UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
POWER THE FUTURE, : : Plaintiff, : Civil Action No.: 24-1942 (RC) : v. : Re Document No.: 5 : WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL ON : ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, : : Defendant. :
MEMORANDUM OPINION
GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Power the Future (“PTF” or “Plaintiff”) brings this suit under the Freedom of
Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552, to obtain all emails sent or received by Defendant
White House Council on Environmental Quality (“CEQ,” the “Agency,” or “Defendant”) Chief
of Staff Matthew Lee-Ashley from June 30, 2021 to May 31, 2024. CEQ moves to dismiss the
Complaint, or, in the alternative, seeks summary judgment, arguing that PTF’s FOIA request is
not reasonably described. For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s FOIA
request is not reasonably described as required by the FOIA and grants Defendant’s motion for
summary judgment.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
PTF is a “non-profit organization . . . dedicated to disseminating research, sharing facts
and truths, engaging at the local level and interacting with the media, specifically relating to
energy and environmental public policy.” Compl. ¶ 4, ECF No. 1 (internal quotations omitted).
On May 31, 2024, PTF submitted a FOIA request to CEQ, id. ¶ 9, an office within the Executive Office of the President that “consults and coordinates with federal agencies . . . on the
implementation of [the National Environmental Policy Act]” and “advises and assists the
President on policies that promote the improvement of environmental quality.” See Council on
Environmental Quality, The White House, https://perma.cc/W32C-A555. In the FOIA request,
PTF sought
copies of all electronic mail a) sent to or from (whether as cc: or bcc:) Chief of Staff Matthew Lee-Ashley, b) dated at any time from June 30, 2021 through May 31, 2024, inclusive, that c) is also sent to, from or which copies any email address ending in @who.eop.gov, excluding calendar invitations.
Ex. A to Decl. of Howard C. Sun (“Sun Decl.”) at 1, ECF No. 5-2 (emphasis omitted). In
addition to excluding calendar invitations, the request sought to exclude “correspondence that
merely receives or forwards . . . newsletters, press releases, or press summaries” and “any
duplicates” of each responsive record. Id. The purpose for this request is to “shed light on
CEQ’s involvement in the current administration’s declared ‘whole of government’ approach to
imposing a never enacted ‘climate’ agenda.” Compl. ¶ 10.
On June 4, 2024, CEQ confirmed receipt of PTF’s FOIA request and assigned the request
a number, FY2024-198. Id. ¶ 13. On July 3, 2024, PTF filed this lawsuit claiming that CEQ was
in violation of FOIA because the Agency was required to provide a determination on the FOIA
request by July 1, 2024. Id. ¶¶ 19–21; 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(a). At the time this lawsuit was
filed, the June 4, 2024 communication was the only correspondence PTF had received from the
Agency. Compl. ¶ 15. On July 11, 2024, the Agency emailed PTF with a determination that the
FOIA request was “overly broad” and offered to work with PTF to narrow the scope of the
request. Ex. C to Sun Decl. To this Court’s knowledge, no other communication regarding the
scope of the request has occurred between the parties. Sun Decl. ¶ 11.
2 In the present suit, PTF seeks (1) a judgment declaring that it is entitled to the requested
records and that CEQ’s processing of the FOIA request is not in accordance with the law; (2) an
injunction ordering CEQ to produce the requested records; and (3) payment of litigation costs
and attorney fees. See Compl. ¶¶ 22–33. CEQ moves for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), or, in
the alternative, for summary judgment, arguing that the FOIA request is not reasonably described
and would impose an undue burden on the agency. See Mot. Dismiss, Alternatively, Summ. J. &
Supp. Mem. Thereof (“Def.’s Mot.”) at 5–10, ECF No. 5. PTF opposes the motion, maintaining
that its FOIA request is reasonably described and that CEQ cannot claim undue burden as a
substantive defense. See Pl.’s Mem. L. Opp’n Mot. Dismiss & Alternative Mot. Summ. J. (“Pl.’s
Opp’n”) at 5–15, ECF No. 6. The motion is now fully briefed and ripe for review.
III. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Summary Judgment
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment shall be granted “if the
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “In FOIA cases, summary judgment may
be granted on the basis of agency affidavits if they contain reasonable specificity of detail rather
than merely conclusory statements, and if they are not called into question by contradictory
evidence in the record or by evidence of agency bad faith.” Aguiar v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 865
F.3d 730, 734–35 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Jud. Watch, Inc.
v. U.S. Secret Serv., 726 F.3d 208, 215 (D.C. Cir. 2013)); see also Students Against Genocide v.
