SCHWELB, Associate Judge:
The principal question presented in this appeal is whether an insured is entitled to recover its counsel fees in a successful action for a declaratory judgment in which the insured has established that its liability insurer wrongfully refused to defend it in a tort action brought against the insured by third parties. The question is one of first impression in this jurisdiction. We answer it in the affirmative.
I.
THE FACTS
A. The insurance policy.
Potomac Residence Club operates several mental health programs in the District of Columbia. Woodley Housing Corporation, a subsidiary or “sister corporation” of Potomac Residence Club, owns ‘Woodley House,” a psychiatric halfway house. In this opinion, we shall refer to Potomac Residence Club and Woodley Housing Corporation collectively as “Potomac Residence.”
In the fall of 1990, Western World Insurance Company issued a comprehensive general liability policy to Potomac Residence. The policy provided three types of coverage: (i) Owners’, Landlords’ and Tenants’ Liability Insurance; (ii) Personal Injury Liability Insurance; and (iii) Professional Liability Insurance.
Under the terms of the policy, Western World agreed to indemnify Potomac Residence for “all sums which [Potomac Residence] shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of ... bodily injury,” subject to certain exclusions. Western World also agreed to pay
all sums which [Potomac Residence] shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of liability arising out of any negligent act, error or omission in rendering or failing to render professional services of the type described in the description of hazard shown above, whether committed by the insured or any person employed by the insured....
The policy defined “professional services” as “mental health rehabilitation counseling and housing.” According to the terms of the policy, Western World was obliged to defend any action instituted against Potomac Residence, “even if any of allegations of the suit are groundless, false or fraudulent.”
The policy contained a “sexual action exclusion” which was added as an endorsement to the policy. The exclusion provided as follows:
It is agreed that no coverage exists for claims or suits brought against any insured for damages arising from sexual action. Sexual action includes, hut is not limited to, any behavior with sexual connotation or purpose—whether performed for sexual gratification, discrimination, intimidation, coercion or other reason.
It is further agreed that this exclusion applies even if an alleged cause of the damages was the insured’s negligent hiring, placement, training, supervision, act, error or omission.
(Emphasis added.)
The “sexual action” exclusion modified the Owners’, Landlords’ and Tenants’ Liability and the Professional Liability Insurance coverages, but it did not apply to Western World’s obligations if Potomac Residence was sued for allegedly causing personal injury. The Personal Injury Liability coverage, which was set forth in a separate schedule attached to the policy, obligated Western World to
pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of injury (herein called “personal injury”) sustained by any person or organization and arising out [1230]*1230of one or more of the following offenses committed in the conduct of the named insured’s business:
Group A-false arrest, detention or imprisonment
Group C-wrongful entry or eviction, or other invasion of the right of private occupancy[.]
B. The Zeender litigation.
On December 19, 1991, Cathy and Ramon Zeender filed a ten-count complaint against Potomac Residence in the Superior Court. The complaint was based on the alleged exploitation of Cathy Zeender by Karen Prieto, a Potomac Residence counselor, at a time when Mrs. Zeender, who was suffering from a Multiple Personality Disorder, was a resident of Potomac Residence’s half-way house. The Zeenders alleged that Ms. Prieto engaged in a sexual relationship with Cathy Zeender from December 19, 1990 through January 6, 1991 and that she drank alcohol with Mrs. Zeender, even though Ms. Prieto knew that these activities were improper and potentially harmful to the patient. The complaint also alleged that Ms. Prieto caused Mrs. Zeender to dissociate,1 contrary to the treatment plan prescribed for Mrs. Zeender by her psychiatrist.
According to the complaint, Edith Maeda, the executive director of Potomac Residence, learned of Ms. Prieto’s improper conduct with Cathy Zeender. The Zeenders alleged that, contrary to the directions of Mrs. Zeen-der’s psychiatrist, Ms. Maeda permitted Ms. Prieto not only to continue her employment with Potomac Residence, but also to maintain her relationship with Cathy Zeender. The Zeenders claimed that the defendants’ conduct constituted, inter alia, breach of fiduciary duty, assault and battery, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, gross negligence, negligent supervision, and breach of contract. They prayed for an award of compensatory and punitive damages totalling one hundred million dollars.
C. The declaratory judgment action.
On December 27,1991, Potomac Residence forwarded the Zeenders’ complaint to Western World and inquired as to coverage. On January 24, 1992, Western World responded that it had no obligation to defend or indemnify Potomac Residence with respect to the Zeender complaint. Western World relied solely on the policy’s sexual action exclusion.
