Potter v. Shute

7 Tenn. App. 222, 1928 Tenn. App. LEXIS 33
CourtCourt of Appeals of Tennessee
DecidedJanuary 28, 1928
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 7 Tenn. App. 222 (Potter v. Shute) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Tennessee primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Potter v. Shute, 7 Tenn. App. 222, 1928 Tenn. App. LEXIS 33 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1928).

Opinion

FAW, P. J..

The defendant in error, John H. Shute, Jr., was seriously and permanently injured on August 18, 1926, as the result of a collision between two automobiles, one of which was owned and *223 driven by bim and the other was owned and driven by tbe plaintiff in error Charles H. Potter.

Shnte sued Potter for $25,000 as damages on account of his aforesaid injuries, and a jury in the Third Circuit Court of Davidson county returned a verdict by which they found the issues (made by Potter’s plea of not guilty to plaintiff’s declaration) in favor of Shute and fixed his damages at $13,500.

On motion for a new trial, the Circuit Judge suggested a remittitur of $2500, which was accepted by Shute under protest, -and thereupon the motion for a new trial was overruled. Defendant Potter prayed, obtained and perfected an appeal in the nature of a writ of error and has assigned errors in this court. Plaintiff Shute prayed and was granted an appeal in error from the action of the trial court in entering a remittitur of $2500, but be did not perfect his appeal and is not now complaining’ of the remittitur.

For convenience, w.e will designate the parties herein as plaintiff and defendant, respectively, as they appeared on the record in the circuit' court.

The defendant’s assignments of error present but two questions, viz: (1) that there is no evidence to support the verdict and judgment, and (2) that the verdict is so excessive as to indicate passion, prejudice and caprice on the part of the jury.

There is one other assignment of error (the second), through which the defendant says that the evidence greatly preponderates against the verdict of the jury; but, under well settled rules, this assignment cannot be considered. Railroad v. Abernathey, 106 Tenn., 722, 728, 64 S. W., 3.

But defendant’s counsel (two excellent lawyers, ranking among the ablest and most learned of the lawyers practicing at the bar of this court) have seen fit to insist upon the second assignment of error, viz: that1 the evidence-greatly preponderates against the verdict. In the outset of their typewritten argument filed with and in support of the defendant’s assignments of error, counsel say that “assignments Nos. One and Two will be discussed together,” and they thereupon proceed to state the testimony of the witnesses, and certain deductions and inferences which they draw therefrom, for the avowed purpose of demonstrating- the truth of their insistence that the plaintiff Shute was guilty of negligence which proximately contributed to his injuries; and they argue that certain of the plaintiff’s witnesses are unworthy of belief, and that (in certain particulars wherein there are material conflicts of testimony) the physical facts disclosed by the record support the defendant and his witnesses rather than the plaintiff and his witnesses.

By thus commingling the discussion of the first and second assignments of error in the manner stated, and in failing to point out undisputed evidence of contributory negligence on the part of plain *224 tiff, counsel for defendant have, in large measure, deprived the court of any benefit from their argument. The jury is the judge of the credibility of the witnesses, and, in case of conflict of testimony, it was for the jury to accept or reject' the testimony of any witness, in whole or in part, and also to determine whether, upon the whole proof, ¡the testimony of any witness- should be rejected on the ground that it was inconsistent with established physical facts.

' We do not mean to be understood as holding that the appellate court would be bound by a jury verdict based on nothing but testimony utterly inconsistent with well known and generally accepted natural laws; but this record does not present a case of that character.

“The question of contributory negligence, as well as the question of .negligence, is ordinarily for the jury. Even though the facts be undisputed, if intelligent minds might draw different conclusions as to whether, under circumstances conceded, the conduct of plaintiff was that' of an ordinarily prudent man, the matter should be left to the jury. The court should draw no inference: when in doubt, but only in those cases where the evidence is without material conflict, and such that all reasonable men must reach the same conclusion tb erefrom. It is only in cases where the evidence is susceptible of no other fair inference that the court is justified in instructing the jury, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff has been guilty of contributory negligence which would bar his recovery.” Roofing & Mfg. Co. v. Black, 129 Tenn., 30, 36, 164 S. W., 1183. See, also, Studer v. Plumlee, 130 Tenn., 517, 519, 172 S. W., 305, and Hines v. Partridge, 144 Tenn., 219, 235, 231 S. W., 16, and other eases therein cited.

There is no occasion to extend this opinion by reviewing the testimony of the witnesses or stating the facts in detail. This is not' a case where a “finding of facts” by this court would be of benefit to the parties, as the question presented by defendant’s first assignment of error is, whether there is any material evidence to support the verdict of the jury, and our answer to that question is a conclusion of law which may be reviewed by the Supreme Court upon the whole record.

There was evidence before the jury supporting the averments of plaintiff’s declaration that while plaintiff was driving in a westerly direction along the Harding Road near its intersection with Wilson avenue, ,at a moderate rate of speed, viz: ten or twelve miles an hour, on his right hand side of the traveled portion of Harding Road, and defendant was driving a large and highpowered automobile in a negligent, careless and reckless manner, at a high and unlawful rate of speed, viz: thirty-five or forty miles an hour, in an easterly direction along the same highway, the defendant, without slowing down or making any reasonable effort to do so, suddenly and quickly swerved his automobile from the southerly side of said *225 Harding Road in a negligent and careless attempt to pass other automobiles parked or standing along or near the southerly side of said road and drove diagonally across said road in a northeasterly direction to his, the defendant’s, left side of the paved and traveled part of said road and negligently ran and drove his automobile into and against the small Chevrolet automobile in which plaintiff, in the exercise of due care, was then and there driving as aforesaid With great force and violence, whereby and as a result of which collision, plaintiff’s car was turned over two or three times and plaintiff was thereby hurled with great force and violence out of his said automobile and had inflicted upon him serious and permanent injuries (which injuries are described in the declaration and shown by the proof.)

It is further averred that the negligent, reckless, and unlawful acts of the defendant as aforesaid were the sole and proximate cause of the injuries thus inflicted upon plaintiff by defendant.

There was also evidence before the jury, from the defendant and his witnesses, tending to show that plaintiff was driving his car at an unlawful rate of speed and did not exercise ordinary care to avoid the collision.

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Crutcher v. Davenport
401 S.W.2d 786 (Court of Appeals of Tennessee, 1965)
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308 S.W.2d 387 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 1957)

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Bluebook (online)
7 Tenn. App. 222, 1928 Tenn. App. LEXIS 33, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/potter-v-shute-tennctapp-1928.