Prather v. State

88 S.W.2d 851, 191 Ark. 903, 1935 Ark. LEXIS 405
CourtSupreme Court of Arkansas
DecidedNovember 18, 1935
DocketNo. CR 3964
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 88 S.W.2d 851 (Prather v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Prather v. State, 88 S.W.2d 851, 191 Ark. 903, 1935 Ark. LEXIS 405 (Ark. 1935).

Opinion

Baker, J.

Ike J. Prather, Otto Ray Bingham, Fred Williams, alias Fred Harvey, and James Edward Mc-Cauley were jointly indicted in the Pulaski Circuit Court under § 2438 of Crawford & Moses’ Digest upon a charge of possessing burglar’s tools. That section of the statute reads as follows: ‘ ‘ Possession or manufacture of burglar’s tools. Any person who makes, mends, designs or sets up, or who has in his custody or concealed about his person, any tool, false key, lock pick, bit, nippers, fuse, force screw, punch, drill, .jimmy, bit, or any material, implement or other mechanical device whatsoever, adapted, designed or commonly used for breaking into any vault, safe, railroad car, boat, vessel, warehouse, store, shop, office, dwelling honse, or door shutter, or window of a building of any kind, shall be guilty of a felony, and upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary for not less than two years, nor more than ten years.”

Upon a separate trial, Prather was convicted and has appealed. The material part of the indictment is as follows: “The said Otto Ray Bingham, Fred Williams, alias Fred Harvey, James Edward McCauley and Ike J. Prather, in the county and State aforesaid, on the 30th day of March, 1935, did unlawfully, wilfully, and feloniously’' have in their possession certain tools, hammer, punches, screwdriver, pliers, wrench, caps and fuses, nitroglycerine, flashlight, gloves and bag, and implements and mechanical devices adapted, designed, and commonly used for breaking into vaults, safes, railroad cars, boats, vessels, warehouses, stores, shops, offices, dwelling houses, door shutters and windows of buildings, ’ ’

The principal contention made upon this appeal is to the effect that the particular tools, appliances, or devices found in the possession of the appellant were not such that they might be called or designated as burglar’s tools and on that account, without regard to the use the defendant might have intended to make of them, he was not guilty.

The rule in the case of Satterfield v. State, 174 Ark. 733, 296 S. W. 63, is invoked by appellant to substantiate and make good his contention that tools, appliances and devices found in his charge or possession were of such kind and character that he had the right to have them in possession, as being the every-day working tools of mechanics, plumbers, carpenters, or other persons following lawful pursuits in every community, and he argues that to prohibit the possession of such tools, devices, appliances and materials, as were found under his control and in his possession would be violative of common rights, which are so clearly recognized as being possessed by all citizens, as to make any such attempt to regulate or prohibit the use or possession thereof illegal and void. In the Satterfield case, cited above, it was said: “This statute was passed in 1915, and has never before been before this court for construction. It is notable that the statute does not require an intent to commit the crime of burglary to make the possession of such tools or implements unlawful. The bare possession thereof, without anything more, is made a felony. In this respect it is unlike the statute of some of the other States. This being a criminal statute, it must be strictly construed.”

We are in accord with the- foregoing announcement^ It must be observed, however, that the above statement does not amount to a prohibition of proof or evidence that would establish facts proving or tending to prove that the defendant had in his possession such a group or selection of tools, devices, or materials as might be found to be more nearly suitable for 'breaking into houses, or opening locked doors and windows, of by explosive forces opening safes or strong boxes, where valuables might be stored or kept, than for any lawful purpose.

The statute does not attempt to describe burglar’s tools. Indeed, we doubt if there are any particular or peculiar tools made, used, or adapted solely for burglary. It prohibits the possession of a false key, lock, pick, bit, nippers, fuse, force screw, punch, drill, - jimmy, bit, or any material, implement or other mechanical device whatsoever, adapted, designed or commonly used for breaking- into any vault, safe, railroad car, boat, vessel, warehouse, store, shop, office, dwelling house, or door, shutter, or window of a building of any kind.

The word “bit,” used twice in the section, means perhaps the common or ordinary bit possessed by every carpenter and wood workman. We know that it is not in every instance in which one may have a false key that the law is violated, as many large enterprises, particularly those like hotels, possess or have what are called skeleton keys, or master keys, which will unlock all rooms in the building, or maybe just, those on a particular floor. Automobile mechanics have force screws with which they separate or draw apart pieces of the machinery upon which they work. Locksmiths have different kind of tools which are designed to pick locks. Practically all workmen use nippers, and wood workmen and smiths use punches. Explosives, such as nitroglycerine, are in common use in every community. Those traveling upon highways frequently find men using these high explosives to move rock, trees or stumps.

Therefore, should we follow the theory upon which this case is presented to us by appellant, that is to say, if the tools, devices, appliances, or materials, were such as might be reasonably used on proper occasions by honest workmen in the prosecution of their respective vocations, then the statute would most probably be futile, so far as its enforcement is concerned. At least, courts and juries would be unable to convict any burglar or any man who might be indicted, unless there wa,s found in the possession of such person some tool, manufactured for or used by burglars, and which would be unsuited for use otherwise. Such construction of this statute would be unwise and would tend to defeat its beneficent purpose in the protection of society against professional lawbreakers.

Perhaps, no fixed rule or announcement should be made as a criterion for guilt or innocence, except that in every instance the matter under investigation should be determined as a matter of fact, controlled or explained by all of the conditions, circumstances, and such pertinent collateral matters as might be present.

What the writer has just said above may be illustrated by some comparisons and contrasts. No one would think that a man should be indicted or convicted because he had in his possession a sledge hammer, or because he had in his possession a punch, or even pistols or revolvers upon a charge of possessing burglar’s tools, though perhaps no other implements or instruments are in more common use by those engaged as burglars than small firearms.

The evidence in this case may be said to be substantially to the following effect, without quoting the exact language of witnesses.

There was found in one of the compartments of a grip or handbag belonging to these parties, who had been indicted, a sledge hammer, with a shortened handle, and a short punch, an ordinary screwdriver, caps lised to set off high explosives, nitroglycerine, gloves or mittens, electric fuses, four pistols, with extra cartridge clips for holding cartridges for immediate reloading of pistols, and a flashlight.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Duchac v. State
505 S.W.2d 237 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 1973)
Freeman v. State
496 S.W.2d 378 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 1973)
Moore v. State
429 S.W.2d 122 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 1968)
Gossett v. State
414 S.W.2d 631 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 1967)
Randall v. State
389 S.W.2d 229 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 1965)
Allen Benton v. United States
232 F.2d 341 (D.C. Circuit, 1956)
Green v. District of Columbia
91 A.2d 712 (District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 1952)
Smith v. Commonwealth
55 S.E.2d 427 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1949)
Cascio v. State
210 S.W.2d 897 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 1948)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
88 S.W.2d 851, 191 Ark. 903, 1935 Ark. LEXIS 405, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/prather-v-state-ark-1935.