PR REALTY LLC v. AMIR SCHAJNOVITZ & Others.

• Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court
• Decided: January 23, 2026
• Docket: 24-P-1209
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-1209

PR REALTY LLC

vs.

AMIR SCHAJNOVITZ & others.1

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

This appeal by the defendant (tenant) follows a jury

verdict in favor of the plaintiff (landlord) after a two-day

summary process trial. The defendant asserts numerous errors in

the conduct and outcome of trial. For the most part, these

contentions are unsupported by adequate citation to the record

and do not comply with the requirements of Mass. R. A. P. 16

(a), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1628 (2019), so we need not

consider them. This rule requires that the argument section of

an appellate brief contain the appellant's contentions, the

reasons therefor, citations to the authorities and parts of the

1The summary process complaint also named "all other occupants" of the property. record on which the appellant relies, and a concise statement of

the applicable standard of review for each issue. See Mass.

R. A. P. 16 (a) (9) (A) & (B), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1628

(2019). "Although some leniency is appropriate in determining

whether pro se litigants have complied with rules of procedure,

the rules nevertheless bind pro se litigants as all other

litigants." Brown v. Chicopee Fire Fighters Ass'n, Local 1710,

IAFF, 408 Mass. 1003, 1004 n.4 (1990). In the exercise of our

discretion, we address those claims whose merits we can discern

from the defendant's briefing, as further explained at oral

argument.

This case began with the plaintiff's filing of a summary

process summons and complaint. The defendant asserted

affirmative defenses as well as counterclaims under G. L.

c. 186, § 15B and G. L. c. 186, § 14. As a sanction for not

making use and occupancy payments in the correct manner, a trial

judge struck the defendant's request for a jury trial, and a

single justice of this court reinstated that request on

interlocutory appeal. The case was then tried to a jury before

the same trial judge.

The defendant maintains that the judge erred by "improperly

merging" the counterclaims for unlawful entry and property

removal under G. L. c. 186, § 15B with the claim for breach of

2 quiet enjoyment under G. L. c. 186, § 14, and that two separate

counterclaims should have been presented for jury verdict.

Contrary to the defendant's claim, the judge preserved this

argument by his ruling. The defendant's counterclaims and his

appellate argument misunderstand both the law and the judge's

ruling on these claims. As the judge explained at trial, G. L.

c. 186, § 15B does not, as the defendant says, "specifically

prohibit[] landlords from unlawful entry and unauthorized

removal of tenants' goods before lawful eviction or lease

termination." Rather, that section relates to the language in a

lease. As the judge explained at trial, under § 15B, "no lease

shall contain a provision that any Lessor may enter the property

except for the specific reasons stated within the statute"

(emphasis added). See G. L. c. 186, § 15B (1) (a). By

construing this claim as part of the defendant's quiet enjoyment

claim, the judge preserved the defendant's ability to make this

argument to the jury. There was no error.

The defendant also asserts that the judge should have

denied the plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings

because it was filed too late or was procedurally barred. We

need not address any procedural flaws in the timing or substance

of this motion because the record establishes that the judge

denied it and the defendant therefore suffered no prejudice. To

3 the extent the ruling on this motion also addressed the

defendant's counterclaims, those matters are addressed above.

We are similarly unpersuaded by the defendant's arguments

about the behavior of the plaintiff's attorney. Although he

contends that counsel "consistently engaged in prejudicial

conduct throughout the trial," the defendant notes only two

specific instances of challenged conduct. We have reviewed

these comments and, while the remarks during the opening were

not particularly respectful, they did not prejudice the conduct

of the trial. See A.C. Vaccaro, Inc. v. Vaccaro, 80 Mass. App.

Ct. 635, 640-641 (2011). That plaintiff's counsel thanked the

jury for their time in closing is not only unobjectionable, but

common (and courteous) trial practice.

Finally, we are not persuaded that the judge should have

recused himself because he issued an earlier order denying the

defendant a jury trial, which was later vacated by a single

justice of this court. We review a judge's decision not to

recuse for abuse of discretion. Haddad v. Gonzalez, 410 Mass.

855, 862 (1991). When confronted with a recusal motion, a judge

"follows a two-prong analysis"; first, a judge consults their

own "emotions and conscience to determine whether [they are]

free from bias or prejudice," (quotation and citation omitted).

Demoulas v. Demoulas Super Markets, Inc., 428 Mass. 543, 546 n.6

4 (1998). If a judge determines that they are impartial, the

second step is to "objectively evaluate whether this was a

proceeding in which [their] impartiality might reasonably be

questioned," (quotation and citation omitted). Id.

We see no abuse of discretion in the judge's decision that

recusal was not required. It is hardly unusual for a judge to

continue presiding over a case after making adverse rulings

against one side or the other -- even when such rulings are

vacated before trial. See Demoulas v. Demoulas Super Markets,

424 Mass. 501, 524-525 (1997). Here, we discern no bias or

prejudice in the judge's continued engagement in this matter.

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Rubin, Walsh & Hershfang, JJ.2),

Clerk

Entered: January 23, 2026.

2 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.