IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
2021-NCCOA-347
No. COA20-406
Filed 20 July 2021
New Hanover County, No. 18CVS2952
LARRY POWELL AND ALL AMERICAN BAIL BONDING, LLC, A North Carolina Limited Liability Company, Plaintiffs,
v.
MARK WAYNE CARTRET, Defendant.
Appeal by the North Carolina Department of Insurance from order entered 4
November 2019 by Judge W. Allen Cobb, Jr., in New Hanover County Superior Court.
Heard in the Court of Appeals 11 May 2021.
Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Special Deputy Attorney General Daniel Johnson, for Appellant North Carolina Department of Insurance.
Law Offices of G. Grady Richardson, Jr., P.C., by G. Grady Richardson Jr. and Susan Renton, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.
COLLINS, Judge.
¶1 The North Carolina Department of Insurance (“Department”) appeals from an
order denying its motion to quash the subpoena of Larry Powell and All American
Bail Bonding, LLC, (“Plaintiffs”) to produce documents and to testify at a Rule
30(b)(6) deposition. The Department contends that the trial court’s order fails to
comply with the plain language of N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 58-10-430(c) and 58-30-62(f) and POWELL V. CARTRET
Opinion of the Court
erroneously orders the Department to release confidential documents.
I. Background
¶2 Plaintiffs filed a verified complaint on 20 August 2018 against Mark Wayne
Cartret (“Defendant”) alleging breach of contract. Defendant filed an answer and
counterclaims, alleging damages to himself and/or his company, Agent Associates
Insurance, LLC, (“AAI”). Plaintiffs issued a subpoena to the Department on 22
August 2019 to produce documents relating to Defendant and AAI, and to testify at
a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition. The Department timely served upon Plaintiffs an
Objection and Motion to Quash Plaintiffs’ Subpoena and 30(b)(6) Deposition
(“Motion”). In its Motion, the Department argued that certain documents and
information sought by the subpoena were confidential and could not be released,
pursuant to numerous provisions in Chapter 58 of the North Carolina General
Statutes, including, in relevant part, N.C. Gen. Stat §§ 58-10-430(c) and 58-30-62(f).
¶3 After a hearing on the Motion, the trial court entered an Order wherein it
found, in relevant part:
9. None of the statutory provisions cited by the [Department] in its Quash Motion under Chapter 58 of the North Carolina General Statutes provide that records can never be obtained from the [Department]. Rather, the statutory provisions cited by the [Department] specifically provide that records requested by subpoena that may fall under Chapter 58 of the North Carolina General Statutes shall be provided “upon an order of a court of competent jurisdiction.” POWELL V. CARTRET
The trial court concluded, in relevant part:
3. The records requested in Plaintiffs’ Subpoena may be produced under Chapter 58 of the North Carolina General Statutes “upon an order of a court of competent jurisdiction,” notwithstanding assertions of statutory confidentiality by the [Department] or alleged statutory requirements that the information be kept confidential.
The trial court ordered the Department to “produce full and complete records to
Plaintiffs’ counsel pursuant to Plaintiffs’ Subpoena” within sixty days and to “submit
to [Plaintiffs’] deposition pursuant to N.C. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6)” within forty-five days
of the date of production of the Department’s records. The Department timely
appealed “from those parts of the Order . . . that ordered the Department to disclose
subpoenaed documents that are confidential under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-10-430(c) and
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-30-62(f).”
II. Appellate Jurisdiction
¶4 Plaintiffs moved to dismiss the Department’s appeal as the Order is
interlocutory. The Department concedes the Order is interlocutory but argues that
the Order affects a substantial right and is thus immediately appealable.
¶5 Interlocutory orders are those “made during the pendency of an action which
do not dispose of the case, but instead leave it for further action by the trial court to
settle and determine the entire controversy.” Carriker v. Carriker, 350 N.C. 71, 73,
511 S.E.2d 2, 4 (1999) (citation omitted). Generally, there is no right to immediately POWELL V. CARTRET
appeal an interlocutory order compelling discovery, and “an appeal will lie only from
a final judgment.” Steele v. Moore-Flesher Hauling Co., 260 N.C. 486, 491, 133 S.E.2d
197, 201 (1963) (citation omitted).