Dep’t of State, 257 F.3d 828, 833 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“[A]n agency is entitled to summary
judgment if no material facts are in dispute and if it demonstrates ‘that each document that falls
3 within the class requested either has been produced . . . or is wholly exempt from the Act’s
inspection requirements.’” (quoting Goland v. CIA, 607 F.2d 339, 352 (D.C. Cir. 1978))).
B. Freedom of Information Act
The FOIA requires federal agencies to “make . . . records promptly available to any
person” who “reasonably describes such records” and makes the request “in accordance with
published rules stating the time, place, fees (if any), and procedures to be followed.” 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(a)(3)(A). A FOIA request reasonably describes agency records when it “would be
sufficient [to] enable[] a professional employee of the agency who was familiar with the subject
area of the request to locate the record with a reasonable amount of effort.” Truitt v. Dep’t of
State, 897 F.2d 540, 545 n.36 (D.C. Cir. 1990). “The linchpin inquiry is whether the agency is
able to determine precisely what records are being requested.’” Yeager v. Drug Enf’t Admin.,
678 F.2d 315, 326 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
IV. ANALYSIS
CEQ moves for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), or, in the alternative, for summary
judgment under Rule 56. See Def.’s Mot at 1. CEQ argues that a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss is appropriate because PTF’s request is not reasonably described on its face and is not
procedurally compliant. See Reply Supp. Mot. Dismiss or Summ. J. (“Def.’s Reply”) at 1–4,
ECF No. 8. In the alternative, CEQ argues that summary judgment is appropriate because PTF’s
FOIA request would be unduly burdensome to process such that it fails to be reasonably
described under 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A). See id. at 4–7. Circuit precedent establishes that an
agency is not required to comply with a request for which its post-search efforts would “impose
an unreasonable burden.” Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., Local 2782 v. U.S. Dep’t of Com. (“AFGE
II”), 907 F.2d 203, 209 (D.C. Cir. 1990). While the parties make arguments addressing both
4 motions, the Court ultimately finds there is no genuine dispute of material fact and that PTF’s
request would create an unreasonable burden on the Agency; thus, summary judgment for the
Agency is appropriate. Because the Court relies on information outside of the pleadings in
coming to its conclusion, the Court analyzes this motion under the summary judgment standard.
See Colbert v. Potter, 471 F.3d 158, 164 (D.C. Cir. 2006); see also Ctr. for Immigr. Stud. v. U.S.
Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 628 F. Supp. 3d 266, 275 (D.D.C. 2022) (“Because
the . . . requests require an unduly burdensome post-search effort, the Court will grant the
agency’s motion for summary judgment.”).
A. Reasonably Describes Requirement
The Circuit has identified three ways in which a request fails the “reasonably describes”
requirement of the FOIA. See Cntr. for Immigr. Stud., 628 F. Supp. 3d at 271–72; 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(a)(3)(A). First, a request that does not allow the agency “to determine precisely what
records are being requested” will not suffice. Yeager, 678 F.2d at 326 (internal quotation marks,
alterations, and citations omitted). Second, a request that would require “an unreasonably
burdensome search” is not reasonably described. Goland, 607 F.2d at 353. And third, even if an
agency is able to sufficiently identify the requested records, an agency is not required to process
a request for which its post-search efforts would “impose an unreasonable burden.” AFGE II,
907 F.3d at 209. Because this Court finds the third reason to be dispositive, the Court will only
address arguments on whether the request’s post-search efforts would impose an unreasonable
burden on the Agency.
1. Unreasonable Burden
CEQ argues that the disputed request is invalid “because of the undue burden that it
would impose on the agency.” Def.’s Mot. at 9. PTF opposes the motion, arguing that there is
5 no defense for undue burden under FOIA, and even if such a defense existed, the Agency’s
estimates are inaccurate because the Agency overestimates the number of responsive records.
See Pl.’s Opp’n at 14–15. Neither of PTF’s arguments are persuasive.
The Court begins with PTF’s unsupported assertion that “the mere fact that records are
voluminous is not a defense under FOIA.” Id. The D.C. Circuit established in AFGE II that
while a request “might identify the documents requested with sufficient precision to enable the
agency to identify them,” a request can still be “so broad as to impose an unreasonable burden
upon the agency.” 907 F.3d at 209. The Circuit’s rule focuses on the burdensomeness of the
post-search efforts, such as “locat[ing], review[ing], redact[ing], and arrang[ing] for inspection.”
