Prada Garcia v. Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: April 10, 2025
• Docket: 24-2173
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 10 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SANDRO PRADA GARCIA; YESICA No. 24-2173 ALEJANDRA BARRETO Agency Nos. NINO; MARLON ESTEBAN PRADA A240-249-950 ACOSTA; DANA SOFIA PRADA A220-773-310 BARRETO, A220-773-384 A220-773-385 Petitioners,

v. MEMORANDUM*

PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted April 8, 2025** Pasadena, California

Before: CALLAHAN, DESAI, and DE ALBA, Circuit Judges.

Lead petitioner Sandro Prada Garcia, his wife Yesica, and their two minor

children (collectively, “petitioners”) petition for review of a Board of Immigration

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Appeals (“BIA”) decision dismissing their appeal from the denial by an Immigration

Judge (“IJ”) of their applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection

under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).1

We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review the BIA’s denial of

asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief for substantial evidence. Duran-

Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2019). Under this standard, “we

must uphold the agency determination unless the evidence compels a contrary

conclusion.” Id. “Where, as here, the BIA agrees with the IJ’s reasoning, we review

both decisions.” Garcia-Martinez v. Sessions, 886 F.3d 1291, 1293 (9th Cir. 2018).

We deny the petition.

1. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s finding that petitioners are

ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal because they failed to establish

past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution. Sandro testified that

he and his family left Colombia because Sandro was threatened and harassed on

several occasions between 2008 and 2021. “Threats standing alone [] constitute past

persecution in only a small category of cases, and only when the threats are so

menacing as to cause significant actual suffering or harm.” Lim v. I.N.S., 224 F.3d

929, 936 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). We are more “likely to find persecution

1 Yesica and the children are riders on Sandro’s applications and are thus co- petitioners before this court.

2 24-2173 where threats are repeated, specific and ‘combined with confrontation or other

mistreatment.’” Duran-Rodriguez, 918 F.3d at 1028 (quoting Lim, 224 F.3d at 936).

While paramilitary members and unknown individuals threatened Sandro on

several occasions, the threats were never violent or combined with mistreatment.

See Hoxha v. Ashcroft, 319 F.3d 1179, 1182 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding “unfulfilled

threats” to constitute “harassment rather than persecution”). Indeed, Sandro was

never physically harmed while in living in Colombia. See Nagoulko v. I.N.S., 333

F.3d 1012, 1016 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[I]t is significant that [petitioner] never suffered

any significant physical violence.”). Moreover, Sandro testified that he lived in

Villavicencio for almost five years without incident, undermining the “frequency”

and “seriousness of the threats.” Cf. Antonio v. Garland, 58 F.4th 1067, 1073 (9th

Cir. 2023) (finding that petitioner experienced past persecution, in part, because she

received frequent, serious, and escalating threats). Because reasonable minds could

differ as to whether the alleged threats, which spanned a 13-year period, rose to the

level of persecution, the record does not compel a finding of past persecution. See

Nahrvani v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2005).

Substantial evidence also supports the BIA’s conclusion that petitioners did

not demonstrate an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution. See Sharma v.

Garland, 9 F.4th 1052, 1065 (9th Cir. 2021) (recognizing that even when a petitioner

does not show past persecution, a petitioner “might nevertheless be eligible for relief

3 24-2173 if he instead shows a well-founded fear of future persecution” that is “objectively

reasonable” (cleaned up)). Sandro asserts that he fears the paramilitary members

who threatened him, but the record does not compel the finding that these

perpetrators maintain an interest in him. See id. (upholding agency decision because

“there is an insufficient basis in the record to conclude that [the perpetrator] and his

followers would have a continuing interest” in the petitioner). Sandro testified that

the mayor, who instigated the threats against Sandro, was convicted and sentenced

to prison in 2014, and her associate voluntarily turned himself in to the authorities.

As to the more recent incidents of alleged harm, the BIA reasonably concluded that

these events involved vague threats by unknown individuals, undermining the

reasonableness of Sandro’s fear of persecution. Furthermore, Sandro took advantage

of the government’s protection program in 2008, and country conditions evidence

shows that the Colombian government has taken steps to protect civilians and to

combat corruption. See Nahrvani, 399 F.3d at 1154 (denying relief where petitioner

did not substantiate claim regarding government’s inability or unwillingness to

control the asserted persecution from which he suffered).

2. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s finding that petitioners failed

to establish eligibility for CAT protection. A petitioner seeking CAT protection must

show that it is more likely than not he will be subjected to torture by or with the

acquiescence of a public official if removed to his native country. Xochihua-Jaimes

4 24-2173 v. Barr, 962 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2020). Because the harm Sandro suffered

does not rise to the level of persecution, “it necessarily falls short of the definition

of torture.” Sharma, 9 F.4th at 1067. And to the extent petitioners rely on country

conditions evidence to demonstrate a likelihood of torture, the “generalized evidence

of violence and crime” is not particular to them. See Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder, 600

F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).

The petition is DENIED.

5 24-2173