Potter-Huffman Land & Livestock Co. v. Witcher

291 P. 725, 48 Cal. App. 93, 1920 Cal. App. LEXIS 378
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
DecidedJune 7, 1920
DocketCiv. No. 2121.
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 291 P. 725 (Potter-Huffman Land & Livestock Co. v. Witcher) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Potter-Huffman Land & Livestock Co. v. Witcher, 291 P. 725, 48 Cal. App. 93, 1920 Cal. App. LEXIS 378 (Cal. Ct. App. 1920).

Opinion

NICOL, P. J., pro tem.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the superior court of Modoc County adjudging plaintiff to be the ownér of a certain water right, reservoir site, and right of way described- in the complaint, and also adjudging that a certain instrument in writing, executed by one Ed Ivory, Jr., to defendant and set out in the complaint, conveyed no right, title, or interest in said water right, reservoir site, and right of way.

The complaint alleges that the plaintiff is the owner and in possession of a certain tract of land described in the complaint as the “E” or Ivory Ranch, in Clover Swale, Modoc County, together with the right to construct and maintain a reservoir on sections 2 and 11, T. 43 N., R. 10 E., M. D. M., and a right of way therefrom down what is known as Weller Canyon to the said “E” Ranch. That this reservoir site and the right of way were located, appropriated, and secured for the purpose of impounding winter water draining from Antelope plains and delivering the same to and upon said “E” Ranch, during the irrigating *95 season to be there used for irrigating the crops thereon, and that at all times since the selection thereof they have been appurtenant to the-said “E” ranch.

The said ranch for many years prior to October 8, 1915, was owned by the Ed Ivory Land & Livestock Company (a corporation) and its predecessors in interest, and the plaintiff through certain mesne conveyances has succeeded to its title thereto, together with all water and reservoir rights, etc., connected therewith.

The complaint further alleges that for more than twenty years continuously, next preceding the year 1912, the said corporation had claimed, appropriated, taken, and used all the natural flow of water from sections 2 and 11 and surrounding lands known as Antelope "plains, draining off through Weller Canyon during the irrigating season of each year, to wit, from June 1st to October 15th, for irrigating said “E” Ranch.

This allegation of the complaint was specifically denied by the defendant, and in addition thereto the defendant avers the facts to be that the defendant is the owner of 160 acres of land that is riparian to the waters flowing from said Antelope plains, through said Weller Canyon, and that for a period of fifty years prior to the commencement of this action the defendant and his grantors have irrigated the tillable portions of said lands from the waters flowing through said Weller Canyon during the irrigating season of each and every year.

Upon the issue thus formed the court found: That for more than twenty years continuously next preceding 1912, the Ed Ivory Land & Livestock Company and its predecessors in interest had claimed, appropriated, taken, and used all the natural flow of water from sections 2 and 11, T. 43 N., R. 10 E., M. D. M., and surrounding lands known as Antelope plains draining through said canyon during the irrigating season for irrigating said ranch and ever since and including the year 1912 plaintiff and its predecessors have so taken and used all of the natural flow of said water, and for a period of more than twenty-eight years preceding the commencement of this action the said waters, and the whole thereof, were and are necessary and indispensable to the proper irrigation of said lands.

*96 The court further found: “That the defendant is the owner of 160 acres of land known as the Redding Field, which adjoins the said ‘E’ Ranch on the south, through which the watercourse flowing through the said ‘E’ Ranch continues and through which watercourse and over said land the drainage from said ‘E’ Ranch passes. That for a long period, namely, forty years prior to the commencement of this action, the water which drained upon said premises from said ‘E’ Ranch had been used from time to time as desired in irrigating said lands. That at no time were the possessors and occupants of the ‘E’ Ranch ever asked to or compelled or did they, during the irrigating season, allow any portion of the water of said Weller Canyon which could be used in irrigating on said ‘E’ Ranch, pass, the boundaries thereof to said defendant’s land. That the only water from said Weller Canyon ever used on said Redding Field' was such as was voluntarily permitted by the owners and occupants of said ‘E’ Ranch to flow on to said defendant’s premises.”

The appellant claims that the court erred in finding and decreeing that the plaintiff is the owner of all the natural flow of the water of Weller Canyon. That this is an action to quiet the title of plaintiff as against defendant to the. reservoir and the right of way described in the complaint. That there was no prayer in the complaint that the court should decree anything else to the plaintiff than the said reservoir and right of way, and that the said findings are not supported by the evidence.

[1] It is true that the prayer of the complaint in this action doe's not specifically ask for judgment as to the ownership of the water right, but it was not necessary that it should, in order to warrant the court in granting the relief that it did in that respect. Section 580 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: “The relief granted to the plaintiff, if there be no answer, cannot exceed that which he shall have demanded in his complaint; but in any other case, the court may grant him any relief consistent with the case made by the complaint and embraced within the issue.” In default cases the demand limits plaintiff’s recovery (Staacke v. Bell, 125 Cal. 309, [57 Pac. 1012]; Brooks v. Forington, 117 Cal. 219, [48 Pac. 1073]), but in contested cases the demand does not so limit the recov *97 ery, and the court may grant the plaintiff any relief consistent with the ease made by the complaint and embraced within the issue, although not specifically prayed for. (Dennison v. Chapman, 105 Cal. 447, [39 Pac. 61]; Zellerbach v. Allenberg, 99 Cal. 57, [33 Pac. 786] ; Hurlbutt v. N. W. Spaulding Saw Co., 93 Cal. 55, [28 Pac. 795] ; Cassinella v. Allen, 168 Cal. 677, [144 Pac. 746]; Murphy v. Stelling, 8 Cal. App. 702, [97 Pac. 672] ; Fox v. Hall, 164 Cal. 287, [128 Pac. 749]; Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. Ingersoll, 158 Cal. 474, [111 Pac. 360]; Fulkner v. First Nat. Bank, 130 Cal. 258, [62 Pac. 463]; Poledori v. Newman, 116 Cal. 375, [48 Pac. 325].) It was said by this court in Haight v. Stewart, 36 Cal. App. 514, [172 Pac. 769], that: “It is well settled in procedural law that a party is not only entitled to any and all relief which is appropriately within the scope of his pleading, but may be awarded such relief upon any substantial legal or equitable ground coming within the fair and reasonable import of the averments of his pleading.”

[2]

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Bluebook (online)
291 P. 725, 48 Cal. App. 93, 1920 Cal. App. LEXIS 378, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/potter-huffman-land-livestock-co-v-witcher-calctapp-1920.