Id. Regardless of whether this holding is couched as a requirement or defense, “it is the
requester’s responsibility to frame requests with sufficient particularity to ensure that searches
are not unreasonably burdensome.” Assassination Archives & Rsch. Ctr., Inc. v. CIA, 720 F.
Supp. 217, 219 (D.D.C. 1989), aff’d, No. 89-cv-5414, 1990 WL 123924 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 13,
1990) (citing Yeager, 678 F.2d 315). Thus, PTF’s assertion that there is no defense for undue
burden under FOIA contradicts Circuit precedent, and this Court must follow the binding Circuit
rule that a request for which its post-search efforts create an “unreasonable burden” fails the
“reasonably described” requirement of 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A). See AFGE II, 907 F.3d at 209.
Moving to PTF’s next argument, PTF asserts that the Agency’s estimates are inaccurate
because they overestimate the number of responsive records by not appropriately searching for
the records. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 15. PTF provides a declaration from Christopher Horner, counsel
for PTF, to support this argument. Decl. of Christopher Horner (“Horner Decl.”) ¶ 2, ECF
No. 6-1. In his declaration, Horner states that “in [his] experience . . . federal agencies
responding to FOIA requests do overstate, sometimes dramatically so, the number of potentially
6 responsive records subject to processing.” Id. ¶ 7. Further, Horner states that it is “unlikely that
hundreds of thousands of records [are] responsive” because the agency failed to “deduplicate
records,” “exclude calendar invitations,” and “remove news articles or non-substantive
'forwards.” Id. ¶ 9 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Agency provides a declaration from Howard Sun, who works in the Office of
General Counsel at CEQ, that provides insight as to how it calculated its estimates. See Sun
Decl. ¶ 1. In his declaration, Sun explains that “[a]lthough the FOIA request identified certain
limited categories of items that CEQ could treat as outside the scope of the request . . . CEQ still
would need to review the records closely . . . . Consequently, those limited exceptions [provided
by PTF] do not reduce the burden of the request.” Sun Decl. ¶ 13 n.1. Even though the Agency
can automatically screen out exact duplicates, it would still have to perform a manual review of
all records to determine which records can be excluded or are not responsive. See id.
In the FOIA context, affidavits submitted by an agency “enjoy a presumption of good
faith.” Ground Saucer Watch, Inc. v. CIA, 692 F.2d 770, 771 (D.C. Cir. 1981). This extends to
declarations and affidavits laying out “good faith estimate[s] of the excessive amount of time
required to” respond to a FOIA request. Pinson v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 80 F. Supp. 3d 211, 216
(D.D.C. 2015). “Purely speculative claims” are insufficient to rebut the presumption of good
faith awarded to agencies. Ground Saucer Watch, 692 F.2d at 771 (citation omitted).
In evaluating the competing declarations, the Court grants Sun’s declaration the
presumption of good faith awarded to declarations submitted by agencies. See Ground Saucer
Watch, 692 F.2d at 771; Pinson, 80 F. Supp. 3d at 216. In contrast, Horner’s declaration makes
“purely speculative claims” based solely on its own counsel’s prior FOIA experience in other
cases involving different declarants at different agencies. See Horner Decl. ¶ 9; Ground Saucer
7 Watch, 692 F.2d at 771 (citation omitted). Horner does not provide any reason specific to the
request at issue as to why the post-search burden would be less than stated in Sun’s declaration.
See id. Focusing on the numbers provided in Sun’s declaration, Horner suggests that the true
number of responsive records is significantly less than the Agency’s estimate. See id. But this
speculative conclusion misses the purpose of the Circuit’s ruling in AFGE II. As the Agency
describes in its declaration, to find the true number of responsive records, the Agency would
have to perform a manual review of all records to determine which records fit into one of the
limited exceptions provided by PTF. See Sun Decl. ¶ 13 n.1. And as the Circuit explained in
AFGE II, the unreasonable burden requirement focuses on the burdensomeness of the post-
search efforts. See AFGE II, 907 F.3d at 209. Because Horner’s declaration makes “purely
speculative claims” unrelated to the key purpose of this Circuit’s unreasonable burden holding,
the Court awards Sun’s declaration a presumption of good faith in accordance with Circuit
precedent. See Ground Saucer Watch, 692 F.2d at 771 (citation omitted); AFGE II, 907 F.3d at
209.
