Powell v. Swan's Administrator

35 Ky. 1, 5 Dana 1, 1837 Ky. LEXIS 1
CourtCourt of Appeals of Kentucky
DecidedApril 4, 1837
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 35 Ky. 1 (Powell v. Swan's Administrator) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Kentucky primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Powell v. Swan's Administrator, 35 Ky. 1, 5 Dana 1, 1837 Ky. LEXIS 1 (Ky. Ct. App. 1837).

Opinion

Judge Ewing

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The administrator of Swan filed his bill alleging that, on the 9th of November, 1821, Lazarus Powell executed his note to the intestate, payable one day after date, for the sum of one thousand and forty-two dollars sixty-three cents; that it was still unpaid; that the signature and seal had been tom off, by Powell, or by some casualty, so that it does not appear in what year it was executed.

It is also charged, that Harrison Powell was indebted to his intestate, in the sum of about four hundred dollars; that the note was surrendered up, on Lazarus Powell’s assuming to pay the debt, which still remained unpaid. The mutilated note is exhibited, with certain figures indorsed on it, with the affidavit of James Swan, deceased, that the note was still unpaid, and a prayer for a decree for both sums, with a prayer for general relief,

Decree of the court below, and appeal. An answer, which is specific and positive as to some minor facts, while, as to others, of more recent date and of more importance, it speaks in doubting, qualified terms, giving the respondent’s present impressions &c. is calculated to cast doubt and suspicion upon his whole defence.

[2]*2The answer of Powell denies the allegations of indebtedness on both scores; and professing to give a detailed account of the origin of the note in question, and the manner of its payment, alleges that, in the year 1808, the respondent borrowed of the complainant’s intestate, one thousand dollars, payable in four years. That he had paid the interest in advance, and had paid off and lifted the note, and exhibits it in his answer. That large sums in usury had been exacted from him, and, as evidence thereof, exhibits a note of one thousand seven hundred and eleven dollars sixty-three cents, payable one day after date, and dated the 30th of July, 1819, executed by him to Swan, with his name torn off, indorsed upon which are various calculations in figures, a part of which seems to have been mutilated by a slip tom off the paper.

That on the 9th of November, 1821, there was a settlement between the parties, in which he admits that he was to take up the note on Harrison, and that the balance due amounted to the sum mentioned in the mutilated note set up in the bill. And then alleges, that “after this, the impression on his mind, at this time, is, that he proposed to give a note he held on G. Carter for nine hundred dollars, and the balance in money, and take up the note set up in the bill;” which was accepted by Swan, and the note taken up and destroyed. That Swan afterwards became dissatisfied, and he took back Carter’s note, and executed his own note to Swan for the amount; upon which judgment has been recovered against him at law; and, by cross bill, he prays an injunction against the whole amount, on the ground of usury.

The answer to the cross bill, denies positively the usury, and every other material allegation.

The Circuit Court gave a decree in favor of Swan’s administrator, for the amount of the mutilated note, and dissolved the injunction against the judgment at law, with damages and costs. From which Powell has ap-appealed to this Court.

The answer of Powell is evasive and disingenuous, and is well calculated to cast a cloud of suspicion over [3]*3his defence. After detailing facts more ancient, and less calculated, to make a lasting impression on the mind, with apparent confidence and precision, he alleges, as to the payment of the mutilated note, that it is his present impression that it was paid in the note on Carter, &c. And after setting out in detail the manner in which the note originated, and his impression of its payment, he concludes by the use of the following language: "if ever said note was given by said respondent

An ans’r in ch’y admits the execution of a note, the signature of which had been torn off, but alleges that the note had been paid: the onus probandi to show the payment, is upon the respondent. The fact, that the promisor’s name has been taken off a note, affords strong presumptive evidence of its payment—if the note, in that condition, is in his possession; but if the note remains in the possession of the payee, that fact repels the presumption.

The term impression, in the statement of the most material matter of defence, which could not well have escaped the recollection of the respondent, seems strongly to indicate, that it was thrust in as a salvo to the conscience; and the concluding words strongly impress the mind with the belief, that he was striving to fabricate a successful defence, without much regard to the truth of the ground assumed.

Assuming that the answer admits the due execution of the note, which cannot be questioned from the prior detailed statements it contains, and placing the defence on. the allegation of payment, the onus probandi, to establish the fact of payment in this, as in all other cases, lies upon the respondent. This is attempted to be made out by two grades of evidence: first — by presumption arising from the fact, that the name is torn, off; and, secondly—by the proof of witnesses.

As it is customary for individuals when they pay off a note, to take possession of it, and tear off their names, had Powell the possession of the note in the case before the Court, it would create a strong presumption in favor of its having been discharged. But as it is unusual for notes that have been discharged to be left in the possession of the promisee, the fact of possession, in this case, by Swan, unaccounted for, or explained — especially when it is considered, that a note may be, and often is, mutilated by casualty or design, in the hands of the promissee — repels the presumption of payment, based on this fact. The possession of an acknowledged genuine note, raises probably as strong, or stronger, presumption in favor of the possessor’s right to demand its payment, without the ability to account for its mutilation, as the [4]*4fact of its mutilation will create in favor of its payment, without accounting for its possession with the promisee. If paid, it was probably lifted; and if lifted, how has it gotten back into the possession of Swan? As the burthen of proof lies on the payor, he should account for. this circumstance. He has wholly failed to do so, or to show that he ever had possession of the note after its, execution.

Circumstances in the character and condition of a witness; evasions in his deposition, and statements inconsistent with facts established in the case—the whole deemed sufficient to render his deposition unworthy of any credit. Statement of circumstances and facts, appearing in the record, from which a conclusion results, satisfactory to the court, that the note upon which the bill, in this case, is founded, had not been paid, altho’ the signature had been torn off, & the def’t alleges, as his impression, and one witness testifies, that it had been raid, in a specified manner.

[4]*4When the parol proof is scrutinized, it falls as far short of satisfying this Court, that the payment has been made.

The deposition of Harrison Powell is taken, who, from the name, is probably related to the respondent, and who, from proof, is of doubtful character.

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Bluebook (online)
35 Ky. 1, 5 Dana 1, 1837 Ky. LEXIS 1, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/powell-v-swans-administrator-kyctapp-1837.