opinion 12 evidence more persuasive than Dr. Denzien's opinion. 13 To the extent that plaintiff argues that the ALJ 14 should have interpreted this record evidence differently, 15 such challenges must be rejected, because they are premised 16 upon a disagreement over how the ALJ resolved arguably 17 conflicting evidence. It is not sufficient that reasonable 18 parties could interpret the evidence differently, and is not 19 the function of this reviewing court to reweigh that 20 evidence. 21 At the December 2021 hearing, the vocational expert 22 identified three representative occupations that an 23 individual with plaintiff's RFC could perform. First, sales 24 attendant; second, price marker; and third, routing clerk. 25 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to adequately 1 investigate a conflict between the frequent reaching required 2 by all three of these occupations under the DOT and 3 plaintiff's ability to perform overhead reaching as 4 established by the ALJ's RFC determination. This Court 5 disagrees. 6 It is well-established that the ALJ is required to, 7 quote, "obtain a reasonable explanation" for any apparent 8 conflict between the DOT and vocational expert testimony. 9 See case of Lockwood versus Commissioner of Social Security, 10 914 F.3d 87, at page 92, Second Circuit 2019 case. Lockwood 11 also recognized that in some cases this conflict may be 12 susceptible to easy resolution. 13 The combination of the ALJ's questions, follow-up 14 inquiries from plaintiff's counsel, and the vocational 15 expert's hearing testimony appropriately resolved the 16 conflict with the reaching requirements in the DOT for each 17 of the three representative occupations. Over the course of 18 his testimony, the vocational expert explained that he was 19 familiar with the physical requirements of each of these 20 positions, because his professional experience included 21 placing individuals into these jobs within the last few 22 years. Based on that experience, the vocational expert 23 estimated that the number of available sales attendant jobs 24 would be reduced by half, that being from 250,000 to 125,000 25 jobs available nationally, if overhead reaching were 1 excluded, but that the number of available price marker and 2 routing clerk positions would be largely unchanged. 3 Therefore, this Court finds the ALJ made an 4 appropriate inquiry of the vocational expert testimony 5 regarding the impact of the overhead reaching restrictions on 6 the number of jobs that plaintiff would be able to perform, 7 and adequately the ALJ resolved the conflict with the DOT. 8 Based on all of this, and according to my analysis 9 that I just set forth, accordingly, the plaintiff's motion 10 for judgment on the pleadings is granted; defendant's motion 11 for judgment on the pleadings is denied; and this matter is 12 reversed and remanded to the Commissioner pursuant to 13 sentence four of Title 42 U.S. Code 405(g) for further 14 proceedings consistent with this decision and order. 15 As I indicated, I will have my order that I just 16 rendered on the record transcribed. I will then attach it to 17 a summary order and then I will file that summary order with 18 attachment in short order in the future. This concludes our 19 hearing for today. And I hope everybody has a good rest of 20 the day. Take care, everybody. 21 MS. SLIMBAUGH: Thank you, your Honor. 22 MR. PECK: Thank you, your Honor. 23 * * * 24 25 Decision - 2/25/2025 - 23-cv-1621 14

1 2 CERTIFICATION 3 4 I, EILEEN MCDONOUGH, RPR, CRR, Federal Official 5 Realtime Court Reporter, in and for the United States 6 District Court for the Northern District of New York, 7 do hereby certify that pursuant to Section 753, Title 28, 8 United States Code, that the foregoing is a true and correct 9 transcript of the stenographically reported proceedings held 10 in the above-entitled matter and that the transcript page il format is in conformance with the regulations of the 12 Judicial Conference of the United States. 13 14 15 16 Leen MeDonough 17 EILEEN MCDONOUGH, RPR, CRR Federal Official Court Reporter 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25