Ppg Industries, Inc. v. Douglas M. Costle, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency, Columbus and Southern Ohio Electric Company v. Douglas M. Costle, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency, Armco, Inc. v. Douglas M. Costle, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency, Ohio Edison Company v. Douglas M. Costle, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency

659 F.2d 1239, 212 U.S. App. D.C. 355, 11 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20858, 16 ERC (BNA) 1329, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 10953
CourtCourt of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
DecidedJuly 30, 1981
Docket79-1708
StatusPublished

This text of 659 F.2d 1239 (Ppg Industries, Inc. v. Douglas M. Costle, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency, Columbus and Southern Ohio Electric Company v. Douglas M. Costle, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency, Armco, Inc. v. Douglas M. Costle, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency, Ohio Edison Company v. Douglas M. Costle, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ppg Industries, Inc. v. Douglas M. Costle, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency, Columbus and Southern Ohio Electric Company v. Douglas M. Costle, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency, Armco, Inc. v. Douglas M. Costle, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency, Ohio Edison Company v. Douglas M. Costle, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency, 659 F.2d 1239, 212 U.S. App. D.C. 355, 11 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20858, 16 ERC (BNA) 1329, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 10953 (D.C. Cir. 1981).

Opinion

659 F.2d 1239

16 ERC 1329, 212 U.S.App.D.C. 355, 11
Envtl. L. Rep. 20,858

PPG INDUSTRIES, INC., Petitioner,
v.
Douglas M. COSTLE, Administrator, Environmental Protection
Agency, Respondent.
COLUMBUS AND SOUTHERN OHIO ELECTRIC COMPANY, Petitioner,
v.
Douglas M. COSTLE, Administrator, Environmental Protection
Agency, Respondent.
ARMCO, INC., Petitioner,
v.
Douglas M. COSTLE, Administrator, Environmental Protection
Agency, Respondent.
OHIO EDISON COMPANY, Petitioner,
v.
Douglas M. COSTLE, Administrator, Environmental Protection
Agency, Respondent.

Nos. 79-1708 to 79-1711.

United States Court of Appeals,
District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued Jan. 13, 1981.
Decided July 30, 1981.

Petitions For Review of Orders of the Environmental Protection agency.

Robert L. Brubaker, Columbus, Ohio, with whom Martin S. Seltzer, Columbus, Ohio, was on the brief for petitioners. J. Jeffrey McNealey, Columbus, Ohio, also entered an appearance for petitioners.

Kenneth A. Reich, Atty., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., with whom Angus MacBeth, Acting Asst. Atty. Gen., Donald W. Stever, Jr., Atty., Dept. of Justice, Earl Salo and Todd Joseph, Attys., Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, D. C., were on the brief for respondent.

Henry V. Nickel and F. William Brownell, Washington, D. C., were on the brief for amicus curiae Edison Elec. Institute, et al., urging that the order be vacated and the record remanded.

Edmund B. Frost, Washington, D. C., was on the brief for Chemical Manufacturers Ass'n amicus curiae urging that the order be vacated and the record remanded.

Before BAZELON, Senior Circuit Judge, and WALD and MIKVA, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge BAZELON.

BAZELON, Senior Circuit Judge:

In 1971, pursuant to the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub.L.No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1679, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) promulgated a series of national ambient air quality standards, known as the NAAQS, for sulfur oxides. The standards established maximum acceptable average concentrations for one-year periods, 24-hour periods, and 3-hour periods. Under the Act and the EPA regulations, if the outdoor air of a locality exceeds either the 24-hour or 3-hour standard more than once during a year, construction of new pollution sources would be restricted and existing sources could be restricted in the technology they may employ.

Prior to 1979, compliance with the 24-hour NAAQS for sulfur oxides, 40 C.F.R. § 50.4(b), was generally determined by analyzing daily average concentrations based on air samples collected during midnight-to-midnight periods. In 1979, however, pursuant to section 110 of the Clean Air Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(C) (Supp. III 1979), the Administrator promulgated a new rule which implemented a national air quality monitoring system.1 In promulgating the rule, EPA purported to require the new monitoring system to measure sulfur oxide concentrations continuously and to calculate hourly running averages for 24-hour periods, rather than only midnight-to-midnight averages. The use of running averages would reveal whether concentrations of sulfur oxides exceed the NAAQS level for any 24-hour period during the year, whereas midnight-to-midnight measurement would only reveal exceedances for 365 specific 24-hour periods. Depending on the times of the day at which sulfur oxide concentrations reach their high and low points, a locality with concentrations that exceed the level set by the standard for many 24-hour periods would be detected by the running average technique but would escape detection under the midnight-to-midnight sampling method.

These appeals challenge the 1979 rule that requires the running average technique for measuring sulfur oxide concentrations. Petitioners operate major stationary sources of sulfur dioxide. They would face significant economic burdens if the air monitoring statistics showed their localities to be in violation of the NAAQS for sulfur oxides. Petitioners charge that the challenged rule, in effect, revises the 24-hour NAAQS for sulfur oxides, and that it therefore should have been promulgated according to the exacting procedures set forth in section 307(d) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d) (Supp. III 1979). Respondent argues that the rule does not constitute a revision of the NAAQS, but merely establishes closer and more uniform air quality monitoring, as mandated by section 319, 42 U.S.C. § 7619 (Supp. III 1979). Therefore, respondent contends, the agency properly proceeded by informal rulemaking, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976).

The scope of review, as well as the lawfulness of EPA procedures, depends upon the characterization of the agency's action. If the rule effects a revision of the NAAQS, then its adoption would require the procedures set out in § 7607(d), which are more demanding than those of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). At the same time, however, § 7607(d) would preclude our invalidation of the rule on procedural grounds without a much stronger showing of prejudicial error than is required in cases under the APA.2 If, on the other hand, the rule does not effect a revision of the NAAQS, then it would have to be adopted only according to the APA procedures.

To decide whether the agency's action amounts to a revision of the 24-hour NAAQS for sulfur oxides, this court must resolve a fundamental ambiguity in the meaning of the NAAQS itself. The question, explained more fully below, is whether an exceedance of the standard's "(m)aximum 24-hour concentration" can be computed on the basis of all periods of twenty-four consecutive hours ("running averages"), or whether it must be computed on the basis of midnight-to-midnight periods only. Unfortunately, EPA has complied no administrative record directed toward that issue. Petitioners were apparently caught off-guard because of the obscurity of the notice given. They claim they were unaware that this issue was presented in the challenged rulemaking, and so offered no comments at all. We thus find ourselves in a "catch-22": the agency's procedures have produced no visible basis upon which to review its interpretation of the 24-hour NAAQS; yet, without reviewing that interpretation, we cannot determine the adequacy of its procedures. We, therefore, must examine the 24-hour sulfur oxide NAAQS directly, but only to the extent necessary to determine whether EPA's interpretation was not wholly unreasonable.

We conclude that the 24-hour NAAQS does not require a midnight-to-midnight sampling period, and that the new rule, therefore, does not revise that standard. Therefore, EPA's rulemaking proceeding under the APA, rather than the Clean Air Act, was not facially unlawful. We also find, however, that EPA failed to publish a critical provision of the new rule in the Federal Register and thereby violated the publication requirement of the APA. Belated publication cannot cure this omission.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
659 F.2d 1239, 212 U.S. App. D.C. 355, 11 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20858, 16 ERC (BNA) 1329, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 10953, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ppg-industries-inc-v-douglas-m-costle-administrator-environmental-cadc-1981.