¶6 However, “immediate appeal is available from an interlocutory order or
judgment which affects a ‘substantial right.’” Sharpe v. Worland, 351 N.C. 159, 162,
522 S.E.2d 577, 579 (1999) (citations omitted); see N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 1-277(a) and 7A-
27(b)(3)(a) (2019). A two-part test is used to determine whether an interlocutory
order affects a substantial right and is therefore immediately appealable. First, “the
right itself must be substantial[,]” and second, “the deprivation of that substantial
right must potentially work injury . . . if not corrected before appeal from final
judgment.” Sharpe, 351 N.C. at 162, 522 S.E.2d at 579 (quotation marks and citation
omitted).
¶7 The Department contends that the trial court’s order affected a substantial
right because the Department was ordered to disclose documents that are
confidential and not subject to disclosure, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-10-430(c)
and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-30-62(f). Indeed, if the Department is required to disclose
the very documents that it alleges are protected from disclosure by the statutory
confidentiality provisions, then “a right materially affecting those interests which [an
entity] is entitled to have preserved and protected by law -- a substantial right -- is
affected.” Id. at 164-65, 522 S.E.2d at 580-81 (quotation marks and citations omitted). POWELL V. CARTRET
Moreover, the substantial right asserted by the Department will be lost if the trial
court’s order is not reviewed before entry of a final judgment. See Lockwood v.
McCaskill, 261 N.C. 754, 757, 136 S.E.2d 67, 69 (1964) (“If and when Dr. Wright is
required to testify concerning privileged matters at a deposition hearing, eo instante
the statutory privilege is destroyed. This fact precludes dismissal of the appeal as
fragmentary and premature.”) Accordingly, the Order on appeal affects a substantial
right; we deny Plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss and address the merits of the
Department’s arguments.
III. Standard of Review
¶8 Generally, a ruling on a motion to quash a subpoena is left to the sound
discretion of the trial court and an order denying a motion to quash is reviewed only
for an abuse of discretion. State v. Newell, 82 N.C. App. 707, 709, 348 S.E.2d 158,
160 (1986). However, where, as here, an appeal presents a question of statutory
interpretation, this Court conducts a de novo review of the trial court’s conclusions of
law. Morgan v. Steiner, 173 N.C. App. 577, 579, 619 S.E.2d 516, 518 (2005) (citation
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
2021-NCCOA-347
No. COA20-406
Filed 20 July 2021
New Hanover County, No. 18CVS2952
LARRY POWELL AND ALL AMERICAN BAIL BONDING, LLC, A North Carolina Limited Liability Company, Plaintiffs,
v.
MARK WAYNE CARTRET, Defendant.
Appeal by the North Carolina Department of Insurance from order entered 4
November 2019 by Judge W. Allen Cobb, Jr., in New Hanover County Superior Court.
Heard in the Court of Appeals 11 May 2021.
Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Special Deputy Attorney General Daniel Johnson, for Appellant North Carolina Department of Insurance.
Law Offices of G. Grady Richardson, Jr., P.C., by G. Grady Richardson Jr. and Susan Renton, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.
COLLINS, Judge.
¶1 The North Carolina Department of Insurance (“Department”) appeals from an
order denying its motion to quash the subpoena of Larry Powell and All American
Bail Bonding, LLC, (“Plaintiffs”) to produce documents and to testify at a Rule
30(b)(6) deposition. The Department contends that the trial court’s order fails to
comply with the plain language of N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 58-10-430(c) and 58-30-62(f) and POWELL V. CARTRET
Opinion of the Court
erroneously orders the Department to release confidential documents.