According to its brief, Potomac Residence could not afford to pay for legal representation in the Zeender matter. The law firms of Piper & Marbury L.L.P. and Kator, Scott & Heller agreed to represent Potomac Residence without fee, but only if the defense costs were not covered by insurance.
In September 1992, pro bono counsel for Potomac Residence informed Western World that the Zeenders’ attorneys had offered to settle the Zeender litigation within the policy limits, and requested that Western World respond to the offer. Western World again disclaimed any obligation to defend or indemnify Potomac Residence. In January 1993, counsel for Potomac Residence informed Western World that if Western World refused to participate in a scheduled mediation conference in the Zeender litigation, Potomac Residence would file suit to vindicate its rights under the policy. Western World refused, and on February 12, 1993, Potomac Residence instituted this action against Western World in the Superior Court.
In its complaint, Potomac Residence prayed for a declaratory judgment that Western World owed a duty to defend Potomac Residence in the Zeender case, and that Western World had breached this duty. Potomac Residence asked the court to award it the expenses and counsel fees that it had incurred to date in defending the Zeender litigation, as well as the costs and fees that it would incur in prosecuting its declaratory judgment action. Potomac Residence also asked the court to declare that Western World was obligated to indemnify Potomac Residence for any amounts that might be [1231]*1231paid to the Zeenders pursuant to an adverse judgment or negotiated settlement. Finally, Potomac Residence included in its complaint a count alleging that Western World had acted in bad faith in denying coverage.
Potomac Residence filed a motion for summary judgment in which it reiterated the position taken in its complaint. Western World opposed the motion, again relying on the sexual action exclusion of the policy. Western World acknowledged in its memorandum in opposition to Potomac Residence’s motion that Ms. Prieto’s alleged actions “included but [were] not limited to behavior with sexual connotation or purpose.” (Emphasis added.) In addition to opposing Potomac Residence’s motion, Western World cross-moved for summary judgment on all counts of the complaint.
On July 6, 1994, Judge Patricia A. Wynn issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order in which she held that Western World had breached its duty to defend Potomac Residence against the Zeender complaint and was therefore liable for damages arising out of that breach. Judge Wynn concluded, inter alia, that the allegations in the Zeender complaint concerning Ms. Prieto’s unauthorized trips with Mrs. Zeender to restaurants and bars were not necessarily sexual in connotation and purpose, and that there was therefore potential coverage under the Professional Liability portion of the policy. The judge also held that the claim for negligent hiring and supervision was not barred by the policy’s sexual exclusion. The judge concluded, however, that there was no evidence of bad faith on Western World’s part, and she granted summary judgment in favor of Western World as to the bad faith count.
On August 1, 1994, following receipt of Judge Wynn’s order, counsel for Potomac Residence submitted to Western World invoices for the costs and fees incurred in the defense of the Zeender suit and in prosecuting the instant declaratory judgment action through June 1994. Western World refused to pay these invoices, claiming that they were excessive.
On September 23, 1994, Judge Wynn issued a second Memorandum Opinion and Order in which she held that Potomac Residence was not entitled to recover its costs and counsel fees in prosecuting the declaratory judgment action. On February 27, 1995, “finding no persuasive evidence that plaintiffs costs are not reasonable,” the judge ordered Western World to pay $273,-306.37 to Potomac Residence within thirty days as reimbursement for the counsel fees and costs incurred in defending the Zeender litigation.
On August 2,1995, at Potomac Residence’s request and with Western World’s consent, Judge Stephen G. Milliken certified for interlocutory appeal Judge Wynn’s rulings denying Potomac Residence its costs and counsel fees in the declaratory judgment action, dismissing its claim of bad faith, and refusing to award prejudgment interest. Those rulings are now before us for review.2
II.
THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION
A. Standard of review.
The trial judge held that Potomac Residence is not entitled to recover its counsel fees in the declaratory judgment action. That ruling was one of law, and we review the judge’s decision de novo. Abdullah v. Roach, 668 A.2d 801, 804 (D.C.1995) (citation omitted).
B. The authorities.
We begin our discussion of the dis-positive legal issue by noting that
this jurisdiction follows “the American Rule under which ... every party to a case shoulders its own attorneys’ fees, and recovers from other litigants only in the presence of statutory authority, a contractual arrangement, or certain narrowly-defined common law exceptions,” such as the conventional “bad faith” exception.
