Postma v. Kijakazi (CONSENT)

CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Alabama
DecidedJune 27, 2023
Docket2:22-cv-00718
StatusUnknown

This text of Postma v. Kijakazi (CONSENT) (Postma v. Kijakazi (CONSENT)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Postma v. Kijakazi (CONSENT), (M.D. Ala. 2023).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA NORTHERN DIVISION

ELIZABETH LEE POSTMA, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) CASE NO. 2:22-CV-718-KFP ) KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting ) Commissioner of Social Security, ) ) Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Plaintiff filed a Complaint seeking review of the Social Security Administration’s decision denying her application for supplemental security income. Doc. 1. The Court construes Plaintiff’s supporting brief (Doc. 6) as a motion for summary judgment and the Commissioner’s opposition brief (Doc. 9) as a motion for summary judgment. The parties have consented to the exercise of dispositive jurisdiction by a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Docs. 7, 8. After scrutiny of the record and motions submitted by the parties, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is due to be DENIED, the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment is due to be GRANTED, and the decision of the Commissioner is due to be AFFIRMED. I. STANDARD OF REVIEW This Court’s role in reviewing claims brought under the Social Security Act is a narrow one. The scope is limited to determining whether substantial evidence in the record as a whole supports the Commissioner’s decision and whether the correct legal standards were applied. Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance. Martin

v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990). The Court may not reweigh evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner, and, even if the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner’s factual findings, the Court must affirm if the decision is supported by substantial evidence. Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178; Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983).

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Plaintiff protectively filed an application for supplemental security income (SSI) on September 9, 2019, alleging disability as of September 1, 2008. R. 15. When her initial application for benefits was denied, she requested a hearing before an ALJ. Id. At the hearing, Plaintiff amended the alleged onset date to September 9, 2019.1 Id. The ALJ issued

an unfavorable decision on March 31, 2022, and the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review of the hearing decision. Id. at 33; Doc. 9 at 2. Thus, the hearing decision became the final decision of the Commissioner. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

1 See 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.330, 416.335 (stating that SSI benefits cannot be paid for the months preceding the month in which the application was filed). The Commissioner states in his brief that he “does not contest the favorable portion of the ALJ’s decision finding that Plaintiff is entitled to SSI from the date he filed his SSI application through the date of the ALJ’s decision. However, the Commissioner does argue that Plaintiff is not entitled to SSI prior to the date he filed his application.” Doc. 9 at 2 n. 3. The ALJ’s decision, however, makes no favorable finding on this claim. Thus, this footnote appears to be an errant reference. III. THE ALJ’S DECISION The ALJ found that Plaintiff had the severe impairments of degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, depression, anxiety, substance addition disorder, borderline

personality disorder, obesity, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, cervical radiculopathy, and sciatica. R. 17. However, she found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals a listed impairment. R. 17–20. She then found that Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity to perform light work with the following limitations:

She can occasionally climb ramps and stairs; and never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. She can frequently balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. She can occasionally operate foot controls. She can frequently handle, finger, and feel. She can tolerate occasional exposure to humidity, dusts, fumes and pulmonary irritants, and vibrations. She can frequently work with hazards such as moving mechanical parts or unprotected heights. The claimant can perform simple tasks for up to two hours without a break. The claimant can use judgment to make simple work-related decisions in an environment with no more than occasional workplace changes. The claimant can frequently interact with supervisors, coworkers, and the general public.

R. 20. After considering Plaintiff’s experience as a secretary and the testimony of a vocational expert, the ALJ found that Plaintiff cannot perform her past relevant work. R. 31. However, given her age, education, work experience, and RFC, the ALJ found other jobs in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform, specifically, the unskilled, light jobs of officer helper, ticket taker, and cashier II. R. 32. Thus, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff had not been under a disability from date of the alleged onset date through the date of the ALJ’s decision. R. 33. IV. DISCUSSION Plaintiff’s brief identifies one issue for this Court’s review: whether the ALJ erred in assessing Plaintiff’s RFC by not providing rational and specific references to evidence

of the record, including the medical opinions Dr. Amason and Dr. Reddy. Doc. 6 at 7. Within this argument, Plaintiff contends (1) the ALJ erred in finding that Plaintiff’s manipulative limitations did not last for twelve months, (2) the ALJ erred in assessing Plaintiff’s manipulative abilities based only on grip strength and dexterity, and (3) the ALJ erred in failing to include a restriction on overhead reaching, as found in the opinions of

Drs. Amason and Reddy that the ALJ found persuasive. A. Plaintiff’s Manipulation Limitations The Court will address Plaintiff’s first two arguments together. In her decision, the ALJ states as follows with respect to Plaintiff’s arm and hand strength and manipulative limitations:

The treatment records document that, in September 2019, the claimant had decreased strength in her arms and hands because of the cervical radiculopathy and the epidural abscess. (Id.) However, the record documents that, after the surgery, the claimant’s strength in her upper extremities improved. (Exhibits 10F, 13F, 14F, 15F, 18F & 19F) At the consultative examination in September 2021, the claimant had normal grip strength and normal dexterity. (Exhibit 17F) Therefore, the claimant’s signaling manipulative limitations did not last for a duration of twelve months. The examinations within one year after the cervical spine surgery have revealed normal range of motion, with the exception of brief exacerbation of symptoms after falling off a chair, falling off a couch and tripping over her cat.

R. 28. In response, Plaintiff argues that it is “irrefutable” that the time between September 2019 and September 2021 exceeds twelve months, so it was error to conclude that Plaintiff’s manipulative limitations did not last twelve months and, further, that it was error to assess Plaintiff’s manipulative limitations based only on grip strength and dexterity. Doc. 6 at 7.

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