I. Background
¶2 Plaintiffs filed a verified complaint on 20 August 2018 against Mark Wayne
Cartret (“Defendant”) alleging breach of contract. Defendant filed an answer and
counterclaims, alleging damages to himself and/or his company, Agent Associates
Insurance, LLC, (“AAI”). Plaintiffs issued a subpoena to the Department on 22
August 2019 to produce documents relating to Defendant and AAI, and to testify at
a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition. The Department timely served upon Plaintiffs an
Objection and Motion to Quash Plaintiffs’ Subpoena and 30(b)(6) Deposition
(“Motion”). In its Motion, the Department argued that certain documents and
information sought by the subpoena were confidential and could not be released,
pursuant to numerous provisions in Chapter 58 of the North Carolina General
Statutes, including, in relevant part, N.C. Gen. Stat §§ 58-10-430(c) and 58-30-62(f).
¶3 After a hearing on the Motion, the trial court entered an Order wherein it
found, in relevant part:
9. None of the statutory provisions cited by the [Department] in its Quash Motion under Chapter 58 of the North Carolina General Statutes provide that records can never be obtained from the [Department]. Rather, the statutory provisions cited by the [Department] specifically provide that records requested by subpoena that may fall under Chapter 58 of the North Carolina General Statutes shall be provided “upon an order of a court of competent jurisdiction.” POWELL V. CARTRET
The trial court concluded, in relevant part:
3. The records requested in Plaintiffs’ Subpoena may be produced under Chapter 58 of the North Carolina General Statutes “upon an order of a court of competent jurisdiction,” notwithstanding assertions of statutory confidentiality by the [Department] or alleged statutory requirements that the information be kept confidential.
The trial court ordered the Department to “produce full and complete records to
Plaintiffs’ counsel pursuant to Plaintiffs’ Subpoena” within sixty days and to “submit
to [Plaintiffs’] deposition pursuant to N.C. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6)” within forty-five days
of the date of production of the Department’s records. The Department timely
appealed “from those parts of the Order . . . that ordered the Department to disclose
subpoenaed documents that are confidential under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-10-430(c) and
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-30-62(f).”
II. Appellate Jurisdiction
¶4 Plaintiffs moved to dismiss the Department’s appeal as the Order is
interlocutory. The Department concedes the Order is interlocutory but argues that
the Order affects a substantial right and is thus immediately appealable.
¶5 Interlocutory orders are those “made during the pendency of an action which
do not dispose of the case, but instead leave it for further action by the trial court to
settle and determine the entire controversy.” Carriker v. Carriker, 350 N.C. 71, 73,
511 S.E.2d 2, 4 (1999) (citation omitted). Generally, there is no right to immediately POWELL V. CARTRET
appeal an interlocutory order compelling discovery, and “an appeal will lie only from
a final judgment.” Steele v. Moore-Flesher Hauling Co., 260 N.C. 486, 491, 133 S.E.2d
197, 201 (1963) (citation omitted).
¶6 However, “immediate appeal is available from an interlocutory order or
judgment which affects a ‘substantial right.’” Sharpe v. Worland, 351 N.C. 159, 162,
522 S.E.2d 577, 579 (1999) (citations omitted); see N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 1-277(a) and 7A-
27(b)(3)(a) (2019). A two-part test is used to determine whether an interlocutory
order affects a substantial right and is therefore immediately appealable. First, “the
right itself must be substantial[,]” and second, “the deprivation of that substantial
right must potentially work injury . . . if not corrected before appeal from final
judgment.” Sharpe, 351 N.C. at 162, 522 S.E.2d at 579 (quotation marks and citation
omitted).
¶7 The Department contends that the trial court’s order affected a substantial
right because the Department was ordered to disclose documents that are
confidential and not subject to disclosure, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-10-430(c)
and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-30-62(f). Indeed, if the Department is required to disclose
the very documents that it alleges are protected from disclosure by the statutory
confidentiality provisions, then “a right materially affecting those interests which [an
entity] is entitled to have preserved and protected by law -- a substantial right -- is
affected.” Id. at 164-65, 522 S.E.2d at 580-81 (quotation marks and citations omitted). POWELL V. CARTRET
Moreover, the substantial right asserted by the Department will be lost if the trial
court’s order is not reviewed before entry of a final judgment. See Lockwood v.
