Prang v. Los Angeles County Assessment Appeals Bd. CA2/8

CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
DecidedOctober 14, 2015
DocketB260580
StatusUnpublished

This text of Prang v. Los Angeles County Assessment Appeals Bd. CA2/8 (Prang v. Los Angeles County Assessment Appeals Bd. CA2/8) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Prang v. Los Angeles County Assessment Appeals Bd. CA2/8, (Cal. Ct. App. 2015).

Opinion

Filed 10/14/15 Prang v. Los Angeles County Assessment Appeals Bd. CA2/8 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

JEFFREY PRANG in his capacity as Los B260580 Angeles County Assessor, (Los Angeles County Plaintiff and Appellant, Super. Ct. No. BS145750) v.

LOS ANGELES COUNTY ASSESSMENT APPEALS BOARD NO. 3,

Defendant and Respondent;

OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION et al.,

Real Parties in Interest and Appellants.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. James C. Chalfant, Judge. Affirmed.

Mark J. Saladino, County Counsel, Albert Ramseyer, Deputy County Counsel for Defendant and Appellant County of Los Angeles.

Cahill Davis & O’Neall, C. Stephen Davis, Cris K. O’Neall and Andrew W. Bodeau, for Real Parties in Interest and Appellants Occidental Petroleum Corp. and Swiftlite Aircraft Corp. __________________________ Occidental Petroleum Corporation and its wholly-owned subsidiary Swiftlite Aircraft Corporation (collectively Oxy) own a fleet of five corporate jets which are hangared in Los Angeles County. As such, the Los Angeles County Tax Assessor assessed Oxy for personal property tax based on the value of the jets. Oxy took the position that its property tax obligation for the jets must be reduced, because the jets spend sufficient time in different states and countries to have acquired tax situs in those other jurisdictions. The assessor agreed that Oxy’s tax should be apportioned if its jets had acquired tax situs in other jurisdictions, but believed Oxy had not made a factual showing sufficient to establish any tax situs other than California. Oxy disputed the determination before Los Angeles County Assessment Appeals Board No. 3 (the board). After a hearing, the board ruled in favor of Oxy, determining that Oxy’s property tax burden must be reduced for the time its planes spent in 31 different jurisdictions. The assessor brought a petition for writ of administrative mandate, challenging (1) the board’s legal determination; (2) the absence of any actual board finding that the 31 jurisdictions constituted tax situses for Oxy’s jets; and (3) the lack of evidence to support any such findings. The trial court granted the writ. The court (1) clarified the law regarding the quantum of contacts necessary to establish alternative tax situs; (2) concluded that the board had not made findings as to whether Oxy had established any jurisdiction as an alternative tax situs; and (3) remanded the matter to the board for new findings in light of the trial court’s statement of decision. Both parties appeal, although, for the most part, neither party questions the trial court’s discussion of the governing law. The assessor contends only that the trial court erred in concluding that the tax situs of the jets is to be determined on a fleet-wide basis, rather than plane-by-plane. Oxy argues that the board’s findings were sufficient or that

2 necessary findings can be implied and, therefore, there is no need to remand to the board.1 We disagree with both parties and affirm.

DISCUSSION

1. Governing Legal Principles

Before discussing the detailed factual and procedural history of the case, it is useful to understand the law governing property taxation of the planes at issue. Oxy’s corporate jets are considered general aviation aircraft, as opposed to commercial aircraft or fractionally-owned aircraft (both of which are taxed differently). General aviation aircrafts are taxed as personal property in the county in which they are hangared. (NetJets Aviation, Inc. v. Guillory (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 26, 34 (NetJets).) However, if a taxpayer can establish that its personal property has acquired a tax situs in a jurisdiction other than where it is domiciled, the domiciliary state must reduce its tax to include only such property values as are not subject to the potential of taxation elsewhere. (Ice Capades, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 745, 752 (Ice Capades).) This is a requirement imposed by the due process and commerce clauses of the United States Constitution. (Netjets at p. 49.) The issue is one of tax situs in the other jurisdiction, not taxation itself. A taxpayer can establish the necessity of apportionment simply by showing that another jurisdiction could impose a property tax on the property. (Flying Tiger Line, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles (1958) 51 Cal.2d 314, 319 (Flying Tiger).) Indeed, the term “tax situs” simply means that the location in question has sufficient contacts to confer jurisdiction to tax. (Zantop Air Transport, Inc. v. County of San Bernardino (1966) 246 Cal.App.2d 433, 437.)

1 In its briefs on appeal, Oxy argues in passing that the board was correct on the law, but does not assign as error any part of the trial court’s differing interpretation of controlling authority.

3 Many cases have considered the issue of the “quantum of contact of property and its owner with a state necessary to establish a tax situs.” (Ice Capades, supra, 56 Cal.App.3d at p. 753.) While the determination is ultimately one of fact, there are certain guiding principles which can be distilled from the case law. To comport with the commerce and due process clauses, any tax imposed must be fairly related to services provided by the state. (NetJets, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at p. 48.) To do so, the tax must have relation to “ ‘opportunities, benefits or protection conferred or afforded’ ” by the taxing state. (Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Bd. of Equalization & Assessment (1954) 347 U.S. 590, 600 (Braniff).) When the issue is one of tax situs over movable personal property, such as aircraft, a mere transitory stay in another state is not sufficient to establish tax situs. (Ice Capades, supra, 56 Cal.App.3d at p. 754.) Both the length of time that the property is in the other state and the intent of its presence are significant to tax situs. (Id. at p. 753.) If the intent is merely that the property remain in the other location for a short period and then move on, or return home, it is not enough for tax situs. (Ibid.) In order to establish situs, the property must have a “more or less permanent location as distinguished from a transient or temporary one. However, permanency in the sense that it must be fixed like real property is not essential to the establishment of a taxable situs for personal property. It seems to be sufficient when, in the ordinary course of business, that property is present and being used and employed with a consistent continuity and not spasmodically and temporarily.” (Reeves v. Island Creek Fuel & Transportation Co. (Ky.App. 1950) 230 S.W.2d 924, 927 (Reeves).) Also significant to the determination is the nature of the property owner’s contact with the other jurisdiction. “The nature of the contact is relevant to the ‘opportunities, benefits, or protection’ which must be afforded by a state if it is to have power to tax.” (Ice Capades, supra, 56 Cal.App.3d at pp. 753-754.) The question of tax situs can be especially complicated when the taxpayer owns a quantity of virtually identical property – such as railroad cars, cargo containers, or airplanes. Suppose a taxpayer nearly always has a fixed quantity of railroad cars on

4 routes in another state, but the precise cars that are in that state vary.

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Central Railroad v. Pennsylvania
370 U.S. 607 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Flying Tiger Line, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles
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528 P.2d 56 (California Supreme Court, 1974)
Ice Capades, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles
56 Cal. App. 3d 745 (California Court of Appeal, 1976)
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55 Cal. App. 3d 864 (California Court of Appeal, 1976)
Zantop Air Transport, Inc. v. County of San Bernardino
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Bluebook (online)
Prang v. Los Angeles County Assessment Appeals Bd. CA2/8, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/prang-v-los-angeles-county-assessment-appeals-bd-ca28-calctapp-2015.