Powell v. Powell

257 S.E.2d 531, 244 Ga. 25, 1979 Ga. LEXIS 1088
CourtSupreme Court of Georgia
DecidedJuly 2, 1979
Docket35022
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 257 S.E.2d 531 (Powell v. Powell) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Powell v. Powell, 257 S.E.2d 531, 244 Ga. 25, 1979 Ga. LEXIS 1088 (Ga. 1979).

Opinion

Undercofler, Presiding Justice.

This is a petition for appointment of a receiver to partition certain real estate owned by the parties, and an order to sell for division. The trial court found the defendants had defaulted and granted the prayers of the petition. They appeal.

1. Appellants first contend there was no default as to the three out-of-state defendants because the court acquired no personal jurisdiction over them until they submitted themselves to its jurisdiction by filing their answer. We disagree. The suit for partitioning is an "in rem” action affecting the out-of-state defendants’ interest in the property. Under Code Ann. § 81A-104 (e) (ii), in rem jurisdiction of these defendants was acquired by service by publication. Personal jurisdiction by submission to the jurisdiction of the court was not necessary. Therefore, the out-of-state defendants were in default 60 days after the order of service by publication as provided in Code Ann. § 81A-104 (e) (ii). Since they did not pay costs, they were not entitled to reopen default as a matter of right under Code Ann. § 81A-155 (a).1 The trial court did not err in refusing [26]*26to open default under Code Ann. § 81A-155 (b),* 2 since the appropriate motion was not filed. Similarly, it did not err as to the in-state defendants, who filed their answer more than 45 days after service and also failed to file a motion as required by Code Ann. § 81A-155 (b). See Coleman v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 130 Ga. App. 228 (202 SE2d 698) (1973).

Submitted June 15, 1979 Decided July 2, 1979. J. Laddie Boatright, for appellants. C. W. Heath, for appellees.

2. Appellants next contend that the court erred in failing to hear evidence on their defenses even though the case was in default. The allegations of the complaint stand admitted and appellant cannot then attack the sufficiency of the deed. Thus it was not error for the court in its discretion to order a receiver appointed and the land sold. See Thomson v. Wooster, 114 U. S. 104 (5 SC 788, 29 LE 105) (1885). It follows that the appellants were not entitled to a trial by jury.

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

SRM Realty Services Group, LLC v. Capital Flooring Enterprises, Inc.
617 S.E.2d 581 (Court of Appeals of Georgia, 2005)
Grandpa's Store, Inc. v. City of Norcross
275 S.E.2d 59 (Supreme Court of Georgia, 1981)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
257 S.E.2d 531, 244 Ga. 25, 1979 Ga. LEXIS 1088, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/powell-v-powell-ga-1979.