McCaskill, 261 N.C. 754, 757, 136 S.E.2d 67, 69 (1964) (“If and when Dr. Wright is
required to testify concerning privileged matters at a deposition hearing, eo instante
the statutory privilege is destroyed. This fact precludes dismissal of the appeal as
fragmentary and premature.”) Accordingly, the Order on appeal affects a substantial
right; we deny Plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss and address the merits of the
Department’s arguments.
III. Standard of Review
¶8 Generally, a ruling on a motion to quash a subpoena is left to the sound
discretion of the trial court and an order denying a motion to quash is reviewed only
for an abuse of discretion. State v. Newell, 82 N.C. App. 707, 709, 348 S.E.2d 158,
160 (1986). However, where, as here, an appeal presents a question of statutory
interpretation, this Court conducts a de novo review of the trial court’s conclusions of
law. Morgan v. Steiner, 173 N.C. App. 577, 579, 619 S.E.2d 516, 518 (2005) (citation
IV. Analysis
¶9 The Department argues that the trial court’s Order requiring disclosure of
certain documents violates statutory confidentiality requirements established by the
General Assembly. Specifically, the Department contends that N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 58- POWELL V. CARTRET
10-430(c) and 58-30-62(f) bar the disclosure of certain confidential documents.
¶ 10 “Legislative intent controls the meaning of a statute.” State v. James, 371 N.C.
77, 87, 813 S.E.2d 195, 203 (2018) (quotation marks and citations omitted). The
intent of the General Assembly may be found first from the plain language of the
statute, then from the legislative history, “the spirit of the act and what the act seeks
to accomplish.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). As a cardinal principle
of statutory interpretation, “[i]f the language of the statute is clear and is not
ambiguous, we must conclude that the legislature intended the statute to be
implemented according to the plain meaning of its terms.” Hyler v. GTE Prods. Co.,
333 N.C. 258, 262, 425 S.E.2d 698, 701 (1993) (citation omitted). “Thus, in
effectuating legislative intent, it is the duty of the courts to give effect to the words
actually used in a statute and not to delete words used or to insert words not used.”
State v. Watterson, 198 N.C. App. 500, 505, 679 S.E.2d 897, 900 (2009).
A. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-10-430(c)
¶ 11 The North Carolina Captive Insurance Act, contained within Article 10 of
Chapter 58 of our North Carolina statutes, “establish[es] the procedures for the
organization and regulation of the operations of captive insurance companies
transacting insurance business within this State[.]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-10-335(b)
(2019). N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-10-430 governs audits of captive insurance companies
and provides, in relevant part: POWELL V. CARTRET
(a) Whenever the Commissioner determines it to be prudent, the Commissioner shall audit a captive insurance company’s affairs to ascertain its financial condition, its ability to fulfill its obligations, and whether it has complied with [N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 58-10-335 through 58-10-655]. . . .
....
(c) All audit reports, preliminary audit reports or results, working papers, recorded information, documents, and copies thereof produced by, obtained by, or disclosed to the Commissioner or any other person in the course of an audit made under this section are confidential, are not subject to subpoena, and may not be made public by the Commissioner or an employee or agent of the Commissioner. Nothing in this subsection shall prevent the Commissioner from using such information in furtherance of the Commissioner’s regulatory authority under this Chapter. The Commissioner shall have the discretion to grant access to such information to public officials having jurisdiction over the regulation of insurance in any other state or country or to law enforcement officers of this State or any other state or agency of the federal government at any time only if the officials receiving the information agree in writing to maintain the confidentiality of the information in a manner consistent with this subsection.
Id. § 58-10-430 (2019) (emphasis added).
¶ 12 Contrary to the trial court’s finding, this statute’s provision that records “under
this section are confidential, are not subject to subpoena, and may not be made public”
essentially provides that “records can never be obtained from the [Department].”