Oliver T. Carr Co. v. United Techs. Communications Co., 604 A.2d 881, 883 (D.C.1992) [1232]*1232(citation omitted); see, generally, Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 257-61, 95 S.Ct. 1612, 1621-24, 44 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975). Western World asks us to sustain the trial court’s decision denying Potomac Residence its counsel fees in the declaratory judgment action, claiming that we are required to do so by our precedents applying the American Rule. Potomac Residence contends, on the other hand, that this case is qualitatively different from those in which we have followed the American Rule in the past, and that we should adopt the approach of the Maryland courts3 and many other courts4 which have sustained awards of counsel fees in the kind of situation presented here. Although the sharp disagreement among the courts reflects that the issue is not free of difficulty,5 we agree with Potomac Residence.
In obtaining a liability insurance policy which contains a provision obligating the insurer to defend covered claims against the insured, the policyholder is attempting to provide in advance for the defense of any such claim against it. The insured’s purpose in securing such a policy is to transfer to the insurer the task of retaining counsel to de[1233]*1233fend the case in the event that the insured is sued by a third party. If we were to adopt the position urged upon us by Western World, then an insurer who wrongfully refused to defend could irrevocably deprive the insured of one of the principal benefits for which the insured paid its premiums. Even if the insured were ultimately—and often, as in this case, quite belatedly—compensated for its defense of the third party’s suit, the insured would remain permanently out of pocket for the expenses of the declaratory judgment action which it was compelled to bring as a result of the insurer’s breach of its contractual duty. We do not believe that the American Rule was intended to deny counsel fees to an insured where, as here, that insured bought its policy and paid its premiums in order to secure its freedom from having to defend lawsuits and to pay counsel fees. The doctrine propounded by Western World would prevent Potomac Residence from enjoying the very benefit for which it bargained when it bought a policy containing a duty-to-defend provision.
In Cohen, supra note 3, as in this case, the defendant insurer declined to provide a defense for the plaintiff, in violation of the terms of a liability insurance policy. Like Potomac Residence, the plaintiff obtained a declaratory judgment establishing that the insurer’s refusal to defend was unjustified. The plaintiff asked the court, inter alia, for an award of counsel fees in the declaratory judgment action. Noting that some courts had declined to grant such relief “in the absence of fraud, bad faith, or stubborn litigiousness on the part of the insurer,” the Maryland Court of Appeals, in a unanimous opinion, adopted the following assessment of the issue in a leading treatise:
But, despite the qualifications placed upon this rule by the [courts requiring a showing of fraud or its equivalent], it still appears to be unfair to the insured. After all, the insurer had contracted to defend the insured, and it failed to do so. It guessed wrong as to its duty, and should be compelled to bear the consequences thereof. If the rule laid down by these courts should be followed by other authorities, it would actually amount to permitting the insurer to do by indirection that which it could not do directly. That is, the insured has a contract right to have actions against him defended by the insurer, at its expense. If the insurer can force him into a declaratory judgment proceeding and, even though it loses in such action, compel him to bear the expense of such litigation, the insured is actually no better off financially than if he had never had the contract right mentioned above.
Id. 258 A.2d at 235 (quoting 7A John A. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4691 (1962)). The court stated that the insurer had “produced the current situation when it refused to defend,” id. at 239, and that
whether one speaks in terms of its having authorized the expenditure by its failure to defend or whether one speaks in terms of the attorney’s fees for the declaratory judgment action being a part of the damages sustained by the insured by American Home’s wrongful breach of the contract, we hold American Home bound to pay the fees incurred by Mrs. Brown in bringing the declaratory judgment action to establish that American Home had not done that which it had agreed with her to do.
Id.
6
In Olympic Steamship Co., supra note 4, the insurance policy in question provided that the insurer “shall have the right and duty to defend any suit against the insured seeking damages on account of ... personal injury or property damage[.]” Id. 811 P.2d at 676. Third parties claimed that the insured was liable to them as a result of the defective packing of certain cans of salmon. Although no lawsuit had been filed, the in[1234]*1234sured demanded that the insurer deal with the third parties’ claims. The insurer denied coverage, and the insured settled with the third parties and instituted an action against the insurer. The Supreme Court of Washington sustained the insured’s claim on the merits and held that the insured was entitled to recover its counsel fees in the suit against the insurer:
We also extend the right of an insured to recoup attorney fees that it incurs because an insurer refuses to defend or pay the justified action or claim of the insured, regardless of whether a lawsuit is filed against the insured. Other courts have recognized that disparity of bargaining power between an insurance company and its policyholder makes the insurance contract substantially different from other commercial contracts. Hayseeds, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas., [177 W.Va. 323], 352 S.E.2d 73, 77 (W.Va.1986). When an insured purchases a contract of insurance, it seeks protection from expenses arising from litigation, not “vexatious, time-consuming, expensive litigation with his insurer.” 352 S.E.2d at 79. Whether the insured must defend a suit filed by third parties, appear in a declaratory action, or as in this case, file a suit for damages to obtain the benefit of its insurance contract is irrelevant. In every case, the conduct of the insurer imposes upon the insured the cost of compelling the insurer to honor its commitment and, thus, is equally burdensome to the insured_ Further, allowing an award of attorney fees will encourage the prompt payment of claims. 352 S.E.2d at 79.
