Prashant Enterprises, Inc. v. State

228 A.D.2d 144, 650 N.Y.2d 473, 650 N.Y.S.2d 473, 1996 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 12364
CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
DecidedDecember 5, 1996
DocketClaim No. 75855
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 228 A.D.2d 144 (Prashant Enterprises, Inc. v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Prashant Enterprises, Inc. v. State, 228 A.D.2d 144, 650 N.Y.2d 473, 650 N.Y.S.2d 473, 1996 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 12364 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1996).

Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

Mercure, J.

Claimant, the operator1 of a Quality Inn Motel on State Route 11 in the Town of Kirkwood, Broome County, brought this action to recover for damage to real and personal property sustained in the July 31, 1986 flooding of claimant’s property as the result of the overflow of Stratmill Creek. On a prior appeal, we determined that the State was solely liable for claimant’s damages and remitted the matter to the Court of Claims for a determination of claimant’s damages on the record previously developed (206 AD2d 729, 731). In April 1995, the Court of Claims rendered a detailed decision calculating the damage to realty and personalty and lost rental income at $186,815.64. Contending that the award is insufficient, claimant appeals the judgment entered thereon.

The motel property consists of approximately five acres of land improved with four principal buildings, a parking lot, and a swimming pool, lawn, shrubbery and other exterior landscaping improvements. Building No. 1 contains the motel’s service facilities, including the lobby, front desk, offices, restrooms, conference room, cocktail bar, lounge area, kitchen, dining room and banquet room, all of which sustained flood damage. Buildings Nos. 2 and 3 contain 105 motel rooms, 50 of which were damaged in the flood. Building No. 4, containing 50 motel rooms, was undamaged due to its elevated site.

In making its assessment of damages, the Court of Claims was faced with three complicating factors. First, the greatest part of the remedial work was performed by claimant’s [146]*146principal, Paul Vakharia, his family and his staff in a flurry of activity during the 20-day period immediately following the flood, and little attention was given to the maintenance of records of the work performed and expenses incurred. Second, because of financial constraints, in many cases claimant was required to perform makeshift repairs instead of replacing damaged fixtures or furnishings. Third, the property was not inspected by claimant’s expert, Dennis Niland, a State-licensed and board-certified public adjuster, until five years after the damage was sustained. Nonetheless, the State chose not to engage its own expert and offered no evidence to controvert Ni-land’s trial testimony.

The interaction of these factors caused the most difficulty in connection with the Court of Claims’ assessment of damage to the 50 motel rooms. The evidence showed, and the Court of Claims properly found, that the muddy flood waters entered these rooms to a depth of approximately one foot. Among the affected improvements were floor coverings (carpeting in the main room and vinyl flooring in the bathrooms), exterior entry doors, hollow-core bathroom doors, door trim, stud and sheet-rock walls (covered with wallpaper in the main rooms and ceramic tile in the bathrooms), rubber base moldings, combination HVAC (heating, ventilation and air conditioning) units, and furniture including conventional beds, water beds, sofa beds, nightstands, credenzas, activity tables, TV stands, draperies, bedspreads, comforters and linens.

According to Niland, because exposure to the flood waters caused the sheetrock to swell and buckle and made it likely that the sheetrock would in the future mildew and deteriorate further, proper repair of the walls required replacement of all sheetrock from the floor to a height of four feet and removal and replacement of the wallpaper, rubber baseboard, ceramic tile and, in the exterior walls only,, fiberglass insulation to a height of four feet. Incidental to this work, all wall fixtures, including wall mirrors, clothes racks, towel bars and towel holders, would have to be removed, stored, cleaned and then reinstalled when the walls were completed. In addition, Niland indicated that the hollow-core bathroom doors needed to be replaced, that the solid exterior doors needed to be rehung and that the door jambs and trim needed to be repainted. There is no dispute that the floor coverings in the 50 motel rooms had to be removed and replaced. As for the personal property, Ni-land opined that most of the furniture, including the conventional beds, water beds, sofa beds, activity tables, nightstands [147]*147and credenzas, was a total loss and that the HVAC units required reconditioning at a cost of $3,000 each.

The actual course taken by claimant was far different. The wallpapered walls were repaired by pounding or smoothing out the raised areas and regluing the loose wallpaper. In the bathrooms, claimant reapplied and regrouted the ceramic tiles that had popped off. The waterbeds, sofa beds and the conventional bed mattresses and box springs were dried, cleaned, chemically treated to eliminate the mildew odor, and returned to service. Three or four of the waterbed heater controls failed and were replaced. Each HVAC unit was removed from its through-the-wall metal sleeve, hosed clean and reinstalled. In the spring of 1987, 40 of the units failed and were serviced at a cost of $18,178.45.

In the face of the sharp contrast between Niland’s uncontroverted testimony as to the repairs that needed to be made and Vakharia’s account of the repairs that were actually made, the Court of Claims rendered a compromise verdict. Recognizing that the flood waters had damaged the sheetrock in buildings Nos. 1, 2 and 3 and crediting Niland’s testimony as to the need for replacement, the court awarded claimant only 50% of the full replacement cost, its rationale being that, although there was "some evidence * * * that permanent damage survived the corrective efforts by Vakharia and his cohorts * * * some allowance must be made for the fact that after approximately 20 days these rooms were placed back in service apparently without any reduction whatsoever in the per diem rental of each and without * * * any reduction in the frequency of occupancy”. In addition, finding that the bathroom walls looked like new after the tiles were reglued and grout reapplied, the court denied the claim for the cost of replacing the sheetrock and then reinstalling the ceramic tile in the bathrooms.

Although we can well appreciate its motivation, we are constrained to conclude that the Court of Claims erred in its assessment of the damage to the sheetrock walls in buildings Nos. 1, 2 and 3. Fundamentally, the proper measure of damages for permanent injury to real property is the diminution in the market value of the property by reason of that injury or, put another way, the difference between the value of the land before the injury and the value after the injury (see, 36 NY Jur 2d, Damages, § 74, at 131). In many cases, however, the cost of repairing the injury will be the proper measure of damages, so long as the cost of restoring the land to its former condition is less than the diminution in the market value of the whole [148]*148property by reason of the injury (see, 36 NY Jur 2d, Damages, § 74, at 132). In such a case, the claimant is entitled to the cost of repair at the time the damages occurred (see, 36 NY Jur 2d, Damages, § 72). As correctly argued by claimant, there is no theory of damages that allows a reduction in the cost of repair on account of the fact that the injured party continued to use the property in a damaged, albeit functional, condition.

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228 A.D.2d 144, 650 N.Y.2d 473, 650 N.Y.S.2d 473, 1996 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 12364, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/prashant-enterprises-inc-v-state-nyappdiv-1996.