Additionally, this statute does not contain a provision that “specifically provide[s]
that records requested . . . shall be provided ‘upon an order of a court of competent POWELL V. CARTRET
jurisdiction[,]’” nor does this statute incorporate another statute in Chapter 58 that
specifically requires disclosure upon court order.1 The trial court’s finding is
erroneous.
¶ 13 The conclusion of law based on this finding that “[t]he records requested in
Plaintiffs’ Subpoena may be produced under Chapter 58 of the North Carolina
General Statutes ‘upon an order of a court of competent jurisdiction,’ notwithstanding
assertions of statutory confidentiality by the [Department] or alleged statutory
requirements that the information be kept confidential” is thus erroneous as applied
to section 58-10-430.
¶ 14 According to the plain language of section 58-10-430, “[a]ll audit reports,
preliminary audit reports or results, working papers, recorded information,
documents, and copies thereof produced by, obtained by, or disclosed to the
Commissioner or any other person in the course of an audit made under [section 58-
1 Section 58-10-345, which sets forth procedures for an entity to apply to be licensed
as a captive insurance company, does provide that, “[i]nformation submitted pursuant to this section is confidential and may be made public by the Commissioner or the Commissioner’s designee only upon an order of a court of competent jurisdiction[.]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-10- 345(f) (2019) (emphasis added). According to the plain language of this statute, only information submitted pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-10-345 may be made public “upon an order of a court of competent jurisdiction.” This provision is specifically incorporated by other sections of Chapter 58, but it does not serve as a blanket provision for all of Chapter 58. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-10-405(b) (2019) (“All other captive insurance companies shall report on forms adopted by the Commissioner. [N.C. Gen. Stat.] 58-10-345(f) shall apply to each report filed pursuant to this section.”); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-10-415(c2) (2019) (“[N.C. Gen. Stat.] 58- 10-345(f) shall apply to all information filed pursuant to this section.”). POWELL V. CARTRET
10-430] are confidential, are not subject to subpoena, and may not be made public by
the Commissioner or an employee or agent of the Commissioner.” N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 58-10-430 (emphasis added). As “the language of the statute is clear and is not
ambiguous, we must conclude that the legislature intended the statute to be
implemented according to the plain meaning of its terms.” Hyler, 333 N.C. at 262,
425 S.E.2d at 701 (citation omitted). Accordingly, we reverse the portion of the trial
court’s order requiring the Department to “produce full and complete records to
Plaintiffs’ counsel pursuant to Plaintiffs’ Subpoena and as ordered herein” with
respect to documents and items that “are not subject to subpoena” pursuant to N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 58-10-430.
B. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-30-62
¶ 15 Under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-30-62, which applies to captive insurance
companies licensed under the Captive Insurance Act,2 “[a]n insurer may be subject to
administrative supervision by the Commissioner” if certain conditions arise. N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 58-30-62(c) (2019). If the Commissioner determines administrative
supervision is necessary, the Commissioner must notify the insurer that it is under
the supervision of the Commissioner and give the insurer a written list of the
2 Under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-10-475, governing supervision, rehabilitation, and liquidation of captive insurance companies, the terms and conditions set forth in Article 30 of Section 58 shall apply in full, unless otherwise provided, to captive insurance companies licensed under the Captive Insurance Act. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-10-475 (2019). POWELL V. CARTRET
requirements to abate the conditions which led to its supervision. Id. § 58-30-62(d).
(f) Notwithstanding any other provision of law and except as set forth in this section, all proceedings, hearings, notices, correspondence, reports, records, and other information in the possession of the Commissioner or the Department relating to the supervision of any insurer are confidential. The Department shall have access to such proceedings, hearings, notices, correspondence, reports, records, or other information as permitted by the Commissioner. The Commissioner may open the proceedings or hearings, or disclose the notices, correspondence, reports, records, or information to a department, agency or instrumentality of this or another state of the United States if the Commissioner determines that the disclosure is necessary or proper for the enforcement of the laws of this or another state of the United States. The Commissioner may open the proceedings or hearings or make public the notices, correspondence, reports, records, or other information if the Commissioner considers that it is in the best interest of the insurer, its insureds or creditors, or the general public. This section does not apply to hearings, notices, correspondence, reports, records, or other information obtained upon the appointment of a receiver for the insurer by a court of competent jurisdiction.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-30-62 (emphasis added).