811 P.2d at 681.7
In Pitrolo, supra note 4, the court held that an insurer which breached its duty to defend was liable to its insured for counsel fees extended by the insured in a declaratory judgment action to establish coverage. The court stated that “to hold otherwise would be unfair to the insured, who originally purchased the insurance policy to be protected from incurring attorney’s fees and expenses from litigation.” Pitrolo, 342 S.E.2d at 160. In the court’s view,
those courts that refuse attorney’s fees in a declaratory judgment action or require a showing that the insurer acted in bad faith or unreasonably in refusing to defend east an unfair burden on the insured. Whether an insurer’s refusal to defend was in good or bad faith is largely irrelevant once it has been established that the insurer breached its contract with its insured.
Id. The court then went on to quote the passage from the Appleman treatise set forth at page 1233 of this opinion, supra. Id. at 161.
The issue before us has been addressed in some detail in Robert E. Keeton & Alan I. Widiss, Insurance Law (1988). The discussion in this treatise is especially instructive with respect to the unique problems that arise in the insurance context, see McGreevy, supra, 904 P.2d at 736, and we quote from it at some length:
A denial of an insurance claim typically has several consequences for an insured. First, any time there is a denial of an insurance claim, that action obviously extends the period during which the insured must incur the adverse economic consequences of the loss without the benefit [of] being indemnified by the insurance. Second, an insured who is forced to litigate to recover insurance incurs legal expenses— which include, but are not limited to the fees charged by an attorney—to secure the insurance payments. Third, many insureds also sustain a variety of consequential problems, including harm to credit standing and loss of business. When an insured is compelled to resort to litigation to recover insurance benefits, the insured is denied indemnification for what, at least in many instances, is a very significant aspect of the economic risks incident to the [1235]*1235hazards against which the insured sought protection when the insurance was purchased. Thus, when the payment of insurance benefits is only made after an insured has sought the assistance of an attorney and the legal process, the insured not only sustains added legal expenses but also is denied the right to prompt indemnification (which is one of the risks insureds seek to avoid through the acquisition of insurance).
* * * *
If, because the insurer is found to have acted reasonably in rejecting the claim, an insured’s recovery is limited to an award of the amount of insurance benefits due, the amount provided by the insurance coverage—after the insurance recovery is reduced by the insured’s payment of the lawyer’s fee and other litigation expenses—is obviously diminished. The net amount actually received by such a claimant is then insufficient to indemnify the insured, often falling far short of that which the insured reasonably anticipated would be available as an insurance benefit to offset the economic loss that resulted as a consequence of the insured event.
Id. § 7.7(c), at 871.
In the present ease, counsel for appellants have represented to the court that, if Potomac Residence had not been able to obtain pro bono legal representation, Western World’s breach of its obligations under the policy would have driven Potomac Residence out of its business of providing mental health services. Having paid its premiums, Potomac Residence had a right to expect that it would not be required to retain counsel or conduct litigation at its own expense. When Western World declined to defend it, Potomac Residence was suddenly confronted with the need for representation in two lawsuits— as defendant in the Zeender action, and as plaintiff in the declaratory judgment suit. Although the trial judge held, after the fact, that Potomac Residence is entitled to compensation for its defense of the Zeender suit, disagreement about the amount of recovery has meant that relief has been painfully slow in coming and has not reached the plaintiff yet. Under the trial court’s disposition, Po-tomae Residence will not receive any compensation at all for its costs and counsel fees in the declaratory judgment action. Like the courts in the cases that we have cited and many others, we conclude that, in the particular context of insurance coverage litigation of the kind now before us, such a result is unacceptable.
