Potomac Electric Power Co. v. Sachs

Fourth Circuit

Potomac Electric Power Co. v. Sachs

841 F.2d 90, 1988 WL 17848

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

DecidedMarch 7, 1988

DocketNos. 86-1572, 86-1573

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 841 F.2d 90 (Potomac Electric Power Co. v. Sachs) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Potomac Electric Power Co. v. Sachs, 841 F.2d 90, 1988 WL 17848 (4th Cir. 1988).

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Opinion

SPROUSE, Circuit Judge:

On January 19, 1988, the Supreme Court, — U.S. —, 108 S.Ct. 743, 98 L.Ed.2d 756 granted the Potomac Electric Power Company’s (PEPCO) petition for certiorari in this cause, vacated our earlier judgment, Potomac Electric Power Co. v. Sachs, 802 F.2d 1527 (4th Cir.1986), and remanded “for further consideration in light of Deakins v. Monaghan, — U.S. —, 108 S.Ct. 523, 98 L.Ed.2d 529 (1988) ], and to consider the question of mootness.” Both parties have since filed supplemental memoranda with this court agreeing that the case is moot. We have reviewed the parties’ contentions in light of subsequent develop[92]*92ments in the case, and now agree with their position that there is no longer a controversy-

After the State of Maryland initiated grand jury proceedings to investigate whether PEPCO had violated Maryland’s criminal laws and regulations governing hazardous waste disposal, PEPCO commenced the instant action in federal court seeking a declaratory judgment that the involved state laws were preempted by the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq. The district court determined that TSCA does not preempt the challenged state laws. We reversed concluding that the court should have abstained from deciding the issue under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971) and its progeny. Sachs, 802 F.2d 1527 (4th Cir.1986). While PEPCO’s petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court was pending, the State informed the Court that it had suspended its criminal investigation of PEPCO and, therefore, no remaining case or controversy existed between the parties. PEPCO subsequently concurred in the State’s position.

In light of the parties’ agreement and the absence of an enforcement action against PEPCO, we now agree that the case has become moot. Therefore, in accordance with the Supreme Court’s instructions, we remand the case to the district court with directions to dismiss the cause as moot. See United States v. Munsingwear, 340 U.S. 36, 71 S.Ct. 104, 95 L.Ed. 36 (1950).

SO ORDERED.

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SPROUSE, Circuit Judge:

On January 19, 1988, the Supreme Court, — U.S. —, 108 S.Ct. 743, 98 L.Ed.2d 756 granted the Potomac Electric Power Company’s (PEPCO) petition for certiorari in this cause, vacated our earlier judgment, Potomac Electric Power Co. v. Sachs, 802 F.2d 1527 (4th Cir.1986), and remanded “for further consideration in light of Deakins v. Monaghan, — U.S. —, 108 S.Ct. 523, 98 L.Ed.2d 529 (1988) ], and to consider the question of mootness.” Both parties have since filed supplemental memoranda with this court agreeing that the case is moot. We have reviewed the parties’ contentions in light of subsequent develop[92]*92ments in the case, and now agree with their position that there is no longer a controversy-

After the State of Maryland initiated grand jury proceedings to investigate whether PEPCO had violated Maryland’s criminal laws and regulations governing hazardous waste disposal, PEPCO commenced the instant action in federal court seeking a declaratory judgment that the involved state laws were preempted by the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq. The district court determined that TSCA does not preempt the challenged state laws. We reversed concluding that the court should have abstained from deciding the issue under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971) and its progeny. Sachs, 802 F.2d 1527 (4th Cir.1986). While PEPCO’s petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court was pending, the State informed the Court that it had suspended its criminal investigation of PEPCO and, therefore, no remaining case or controversy existed between the parties. PEPCO subsequently concurred in the State’s position.

In light of the parties’ agreement and the absence of an enforcement action against PEPCO, we now agree that the case has become moot. Therefore, in accordance with the Supreme Court’s instructions, we remand the case to the district court with directions to dismiss the cause as moot. See United States v. Munsingwear, 340 U.S. 36, 71 S.Ct. 104, 95 L.Ed. 36 (1950).

SO ORDERED.

The Potomac Electric Power Company v. Stephen H. Sachs, in His Capacity as Attorney General of Maryland Adele Wilzack, in Her Capacity as Secretary of the Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, State of New York, Amici Curiae, the Potomac Electric Power Company v. Stephen H. Sachs, in His Capacity as Attorney General of Maryland Adele Wilzack, in Her Capacity as Secretary of the Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, State of New York, Amici Curiae

841 F.2d 90 (Fourth Circuit, 1988)

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