Postema v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs

Second Circuit

Postema v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs

998 F.2d 60, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 15504, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 99, 62 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 42,525, 1993 WL 240824

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit

DecidedJune 25, 1993

DocketNos. 941, 942, 943, Dockets 92-9150; 92-9152; 92-9154

StatusPublished

Cited by9 cases

This text of 998 F.2d 60 (Postema v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Postema v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 998 F.2d 60, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 15504, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 99, 62 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 42,525, 1993 WL 240824 (2d Cir. 1993).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM:

This is an interlocutory appeal from an order entered by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Patterson, J.), 799 F.Supp. 1475, holding that provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub.L. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (the “1991 Act”), granting certain plaintiffs asserting claims under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. the right to request trials by jury and to seek compensatory and’ punitive damages, see 42 U.S.C. § 1981a, apply to- claims arising before the effective date of the 1991 Act.

Plaintiff-appellee Pamela A. Postema filed her complaint against defendants-appellants National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, American League of Professional Baseball Clubs, Triple-A Alliance of Professional Baseball Clubs, and Baseball Office for Umpire Development on December 19, 1991, approximately one month after the 1991 Act was signed into law. However, Postema’s claims arose more than two years before the effective date of the 1991 Act. The defendants moved, inter alia, to strike Postema’s jury trial demand and claims for compensatory and punitive damages, arguing that the 1991 Act’s -jury trial and damages provisions were not retroactive. The district court ruled in favor of Postema, holding that the jury trial and damages provisions were retroactive. Judge Patterson then certified his order for appeal, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), and we granted the defendants’ petition for interlocutory review.

In Wisdom v. Intrepid Sea-Air Space Museum, 993 F.2d 5 (2d Cir.1993) (per curiam), which ruled upon an order certified for interlocutory appeal by Judge Patterson at the same time as the order reviewed here, we held that the jury trial and damages provi[62]*62sions of the 1991 Act are not retroactive. See also Butts v. City of New York Dep’t of Hous. Preservation and Dev., 990 F.2d 1397 (2d Cir.1993) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b), provision of 1991 Act altering rule of Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989), is not retroactive).

We therefore reverse the order of the district court and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with our holding in Wisdom.

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PER CURIAM:

This is an interlocutory appeal from an order entered by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Patterson, J.), 799 F.Supp. 1475, holding that provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub.L. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (the “1991 Act”), granting certain plaintiffs asserting claims under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. the right to request trials by jury and to seek compensatory and’ punitive damages, see 42 U.S.C. § 1981a, apply to- claims arising before the effective date of the 1991 Act.

Plaintiff-appellee Pamela A. Postema filed her complaint against defendants-appellants National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, American League of Professional Baseball Clubs, Triple-A Alliance of Professional Baseball Clubs, and Baseball Office for Umpire Development on December 19, 1991, approximately one month after the 1991 Act was signed into law. However, Postema’s claims arose more than two years before the effective date of the 1991 Act. The defendants moved, inter alia, to strike Postema’s jury trial demand and claims for compensatory and punitive damages, arguing that the 1991 Act’s -jury trial and damages provisions were not retroactive. The district court ruled in favor of Postema, holding that the jury trial and damages provisions were retroactive. Judge Patterson then certified his order for appeal, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), and we granted the defendants’ petition for interlocutory review.

In Wisdom v. Intrepid Sea-Air Space Museum, 993 F.2d 5 (2d Cir.1993) (per curiam), which ruled upon an order certified for interlocutory appeal by Judge Patterson at the same time as the order reviewed here, we held that the jury trial and damages provi[62]*62sions of the 1991 Act are not retroactive. See also Butts v. City of New York Dep’t of Hous. Preservation and Dev., 990 F.2d 1397 (2d Cir.1993) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b), provision of 1991 Act altering rule of Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989), is not retroactive).

We therefore reverse the order of the district court and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with our holding in Wisdom.

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998 F.2d 60, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 15504, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 99, 62 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 42,525, 1993 WL 240824, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/postema-v-national-league-of-professional-baseball-clubs-ca2-1993.

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