C. Stare decisis considerations and M.A.P. v. Ryan.
Judge King argues in dissent that this court is obliged, under the doctrine of M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310 (D.C.1971), to apply the American Rule and require Potomac Residence to pay its own counsel fees. We do not agree.
The parties have cited no District of Columbia precedent, and we have found none, squarely deciding the question whether the American Rule is applicable to a situation like the present one, in which the insured has paid its premiums for the specific purpose of avoiding any obligation to retain or pay counsel, and in which the insurer’s breach has denied the insured the representation to which it had a right under the terms of the policy. The closest case to this one is Siegel v. William E. Bookhultz & Sons, Inc., 136 U.S.App. D.C. 138, 419 F.2d 720 (1969). In Siegel, the court held that the insured was entitled to recover litigation costs and counsel fees incurred in a declaratory judgment action to establish insurance coverage where the insurer (1) erroneously refused to provide a defense after a “dubious investigation”; (2) steadfastly resisted the insured’s attempts to establish the right to a defense; and (3) abandoned an “obviously helpless insured to whatever might come,” leaving the insured in a “hapless predicament.” Id, at 143, 419 F.2d at 725. Although the court also stated that it could not “ignore the insured’s expense of litigation where the insurer, however honestly motivated, acts at its peril in disregarding the insured’s claim to a defense,” id. (emphasis added), Siegel cannot fairly be read as deciding whether the insured is entitled to counsel fees in a declaratory judgment action to establish coverage in the absence of the oppressive conduct by the insurer which the court discerned in that [1236]*1236case. Siegel therefore does not dispose of the issue before us.8
Judge King relies on Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Chamberlain Protective Servs., Inc., 451 A.2d 66 (D.C.1982), a case not cited by the parties. In Safeway Stores, a supermarket security guard who was employed by Chamberlain allegedly assaulted a customer. The customer brought an action against both Safeway and Chamberlain, asserting that they were joint tortfeasors. Safeway filed a cross-claim against Chamberlain in which it alleged that Chamberlain was primarily liable for the plaintiffs injury, and that Chamberlain owed Safeway a duty of indemnification. The jury found both defendants liable to the plaintiff and ruled in Chamberlain’s favor on Safeway’s request for indemnification. The trial judge, however, granted Safeway’s motion for judgment n.o.v. on the cross-claim, concluding that Chamberlain had an “implied obligation ... to indemnify Safeway.” Id. at 68. Safeway then sought to recover its counsel fees as part of Chamberlain’s obligation of indemnity. The trial court denied relief and this court, invoking the American Rule, affirmed. Id. at 68-73.
We think that Safeway Stores is distinguishable from the present case in decisive respects. Although Chamberlain, a primary tortfeasor, had an “implied obligation” to indemnify Safeway, the agreement between the two parties did not center on any duty on the part of Chamberlain to assure that Safeway would not have to retain counsel. On the contrary, Safeway hired Chamberlain to maintain order in Safeway’s supermarket, not to provide Safeway with legal representation. Safeway Stores is not dispositive here because the considerations which make application of the American Rule so incongruous and unfair in the present context, see pp. 1231-1235, supra, simply did not arise.
Our position is supported by Link v. District of Columbia, 650 A.2d 929 (D.C.1994), a case which also addressed the scope of the American Rule. In that case, we rejected the position that the enumeration in Alyeska and subsequent eases of three exceptions to that Rule precludes the recognition of any other exceptions, no matter what the circumstances may be. In Link, the District of Columbia was adjudged to be in civil contempt of a Superior Court order, but the trial judge expressly found that the disobedience was not willful. The plaintiff, who was represented by attorneys from the Neighborhood Legal Services Program at no cost to herself, requested an award of counsel fees in connection with the conduct of the civil contempt proceedings. The Supreme Court had stated in Alyeska that in the exercise of its equitable authority, “a court may assess attorneys’ fees for the willful disobedience of a court order ... or when the losing party has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.” 421 U.S. at 258-59, 95 S.Ct. at 1622 (quoted in Link, 650 A.2d at 931). Seizing on that language, the District argued that, absent a showing of willfulness, Alyeska and this court’s precedents applying the American Rule precluded an award of counsel fees to the plaintiff in Link.
This court rejected the District’s contention. We noted that Alyeska was not a contempt case, and that the Supreme Court had not addressed the question before us in Link and could not have decided it. 650 A.2d at 932. We held that because the District had violated an order of the court, the plaintiff was entitled to an award of counsel fees in spite of her failure to prove that the District had acted willfully, oppressively, or in bad faith. Link, 650 A.2d at 931-33. We thus recognized a “civil contempt” exception to the American Rule, and we declined to read as dispositive decisions in which we had applied the American Rule, under entirely different circumstances, to deny counsel fees to a prevailing party.
