Poulin v. Fleming

782 So. 2d 452, 2001 WL 256126
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
DecidedMarch 16, 2001
Docket5D99-2592
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 782 So. 2d 452 (Poulin v. Fleming) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Poulin v. Fleming, 782 So. 2d 452, 2001 WL 256126 (Fla. Ct. App. 2001).

Opinion

782 So.2d 452 (2001)

Retina Rybolt POULIN, et al., Appellants,
v.
Carlos FLEMING, M.D., et al., Appellees.

No. 5D99-2592.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

March 16, 2001.
Rehearing Denied April 19, 2001.

Michael D. Martin of Martin & Martin, P.A., Lakeland, and Douglas K. Burnetti of Burnetti, P.A., Lakeland, for Appellant.

Jennings L. Hurt, III and Mary Gannon McMurry, of Rissman, Weisberg, Barrett, Hurt, Donahue & McLain, P.A., for Appellees Orlando Healthcare Group P.A., Fleming, Cook and Marrioneaux.

Theodore R. Dempster of Law Offices of Steven M. Ziegler, P.A., Hollywood, for Appellee Prudential Health Care Plan, *453 Inc., etc. No Appearance for Appellee Carlos Fleming, M.D.

SHARP, W., J.

The Poulins, individually and on behalf of their child, Payton, appeal from a final summary judgment in favor of the appellee health care providers. The issue on appeal is whether the trial court was correct in excluding the Poulins' expert opinion testimony that their child's condition (schizencephaly) was caused by medical treatment given to his mother by appellees while she was pregnant. We conclude that the Poulins' evidence does not meet the standard for admissibility of scientific evidence in Florida. Accordingly we affirm the judgment.

In the late winter/early spring of 1994, Mrs. Poulin sought medical treatment from appellees for abdominal pain, vomiting and nausea. She was prescribed antinausea drugs and antibiotics for a possible urinary infection. A chest x-ray and upper and lower GI series, which involved the use of fluoroscopy and barium, were performed.

In May 1994, a pregnancy test was performed and Mrs. Poulin was found to be about twenty-one weeks pregnant. Payton was born in October. Several months later, he was diagnosed with schizencephaly, a severe brain malformation. The Poulins filed suit against her appellees, alleging that the radiation alone or in combination with the medications administered to her caused this condition.

At trial, the appellees moved to exclude the Poulins' expert opinion testimony on causation. After a hearing, the trial court granted the motion. The court found that the experts' opinions were not based on scientific principles or discoveries that were sufficiently established so as to have gained general acceptance in their field. The court also found that the experts were not qualified to present opinion testimony on the issue of the relationship between radiation exposure and schizencephaly. The court then entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants.

The issue of admissibility of expert testimony is governed by the Florida Evidence Code, section 90.702. This section provides:

Testimony by Experts.
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or in determining a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify about it in the form of an opinion; however, the opinion is admissible only if it can be applied to evidence at trial.

Like its federal counterpart, Federal Rule of Evidence 702,[1] section 90.702 does not contain any requirement that there be general acceptance of a newly developed scientific technique or principle in the particular field in which it belongs. Berry v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 709 So.2d 552 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. denied, 718 So.2d 167 (Fla.1998). The "general acceptance" test applied to scientific evidence was derived from Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir.1923). There, the court stated the test as follows:

Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental *454 and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.

293 F. at 1014.

After the adoption of the Florida Evidence Code, disagreement arose as to whether the Frye test was still to be applied to determine the admissibility of novel scientific evidence. Berry. In Stokes v. State, 548 So.2d 188 (Fla.1989), the Florida Supreme Court acknowledged that the Frye test had come under criticism since its inception in 1923 as too harsh and inflexible. However, the court believed that the problems associated with the other recognized judicial approaches foreclosed their use and it reaffirmed application of the Frye test. The court explained its rationale as follows:

The underlying theory for this rule is that a courtroom is not a laboratory, and as such it is not the place to conduct scientific experiments. If the scientific community considers a procedure or process unreliable for its own purposes, then the procedure must be considered less reliable for courtroom use.

548 So.2d at 193-194.

A similar debate was ongoing in the federal courts concerning whether Frye or Federal Rule of Evidence 702 should govern the admissibility of scientific evidence. In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), the United States Supreme Court held that the federal evidence code superceded the Frye test. Brim v. State, 695 So.2d 268 (Fla.1997); Hadden v. State, 690 So.2d 573 (Fla.1997). This in effect broadened the standard for admissibility of scientific opinion. Olvera v. State, 641 So.2d 120 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994).

Despite the federal adoption of a more lenient standard in Daubert, the Florida Supreme Court has continued to adhere to the use of the Frye test. Brim; Murray v. State, 692 So.2d 157 (Fla.1997); Hadden; Ramirez v. State, 651 So.2d 1164 (Fla.1995); Brim v. State, 779 So.2d 427 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); Olvera. In Hadden, the court explained its reason for adhering to the Frye test:

Moreover, we firmly hold to the principle that it is the function of the court to not permit cases to be resolved on the basis of evidence for which a predicate of reliability has not been established. Reliability is fundamental to issues involved in the admissibility of evidence. It is this fundamental concept which similarly forms the rules dealing with the admissibility of hearsay evidence. As a rule, hearsay evidence is considered not sufficiently reliable to be admissible, and its admission is predicated on a showing of reliability by reason of something other than the hearsay itself. See § 990.802, Fla. Stat. (1995) ("Except as provided by statute, hearsay evidence is inadmissible."). This same premise underlies why novel scientific evidence is to be Frye tested. Novel scientific evidence must also be shown to be reliable on some basis other than simply that it is the opinion of the witness who seeks to offer the opinion.

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782 So. 2d 452, 2001 WL 256126, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/poulin-v-fleming-fladistctapp-2001.