¶ 16 Contrary to the trial court’s finding, this statute contains no provision that
“specifically provide[s] that records . . . shall be provided ‘upon an order of a court of
competent jurisdiction’” and does not incorporate another section in Chapter 58 that
specifically requires disclosure upon court order.3 However, unlike section 58-10-430
3 See footnote 1. POWELL V. CARTRET
and in accordance with the trial court’s finding of fact, this statute does not contain
a provision that essentially provides that “records can never be obtained from the
[Department]” in that section 58-30-62 does not explicitly state that the materials
under this section “are not subject to subpoena.” Had the legislature intended for
materials to be protected from subpoena, it could have explicitly done so as it did in
section 58-10-430 and various other provisions of Chapter 58.4
¶ 17 The legislature established that the Commissioner “shall be a public office[,]”
and its “records, reports, books and papers thereof on file therein shall be accessible
to the inspection of the public[.]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-2-100 (2019). Any exception to
the public’s accessibility to otherwise public records should be construed narrowly.
DTH Media Corp. v. Fult, 374 N.C. 292, 301, 841 S.E.2d. 251, 258 (2020) (quotation
marks and citation omitted).
¶ 18 The Department cites no authority supporting the proposition that labeling
materials confidential, without more, bars those materials from being produced upon
an order of a court of competent jurisdiction. Our courts routinely deal with
confidential information and have the ability to ensure the information is not used
improperly. See, i.e., N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 26(c) (2019) (allowing trial courts
4 See N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 58-2-132(f), 58-10-175(b), 58-10-430(c), 58-10-735(a), 58-10-
780(a), 58-12-35(a), 58-19-40(a), 58-33-56(h), 58-58-50(j)(10), 58-58-268(c), 58-58-280(a), 58- 71-115(c). POWELL V. CARTRET
to seal depositions and filed court documents to be opened as directed by the court);
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 45(c)(2) (“Copies of hospital medical records tendered
under this subdivision shall not be open to inspection or copied by any person, except
to the parties to the case or proceedings and their attorneys in depositions, until
ordered published by the judge at the time of the hearing or trial.”) N.C. Gen. Stat. §
1A-1, Rule 45(c)(7) (“When a subpoena requires disclosure of a trade secret or other
confidential research, development, or commercial information . . . the court may
order a person to . . . produce the materials only on specified conditions stated in the
order.”).
¶ 19 Essentially, the Department is asking this Court to add an additional provision
to section 58-30-62 that materials under this section “are not subject to subpoena.” It
is our duty to “give effect to the words actually used in a statute” and we cannot insert
“words not used.” Watterson, 198 N.C. App. at 505, 679 S.E.2d at 900. The conclusion
of law that “[t]he records requested in Plaintiffs’ Subpoena may be produced under
Chapter 58 of the North Carolina General Statutes ‘upon an order of a court of
competent jurisdiction,’ notwithstanding assertions of statutory confidentiality by the
[Department] or alleged statutory requirements that the information be kept POWELL V. CARTRET
confidential” is not erroneous.5
¶ 20 Accordingly, we affirm the portion of the trial court’s order requiring the
Department to “produce full and complete records to Plaintiffs’ counsel pursuant to
Plaintiffs’ Subpoena and as ordered herein” with respect to documents and items
listed in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-30-62.
V. Conclusion
¶ 21 The trial court erred by ordering the disclosure of certain documents pursuant
to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-10-430. The trial court did not err by ordering the disclosure
of certain documents pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-30-62. We thus reverse the
trial court’s order in part and remand for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART.
Judges ARROWOOD and GORE concur.
5 The Department asked the trial court to subject certain records “to a protective order
issued by the Court maintaining the confidentiality of the information” in the event that the records were “reviewed by the Court or admitted as evidence[.]” The trial court did not rule upon that request.