Moving to the Agency’s arguments in support of its motion, CEQ estimates that the
initial processing of PTF’s request would require 21,870 hours, or 911 workdays, if all current
FOIA Specialists employed by the Agency processed the request full-time. Sun Decl. ¶ 18. The
initial processing “would consume virtually all the time of the [Agency’s] limited FOIA staff for
over a three-year period.” Def.’s Mot. at 9; Sun Decl. ¶ 18–20. This estimate falls well above
what other courts in this district have found to be unreasonably burdensome. See, e.g., Wolf v.
CIA, 569 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2008) (finding 3,675 hours as unreasonable); Ctr. for Immigr.
Stud., 628 F. Supp. 3d at 272–73 (finding 8,151 hours as unreasonable); Ayuda, Inc. v. Fed.
Trade Comm’n, 70 F. Supp. 3d 247, 275–76 (D.D.C. 2014) (finding 8,000 hours as
8 unreasonable). Even if the Court were to apply the reduced responsiveness rate described in
Horner’s attached declaration, a 78% reduction in the amount of records the Agency would need
to process would still require about 4,800 hours, significantly greater than the number of hours
deemed unreasonable in Wolf. See 569 F. Supp. 2d at 9.1
But “burdensomeness does not boil down to a simple game of numbers,” Ctr. for Immigr.
Stud., 628 F. Supp. 3d at 273, and “sheer volume of responsive pages is not the only issue,” Feds
for Freedom v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., No. 23-cv-3607, 2025 WL 522017, at *3 (D.D.C. Feb. 18,
2025). The Agency relies on AFGE II to illustrate that PTF’s request is unreasonably
burdensome. See Def.’s Mot. at 10. In AFGE II, a labor union submitted broadly worded FOIA
requests seeking documents about the Census Bureau’s promotion policies, requiring inspection
of “every chronological office file and correspondence file, internal and external, for every
branch office, staff office, etc.” 907 F.2d at 205, 208–09 (alterations omitted). According to the
Circuit, such requests, which “might identify the documents requested with sufficient precision
to enable the agency to identify them,” still did not “reasonably describe[] a class of documents
subject to disclosure” because they were “so broad as to impose an unreasonable burden upon
the agency.” Id. at 209 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Circuit’s main
reason for reaching this conclusion was that responding to the request would be quite costly as it
“would require the agency to locate, review, redact, and arrange for inspection a vast quantity of
material.” AFGE II, 907 F.2d at 209.
1 In his declaration, Horner cites four examples “of a federal agency dramatically overstating the volume of potentially responsive records.” See Horner Decl. ¶ 8. Only one of the examples was from a case in this district, which is why this Court elects to use 78% for illustrative purposes. See id. (referring to Gov’t Accountability & Oversight v. U.S. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., No. 23-cv-1712 (D.D.C. filed June 13, 2023)).
9 Like the requests in AFGE II, PTF’s request seeks similarly broad categories of records.
While CEQ might be able to identify the documents requested, see Sun Decl. ¶ 13, the request is
still so broad as to impose an unreasonable burden on the Agency. See AFGE II, 907 F.2d at
209. Like the requests in AFGE II, PTF submitted a blanket request for “all electronic mail” sent
to or from a high-ranking officer in the Agency without any restriction on subject matter. Ex. A
to Sun Decl. at 1. Chief of Staff Matthew Lee-Ashley’s high-level position within the Agency
would likely implicate numerous FOIA exemptions and require time-consuming internal review
and consultation with the White House Counsel’s Office. See Sun Decl. ¶ 20. Because of the
nature of Chief of Staff Matthew Lee-Ashley’s position, the Agency’s post-search efforts
become even more burdensome. See Ctr. for Immigr. Stud., 628 F. Supp. 3d at 273 (“Taking
[the high positions of the three officials] into account, the agency’s current estimates likely
understate the time needed to produce all records.”).
The Court concludes that PTF’s request would require the Agency to undertake
unreasonably burdensome post-search efforts. See AFGE II, 907 F.2d at 209. Thus, the request
is not “reasonably described” as required by 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A), and the Agency has no
responsibility to further process the request. See id. The Court therefore grants Defendant’s
motion for summary judgment.2
2 Plaintiff has not requested discovery in order to oppose the present motion for summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). Accordingly, this Court finds no reason to depart from the general rule that “summary judgment may be granted on the basis of agency affidavits if they contain reasonable specificity of detail rather than merely conclusory statements, and if they are not called into question by contradictory evidence in the record or by evidence of agency bad faith.” Aguiar, 865 F.3d at 734–35 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
10 V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 5) is
GRANTED. An order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and
contemporaneously issued.
Dated: August 4, 2025 RUDOLPH CONTRERAS United States District Judge