Pratiksha Hasji v. Kilolo Kijakazi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: October 4, 2023
• Docket: 21-15319
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 4 2023 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PRATIKSHA LAL HASJI, No. 21-15319

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:19-cv-01979-CKD

v. MEMORANDUM* KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California Carolyn K. Delaney, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Submitted October 4, 2023**

Before: BENNETT, SUNG, and H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judges.

Pratiksha Lal Hasji appeals the district court’s order affirming the denial by

an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) of Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB). We

have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.

We review the district court’s decision de novo. Luther v. Berryhill, 891

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). F.3d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 2018). We may overturn the ALJ’s decision only if it is not

supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error. Id. Substantial

evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate

to support a conclusion.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (citing

Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). “Where evidence is

susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, it is the ALJ’s conclusion that

must be upheld.” Shaibi v. Berryhill, 883 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting

Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005)).

In order to be eligible for DIB, a claimant must prove continuous disability

that began on or before the date last insured (DLI). See 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(A),

(c)(1); 20 C.F.R. § 404.131; see also Flaten v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 44

F.3d 1453, 1459 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he individual must be insured at the time that

the individual suffers from the disability in order to receive benefit payments.”).

Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that Hasji was not disabled

on or before her December 31, 2014 DLI.

The ALJ found that statements from Hasji and her spouse regarding her

symptoms were inconsistent with the medical record prior to the DLI.

Additionally, the ALJ rejected a non-contemporaneous questionnaire from Dr.

Nguyen asserting that Hasji has been unable to work since May 2010. The ALJ

gave little weight to the questionnaire due to Dr. Nguyen’s lack of

2 contemporaneous treatment and the “sparse” medical evidence prior to the DLI.

Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determinations.

Hasji herself alleged that she did not become disabled until November 2015,

well after the DLI. Hasji testified before the ALJ that her breathing symptoms

began in 2010 and were the same at the hearing as they were in 2010 and 2014—

prior to her DLI. But the ALJ reasonably concluded that Hasji did not have a

severe impairment prior to her DLI. See Flaten, 44 F.3d at 1459 (rejecting a

relation-back interpretation of the statutory eligibility provisions and holding that a

claimant must establish continuous disability). Specifically, the ALJ explained that

Hasji had “minimal treatment” and that there were “minimal objective findings on

and before the [DLI].”

The medical record supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Hasji’s disability

began after the DLI. Medical treatment notes reflect reports from Hasji to her

medical providers that her increased respiratory symptoms began in November

2015, eleven months after the DLI. While the medical record reflected a few earlier

visits with Hasji’s medical providers due to respiratory symptoms, those symptoms

either did not require medical attention or resolved with limited treatment. There is

also minimal objective medical evidence confirming Hasji’s alleged symptoms

related to depression on or before the DLI. Hasji was negative for depression and

anxiety in July 2013, appeared anxious in September 2013, but then was “well-

3 appearing” in March 2014. Hasji did not report increased depression-related

symptoms until after the December 2014 DLI. Due to the limited treatment for

these symptoms until November 2015, the ALJ reasonably concluded that Hasji’s

testimony alleging disability on or prior to her DLI was unsupported.

As to Dr. Nguyen’s 2018 opinion, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s

decision to give that opinion little weight. As the ALJ found, “the

contemporaneous medical evidence [from the time period prior to the DLI] is

sparse and does not support this retroactive disability opinion.”1 See Flaten, 44

F.3d at 1459.

Finally, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s rejection of testimony from

Hasji’s spouse. The spouse’s statements “were offered well after the claimant’s

[DLI]” and were “not persuasive for the same reasons” as the ALJ found Hasji’s

testimony not to be persuasive. See Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1218 (9th

Cir. 2005) (“An ALJ need only give germane reasons for discrediting the

testimony of lay witnesses. Inconsistency with medical evidence is one such

reason.” (citation omitted)).

1 Hasji claims on appeal that the district court erred by accepting the ALJ’s erroneous finding that Dr. Nguyen treated Hasji for only one year in 2016–2017. While the ALJ misinterpreted the dates that Dr. Nguyen treated Hasji, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that Hasji was not disabled on or before her DLI due to “minimal treatment” and “minimal objective findings on and before the [DLI].”

4 AFFIRMED.