Powless v. Powless

2025 Ohio 5795

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: December 29, 2025
• Docket: 25CA00027
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as Powless v. Powless, 2025-Ohio-5795.]

COURT OF APPEALS LICKING COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

JULIE L. POWLESS Case No. 25 CA 00027 [now known as JULIE L. STRONG], Opinion & Judgment Entry Plaintiff - Appellee Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas -vs- of Licking County, Domestic Relations Division, MARK W. POWLESS, Case No. 2003 DR 00619

Defendant - Appellant Judgment: Affirmed

Date of Judgment: December 29, 2025

BEFORE: William B. Hoffman; Kevin W. Popham; David M. Gormley, Judges

APPEARANCES: Jessica N. Rowland and Joseph A. Nigh, Columbus, Ohio, for Plaintiff-Appellee; Craig M. Stewart, Columbus, Ohio, for Defendant-Appellant.

Gormley, J.

{¶1} Defendant Mark Powless argues in this domestic-relations appeal that the

trial court erred by approving Plaintiff Julie Strong’s proposed division-of-property order

that awarded her — in accordance with the parties’ 2003 divorce decree under which

Strong was entitled to one-half of Powless’s “retirement benefits” — one-half of Powless’s

disability benefits that the trial court found he was receiving in lieu of retirement benefits.

Strong in turn argues that we should dismiss this appeal because the April 3, 2025

judgment entry that Powless challenges was not, in her view, a final and appealable order.

For the reasons explained below, we deny Strong’s motion to dismiss and affirm the trial

court’s judgment.

The Key Facts and Procedural History {¶2} Strong and Powless were married for over 20 years before their marriage

was terminated by a 2003 divorce decree, which provided that Strong was “awarded one-

half of the state pension and/or retirement benefits” that Powless had earned during their

marriage.

{¶3} Strong alleges that several years after the 2003 divorce in this case, she

learned that Powless was receiving disability benefits instead of retirement benefits.

(Strong was not then receiving either type of benefit under the divorce decree.) Strong in

February 2024 filed a motion for relief from judgment under Civ.R. 60(B). In its decision

denying that motion in July 2024, the trial court found that Strong had not presented

sufficient evidence that Powless was receiving disability payments in lieu of any

retirement benefits.

{¶4} In that same ruling, though, the trial court found that the term “retirement

benefits” in the 2003 divorce decree was ambiguous, and the court noted that “disability

benefits received in lieu of retirement pay constitute retirement benefits.” This meant, in

the trial court’s view, that Strong was entitled to receive one-half of any disability

payments that Powless was receiving in lieu of any retirement pay to which he was

entitled for his employment during the parties’ marriage.

{¶5} The trial court also opined in its July 2024 ruling that a better vehicle for

resolving the concern raised by Strong would be a motion from her seeking clarification

of the divorce decree’s ambiguous language rather than the Civ.R. 60(B) motion that she

had filed. The court also outlined the proper steps that the parties could take to submit a

proposed order to divide any disability compensation that Powless was receiving in lieu

of retirement benefits. {¶6} In February 2025, the trial court, seemingly frustrated by the parties’ inability

to resolve the issue, ordered the parties to submit evidence indicating whether Powless

was in fact receiving disability benefits in lieu of retirement benefits and, if so, the amount

of those benefits. The court also ordered Powless to sign a release of information to allow

the State Teachers Retirement System (STRS) to disclose information about any

disability or retirement payments that he was receiving.

{¶7} After Strong received information from STRS about payments being made

to Powless, her counsel enlisted the assistance of a legal and actuarial consulting firm

known as the QDRO Group. QDRO Group determined — after looking at Powless’s

information from STRS — that Powless was indeed receiving disability benefits in lieu of

standard monthly retirement benefits and would continue to receive those benefits

assuming that his condition remained unchanged and he did not return to work for STRS.

Based on that information, combined with Powless’s failure to submit any evidence to the

contrary, the court adopted Strong’s proposed order that called for her to begin receiving

one-half of Powless’s disability benefits. Powless now appeals the trial court’s decision.