[1237]*1237Our problem here is not unlike that which confronted the court in Link.9 The denial of counsel fees in the present context raises issues which have not previously been considered by this court. “[T]he rule of stare decisis is never properly invoked unless in the decision put forward as precedent the judicial mind has been applied to and passed upon the precise question.” District of Columbia v. Sierra Club, 670 A.2d 354, 360 (D.C.1996) (quoting Murphy v. McCloud, 650 A.2d 202, 205 (D.C.1994)); see also Umana v. Swidler & Berlin, Chartered, 669 A.2d 717, 720 (D.C.1995). The judicial mind cannot fairly be said to have passed on the issue before us.
Our dissenting colleague’s position is also effectively foreclosed by our very recent decision in Carl v. Children’s Hosp., 702 A.2d 159 (D.C.1997) (en banc) (per curiam) (Carl II). In that case, a nurse who was an “at-will” employee claimed that Children’s Hospital had wrongfully discharged her in retaliation for testifying before the Council of the District of Columbia in opposition to proposed tort reform legislation and for appearing as a plaintiffs expert witness in medical malpractice litigation. The trial judge dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. A division of this court affirmed. Carl v. Children’s Hosp., 657 A.2d 286 (D.C.1995) (Carl I). The division was of the opinion that, as interpreted in subsequent case law,10 our earlier decision in Adams v. George W. Cochran Co., 597 A.2d 28 (D.C.1991), in which we held that it was unlawful for an employer to discharge an employee for refusing to violate a statute, represented the sole permissible exception to the “employment at-will doctrine,”11 and that a division of this court was not at liberty to recognize any new exception. Carl I, 657 A.2d at 288-89; see also id. at 294 (Farrell, J., concurring).
In Carl II, however, this court, sitting en banc, rejected the division’s reasoning. The court held that the
“very narrow exception” created in Adams should not be read in a manner that makes it impossible to recognize any additional public policy exceptions to the at-will doctrine that may warrant recognition.... “We could not and did not hold in Adams that this was the only public policy exception, because that question was simply not [1238]*1238presented.” Adams simply said that there is “a very narrow exception to the at-will doctrine,” not “just one and only one” such exception. There is nothing in the Adams opinion that bars this court—either a three-judge panel or the court en banc— from recognizing some other public policy exception when circumstances warrant such recognition. On this point a majority of the en bane court agrees.
Carl II, 702 A.2d at 160 (citations omitted); see also id. at 161 (Terry, J., concurring); id. at 166 (Ferren, J., concurring); id. at 174 (Schwelb, J., concurring); id. at 186 (Mack, J., concurring).
Our dissenting colleague’s approach in this case is essentially identical to that taken by the division in Carl I. Just as the division in that case asserted that Adams represented the sole exception to the “at-will doctrine,” so Judge King now says that the three exceptions to the American Rule enumerated in Alyeska constitute the sole permissible exceptions to that Rule. Judge King thus continues to insist that decisions by the Supreme Court and by this court should be construed as deciding “[a] question [that] was simply not presented.” Carl II, supra, 702 A.2d at 160. In Carl II, the en banc court squarely and emphatically rejected that proposition.
* * * *
We reiterate what should be obvious to the reader: our decision is a narrow one. The American Rule is alive and well in the District of Columbia. It simply does not apply where, as in this case, the agreement between the insurer and its insured discloses that the latter has paid its premiums to ensure that it will not have to retain or compensate counsel, and the insurer’s breach frustrates those expectations. “We do not purport in this opinion to instruct trial judges how to rule on facts substantially different from those here.” Mims v. Mims, 635 A.2d 320, 325 n. 12 (D.C.1993).
III.
OTHER ISSUES
Western World has cross-appealed from Judge Wynn’s order awarding Potomac Residence $237,306.37 for its costs and counsel fees in the defense of the Zeender litigation. Potomac Residence contends that the award was fully justified, but that the judge erred in denying Potomac Residence prejudgment interest on that amount. We consider each of these issues in turn.