This Court Has Jurisdiction to Hear Powless’s Appeal

{¶8} We first address Strong’s argument that we should dismiss this appeal for

lack of jurisdiction. According to her, the trial court’s April 3, 2025 judgment entry

approving her request to receive half of the disability benefits now being paid to Powless

was not a final and appealable order because the court’s order merely enforces the terms

of the 2003 divorce decree, which she argues was the one final and appealable order in

this case. {¶9} A trial court’s decision regarding the division of retirement benefits in a

divorce action may be implemented through the issuance of a qualified domestic-relations

order (QDRO), which “creates or recognizes the existence of an alternate payee’s right

to, or assigns to an alternate payee the right to, receive all or a portion of the benefits”

payable under a retirement plan. Wilson v. Wilson, 2007-Ohio-6056, ¶ 6–7. Such orders

dividing retirement benefits payable by one of Ohio’s public retirement systems are

referred to as division-of-property orders (DOPO) because they must comply with certain

statutory requirements under Ohio law, but appellate courts generally treat QDROs and

DOPOs no differently. See Reeves v. Reeves, 2016-Ohio-4590, ¶ 9 (12th Dist.) (“While

the issue in the case at bar is the future execution of a DOPO, rather than a QDRO, the

reasoning remains the same and is not changed merely because the DOPO is specific to

a state pension where the QDRO divides private pensions”); Rice v. Rice, 2011-Ohio-

1366, ¶ 7 (8th Dist.) (“The terms DOPO and QDRO are used interchangeably for the

purposes of this appeal”).

{¶10} The Supreme Court of Ohio has explained that because it is the decree of

divorce that constitutes the final determination of the court when a domestic-relations

case is resolved on the merits, the divorce decree itself is the final and appealable order,

even if the decree calls for the future preparation of a QDRO. Wilson v. Wilson, 2007-

Ohio-6056, ¶ 15–16. Based on that logic, a QDRO that adheres to the terms of an earlier-

issued divorce decree is not an independent final order that may be challenged in an

appeal. Dutton v. Dutton, 2025-Ohio-1980, ¶ 22 (10th Dist.); Lamb v. Lamb, 1998 Ohio

App. LEXIS 6007, *5 (3d Dist. Dec. 4, 1998) (“the QDRO in this case does not affect a

substantial right of the parties in that it merely mimics the order of the original divorce decree”). Once a trial court has made its equitable division of marital property in a divorce

decree, that court no longer has jurisdiction to modify the decision. Butcher v. Butcher,

2011-Ohio-2550, ¶ 8 (8th Dist.), citing R.C. 3105.171(I).

{¶11} A trial court does, however, retain broad jurisdiction “to clarify and construe

its original property division so as to effectuate the judgment.” Oberst v. Oberst, 2010-

Ohio-452, ¶ 22 (5th Dist.). If a trial court finds that an ambiguity exists in a divorce decree,

that court has both a duty and the power to clarify and interpret it. Id. at ¶ 23.

{¶12} And a trial court’s decision interpreting for the first time the meaning of

ambiguous language in an earlier divorce decree is a final and appealable order that an

appellate court has jurisdiction to review. Miller v. Miller, 2008-Ohio-2106, ¶ 15 (9th Dist.)

(“the actual basis for Husband’s challenge is the 2006 Order interpreting the parties’

divorce decree and adopting the 2006 Formula. . . . We now know that the 2006 Order

was final and appealable”); Haddox v. Haddox, 2022-Ohio-3500, ¶ 47–48 (6th Dist.) (“All

that remained to determine was the methodology of th[e] offset, which the trial court found

to be ‘unclear’ from the original decree. . . . Since the trial court first determined the

methodology for the offset in its October 18, 2018 decision, that decision was final and

appealable”).

{¶13} We find that the trial court’s April 3, 2025 order resolving an alleged

ambiguity in the divorce decree and approving Strong’s proposed DOPO is a final and

appealable order. Under the 2003 divorce decree, Strong is entitled to “one-half of the

state pension and/or retirement benefits” earned by Powless during the marriage. The

term “retirement benefits” is ambiguous, according to the trial court, and that court has now clarified what that term means. That decision by the trial court is, in our view, a final

and appealable order, and Powless’s appeal is therefore properly before us now.

The Trial Court Did Not Err by Approving Strong’s Proposed DOPO

{¶14} Powless argues in his sole assignment of error that the trial court erred in

approving Strong’s proposed DOPO that calls for his ex-wife to receive one-half of the

monthly disability payment being paid to him by STRS. In support of his argument,

Powless argues that the trial court, in its July 2024 entry denying Strong’s Civ.R. 60(B)

motion for relief from the divorce-decree judgment, found that Strong had failed to present

sufficient evidence that he was receiving disability compensation in lieu of retirement

benefits. That finding by the trial court, Powless argues, precluded Strong from

presenting any further evidence to the court regarding the issue of Powless’s disability

benefits.

The Doctrine of Claim Preclusion Did Not Bar the Trial Court From Considering Additional Evidence Concerning the Proper Interpretation of the 2003 Divorce Decree

{¶15} Under the doctrine of claim preclusion, “a valid, final judgment rendered

upon the merits bars all subsequent actions based upon any claim arising out of the

transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action.” Grava v.

Parkman Twp., 73 Ohio St.3d 379, 382 (1995).