A. The award of costs and counsel fees.
In her February 27, 1995 order awarding Potomac Residence its fees and costs for the defense of the Zeender suit, the trial judge stated that she found “no persuasive evidence that Plaintiffs costs are not reasonable.” The judge did not, however, elaborate upon this conclusion. Western World concedes that Potomac Residence is entitled to recover reasonable counsel fees and costs, but contends that the award is excessive and that the trial judge should have granted Western World’s request for discovery and for a hearing to determine whether the amount prayed for was appropriate.
Potomac Residence responds that Western World’s objections come too late, that they are insufficiently specific, and that Western World’s alleged failure to seek additional information when Potomac Residence first presented its demand constituted a waiver of any right to discovery. ' See National Ass’n of Concerned Veterans v. Secretary of Defense, 219 U.S.App.D.C. 94, 675 F.2d 1319 (1982).12
The trial judge has broad discretion in determining whether and in what amount counsel fees should be awarded. Bagley v. Foundation for Preservation of Historic Georgetown, 647 A.2d 1110, 1115 (D.C.1994); see also District of Columbia v. Jerry M., [1239]*1239580 A.2d 1270, 1280-81 (D.C.1990).13 We defer to the judge’s exercise of discretion because he or she is in the trenches, and therefore has a superior understanding of the litigation and of the essentially factual issues relevant to an appropriate award. Hampton Courts Tenants Ass’n v. District of Columbia Rental Hous. Comm’n, 599 A.2d 1113, 1115 (D.C.1991); see also Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 487, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1941, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). But although a ‘“request for attorney’s fees should not result in a second major litigation’ ... [t]he trial court’s findings must be reasonably specific.” Bagley, supra, 647 A.2d at 1115 (quoting Hensley, supra, 461 U.S. at 437, 103 S.Ct. at 1941).
In the present case, the parties are at odds not only as to the reasonableness of .the fees requested by counsel for Potomac Residence but also as to the timeliness and sufficiency of Western World’s objections. Although it appears that discovery was requested by Western World and denied, the record does not disclose the reasons for that denial. The amount in controversy is quite substantial, and we think it appropriate to remand the case to the trial court for findings of fact and conclusions of law as to the issues, both procedural and substantive, which have been raised by the parties regarding the award. We emphasize, however, that a new full-blown quasi-lawsuit over the amount to which Potomac Residence is entitled would not be in the interests of justice.
B. Prejudgment interest.
The trial judge denied without explanation Potomac Residence’s request for prejudgment interest on the award it received for the defense of the Zeender suit. Potomac Residence contends that this was error.
The decision whether to award prejudgment interest is confided to the discretion of the trial court. District of Columbia v. Pierce Assocs., Inc., 527 A.2d 306, 310 (D.C.1987). We have stated, albeit in circumstances significantly different from those presented here, that prejudgment interest in contract eases is not favored. Blake Constr. Co. v. C.J. Coakley Co., Inc., 431 A.2d 569, 580 (D.C.1981) (citing Flanaghan v. Charles H. Tompkins Co., 86 U.S.App.D.C. 307, 308, 182 F.2d 92, 93 (1950) (per curiam)).14
Judicial discretion must be based on correct legal principles, and the judge’s determination must be drawn from a firm factual foundation. In re J.D.C., 594 A.2d 70, 75 (D.C.1991) (citations omitted). Because the judge did not state her reasons for denying Potomac Residence’s claim, we do not know what considerations led to her ruling. Under the circumstances, and in light of Potomac Residence’s arguments, a remand for further consideration is appropriate.
We summarize some considerations relevant to the “prejudgment interest” calculus. The Zeender suit was filed on December 19, 1991, almost six years ago. On March 6, 1995, some two and a half years ago, the trial judge ordered Western World to pay Potomac Residence more than a quarter of a million dollars for the defense of that suit. The amount to which Potomac Residence is entitled has been in dispute, however, and Potomac Residence has yet to be paid. Western World has enjoyed what Potomac Residence calls “the double benefits of investing both the insurance premiums paid by [Potomac Residence] and the money it owes for its insured’s defense costs.”
Under the provisions of D.C.Code § 15-109 (1995), the Superior Court is empowered [1240]*1240to award prejudgment interest. This court has interpreted that statute to authorize this relief if such an award is necessary “to fully compensate the plaintiff.” Pierce Assocs., 527 A.2d at 310; House of Wines, Inc. v. Sumter, 510 A.2d 492, 499 (D.C.1986). Where a plaintiff has been deprived of the use of money withheld, prejudgment interest is often an element of complete compensation. Riggs Nat'l Bank v. District of Columbia, 581 A.2d 1229, 1253 (D.C.1990) (Riggs I).
At common law, prejudgment interest was viewed as a penalty to be used to punish the wrongdoing of a delinquent debtor. Pierce Assocs., 527 A.2d at 310. “Out of this view, the dichotomy between unliquidated and liquidated amounts arose.... [I]t was deemed unfair to penalize one who failed to tender payment when he could not know the amount of the debt.” Id. at 310-11.
[6] Our more recent decisions have recognized that prejudgment interest is often one significant element of damages. Id. Interest is not awarded in order to exact a penalty; rather, its primary purpose is to compensate the plaintiff for the loss of use of his money. District of Columbia v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 402 A.2d 430, 441 (D.C.1979). Under this approach, the liquidated or unliquidated character of the debt is not dispositive, for “the important question is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of the use of the money withheld and should be compensated for the loss.” Pierce Assocs., 527 A.2d at 311; see also, e.g., Riggs Nat’l Bank v. Carl G. Rosinski Co., 596 A.2d 997, 1000 (D.C.1991) (Riggs II) (prejudgment interest may be awarded on an unliquidated debt). Where the plaintiff has been deprived of the use of the money withheld, “prejudgment interest is an element of complete compensation for the loss of use of such money ‘from the time the claim accrues until judgment is entered, thereby achieving full compensation for the injury those damages are intended to redress.’ ” Riggs I, supra, 581 A.2d at 1253 (quoting West Virginia v. United States, 479 U.S. 305, 310-11 n. 2, 107 S.Ct. 702, 706 n. 2, 93 L.Ed.2d 639 (1987)).
We have also recognized that a defendant is unjustly enriched if he is permitted to benefit from the income from funds which he owes to the plaintiff and which he has wrongfully withheld. “Where the debtor should have paid what he owed but did not do so, a denial of prejudgment interest would deny full compensation to the creditor while allowing the recalcitrant party to take advantage of its own wrong and become the richer for it.” Riggs I, supra, 581 A.2d at 1253. The defendant “cannot be heard to say that it is fair and equitable that it should enjoy [the use of plaintiffs money] for so long, and pay not a cent for it.” Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Adams, 513 F.2d 355, 370 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 930, 96 S.Ct. 281, 46 L.Ed.2d 259 (1975).
An award of prejudgment interest in the insurance context has three goals: “to provide full and fair compensation to plaintiffs, to encourage settlements, and to discourage delay by defendants.” Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lafarge Corp., 910 F.Supp. 1104, 1112 (D.Md.1996). Potomac Residence argues that each of these purposes would be served by an award of prejudgment interest in this case. According to Potomac Residence, the court’s failure to make such an award (1) deprives it, for a substantial period of time, of the use of and income from money which rightfully belongs to it; (2) discourages settlement, because as long as the case is pending Western World retains (and can invest) both the money it owes and the premiums that it has received; and (3) provides a disincentive to prompt payment, since the same number of dollars will buy less in, say, 1998, than when the controversy began in 1991.
Judge King takes the position that because Potomac Residence has not paid any legal fees to its pro bono counsel, it is not out-of-pocket, and therefore should not be entitled to an award of prejudgment interest as to its legal fees.15 We have held, however, that
[i]n determining the amount of fees to be awarded, it is not legally relevant that plaintiffs’ counsel ... are employed by ... [1241]*1241a privately funded non-profit public interest law firm. It is in the interest of the public that such law firms be awarded reasonable attorneys’ fees to be computed in the traditional manner when its counsel perform legal services otherwise entitling them to the award of attorneys’ fees.
Link, supra, 650 A.2d at 984 (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895, 104 S.Ct 1541, 1547, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984)). We went on to explain that
[w]hen free legal services are provided there may be no direct barrier to the courtroom door, but if no fees are awarded, the burden of the costs is placed on the organization providing the services, and it correspondingly may decline to bring such suits and decide to concentrate its limited resources elsewhere....
Link, 650 A.2d at 934 (quoting Hairston v. R & R Apartments, 510 F.2d 1090, 1092 (7th Cir.1975)). We think that the reasoning in Link with respect to counsel fees applies with equal force to the plaintiffs right to recover prejudgment interest on those fees.
In summary, the trial court did not address Potomac Residence’s arguments for an award of prejudgment interest. On remand, the judge should reconsider her exercise of discretion in light of the authorities discussed in this Part III. B of our opinion. She should also articulate, in writing or orally on the record, the basis for her decision, either way, with respect to the appropriateness of an award of prejudgment interest to Potomac Residence.16
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.