{¶16} We are unpersuaded by Powless’s argument that claim preclusion barred

the trial court from considering whatever evidence might be needed by that court to give

proper effect to the 2003 divorce decree. Trial courts in domestic-relations cases have

long been permitted to hold post-decree hearings and to consider at those hearings any

extrinsic evidence that helps to clarify ambiguities in divorce decrees. See Slife v. Slife, 1987 Ohio App. LEXIS 10334, * 40 (10th Dist. Dec. 31, 1987) (“the trial court, in the midst

of continuing dispute between the parties, merely clarified its original judgment but did not

disturb a final judgment which was conclusive of the rights of the parties”); Dorsky v.

Dorsky, 1981 Ohio App. LEXIS 14072, *15 (8th Dist. Dec. 10, 1981) (finding that, although

a divorce decree is a final judgment as to all issues adjudicated in the divorce action, that

does not mean that “a divorce decree may not be interpreted or clarified,” and “parol

evidence may be used to interpret an ambiguous divorce decree”). In other words, the

trial court’s finding that Strong presented insufficient evidence to be relieved from the

2003 divorce decree did not preclude the trial court from later considering evidence

necessary to enforce the terms of that final judgment.

{¶17} In the April 2025 judgment entry in which the trial court approved Strong’s

DOPO, that court pointed out that it viewed the issue raised by Strong in her 60(B) motion

not as one seeking relief from judgment, but instead as a request to clarify and interpret

language already contained in the 2003 divorce decree. We therefore find that claim

preclusion did not prevent the court from seeking additional evidence to interpret the

meaning of the language in the 2003 divorce decree.

The Trial Court Had the Authority to Clarify and Enforce the Terms of the 2003 Divorce Decree

{¶18} Powless argues that the trial court improperly ordered the division of an

asset that was not marital property. We disagree.

{¶19} We review with fresh eyes a trial court’s finding that language is ambiguous.

Oberst, 2010-Ohio-452, at ¶ 24 (5th Dist.). If an appellate court agrees that language is

ambiguous, the trial court’s clarification is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Stevens

v. Stevens, 2018-Ohio-2662, ¶ 31 (2d Dist.). {¶20} As explained above, a trial court retains broad jurisdiction to “clarify and

construe its original property division so as to effectuate the judgment.” Oberst at ¶ 22.

“An ambiguity exists when a provision in an order or decree is reasonably susceptible to

more than one meaning.” McKinney v. McKinney, 142 Ohio App.3d 604, 609 (2d Dist.

2001). Where an ambiguity exists, the trial court has the duty to interpret and clarify the

language by considering the intent of the parties and the fairness of the agreement.

Oberst at ¶ 23.

{¶21} Our court has previously determined that disability benefits are not marital

property unless those benefits are being received in lieu of retirement pay, “‘in which case

they are marital property to the extent that retirement pay value is included in the disability

pension benefit.’” Cockerham v. Cockerham, 2017-Ohio-5563, ¶ 28 (5th Dist.), quoting

Bevan v. Bevan, 2008-Ohio-724, ¶ 7 (9th Dist.).

{¶22} The 2003 divorce decree awarded to Strong “one half of the state pension

and/or retirement benefits” of Powless. We agree with the trial court’s finding that the

meaning of “retirement benefits” is unclear in the 2003 divorce decree. That term was

not defined anywhere in the decree, and as the trial court noted, that term does not have

the same straightforward meaning as the term “pension.” The trial court, therefore, had

the authority to clarify the meaning of the term “retirement benefits” in the 2003 divorce

decree, and that court permissibly directed the parties to submit evidence on the question.

{¶23} In applying our court’s decision in Cockerham, the trial court determined

that, under the terms of the 2003 divorce decree, Strong was entitled to one-half of

Powless’s disability benefits because they were being received by him in lieu of standard

age-and-service retirement benefits. In reaching that conclusion, the trial court considered evidence submitted by Strong, including a letter from STRS stating that

Powless was in fact receiving a disability retirement benefit. Strong also submitted to the

court information she obtained after working with QDRO Group, which found — after

looking at documents provided by STRS — that Powless was receiving disability benefits

in lieu of standard monthly age-and-service retirement benefits and would continue to do

so for his lifetime unless his condition improved or he returned to work for STRS.

Powless, in turn, provided no new evidence to the court.

{¶24} On this record, we see no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s finding that

the divorce decree’s term “retirement benefits” includes the disability payments now being

received by Powless. His assignment of error is overruled.

{¶25} For these reasons, Strong’s motion to dismiss the appeal is denied, and the

judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs are to be paid by Appellant Mark W. Powless.

By: Gormley, J.;

Hoffman, P.J. and

Popham, J. concur.