Poss v. Brown

73 So. 2d 661, 1954 La. App. LEXIS 839
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedJune 25, 1954
DocketNo. 8180
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 73 So. 2d 661 (Poss v. Brown) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Poss v. Brown, 73 So. 2d 661, 1954 La. App. LEXIS 839 (La. Ct. App. 1954).

Opinions

GLADNEY, Judge.

Plaintiff conducts a printing business on leased premises known as 940-942 Louisiana Avenue, Shreveport, Louisiana. On the second floor of the same building the defendant operates the Rio Hotel subject to a similar lease from the same owners, which hotel has its entrance at 705 Snow Street. This action was brought against the defendant for water damage to finished printing products having an estimated value of $818.25. The lessors are not made parties to the suit.

For cause of action it is alleged the defendant assumed in writing the liability of the landlord for the defective condition of a sewer pipe which caused his loss and that defendant is guilty of negligence: (1) in failure to repair the plumbing; (2) in permitting guests in said hotel to allow water to run in excess of that which the sewer was carrying off; and (3) in permitting guests to obstruct and stop up the sewer system by inserting towels, handkerchiefs and other objects in same. Asserting the damages occurred from a cause located on the premises of defendant, plaintiff invokes the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. By way of defense respondent disclaims any liability under its contract of lease, denies any independent acts of negligence, invokes likewise the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, and pleads the contributory negligence of defendant, its employees and guests.

The court a quo overruled an exception of no cause or right of action and after trial rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff for $613.75. From this decree the defendant has prosecuted this appeal, which appellee has answered, asking the award be increased to $818.25.

On December 26, 1952, G. W. Robinson, an occupant of one of the first-floor premises of the building underneath the Rio Hotel, discovered water on the floor of his place of business and immediately notified plaintiff, who, upon investigation of his premises, found that water had come through a hole in the ceiling and ruined a quantity of printing which was stacked for delivery to his customers. After notifying Dr. Schnitt, one of the lessor owners of the building, Sam Giglio and Ronald Pruitt, two plumbers, came for the purpose of repairing the plumbing. An inspection of the premises of the Rio Hotel upstairs disclosed the fixtures there were not leaking and no water was found on the floor. The source of the trouble was located in a sewer pipe which was suspended four to twelve inches below the ceiling on the premises occupied by plaintiff. This pipe carried sewerage from defendant’s hotel and was part of and connected to a common system used also by tenants on the lower floor. The trouble-was found at an opening chiseled into the top surface of the sewer pipe. The opening-was covered by a piece of tin which had “rotted out”, as expressed by the witnesses. The jagged edges of the pipe and deteriorated tin cover caused waste material to stop the flow of sewerage at this point, resulting in back filling until the water overflowed somewhere, not exactly disclosed by the evidence, thence it spilled upon plaintiff’s finished printed products. The plumbing on the lower floor was not affected by the stoppage.

From the evidence so presented we infer the water which fell upon plaintiff’s premises and caused the damages came from the use of, but not necessarily from the improp[663]*663er use of, the facilities in the hotel. Plaintiff earnestly contends the stoppage was brought about by improper use of the upstairs facilities in that towels and objects of cloth were put into the commodes by guests of the hotel, but this charge is not made out by the evidence. Pruitt, who unstopped the line, did not determine the identity of the objects closing the sewerage and testified it could have been toilet tissue, a more likely conclusion in our opinion. Pruitt attributed the cause of stoppage to jagged edges of the broken pipe or to the rotting of the piece of tin which was placed over the hole in a crude sort of repair made some time before. The testimony did establish, however, that the location of this opening, being on top of the pipe, would not normally be detected except upon a close examination. Neither litigant knew of the existence of the opening prior to the occurrence on December 26, 1952, which brought it to light.

We are convinced plaintiff has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence actionable negligence on the part of defendant. We also find the proximate cause of the damage was the stoppage of the sewer line at a place not upon or within the premises of defendant. The sewer line which caused the trouble was a portion of a common system used by all of the tenants.

Liability for plaintiff’s damage, we surmise, cannot attach to defendant who, in the absence of an express covenant to the contrary, was under no responsibility to make repairs to a common sewer line situated entirely off her premises. Defendant’s written lease does not impose upon her such an obligation.

By stipulation it is agreed both plaintiff and defendant executed identical leases with the owner of the building which houses their two businesses. A copy of defendant’s contract in the record provides in part:

“It is further stipulated and agreed that Lessee shall pay promptly for all water and sewerage service, gas and electricity used on the leased premises, and keep all pipes and connections, plumbing and electrical fixtures, and installations in good repair at her own expense, and that she shall maintain the leased premises in good repair at her own expense, and that Lessee will make all repairs and improvements rendered necessary or required by any Federal, State or local law, or by any Governmental instrumentality, whether such action is required by statute or departmental order, and the Lessee further agrees to maintain the leased premises in good condition and repair during the term of this lease and make all necessary repairs to the said premises at her own expense and restore the premises to the Lessors at the termination of this lease in like good condition as that in which it is received, subject to the usual wear and tear brought about by a prudent use of the leased premises. Lessee hereby acknowledges that the leased premises áre received by her in first class condition.
“It is hereby expressly stipulated and agreed that Lessors shall at any reasonable time have access to the leased premises for the purpose of inspecting said premises as to its then existing state of repair and condition.
“It is further stipulated and agreed that Lessee expressly assumes the responsibility for the condition of the leased premises, and Lessors shall not be held liable for damage for injury to persons or property caused by any vice or defect or change of conditions in the leased premises, to any tenant or occupant or to any person or property in the building or on the premises by license of the tenant or occupant, or otherwise, unless the Lessors be notified in writing Of such vice or defect and shall have failed to remedy same within a reasonable time, if such defect involves a repair for which Lessors are responsible by law or under the terms of this lease; and Lessee assumes all liability and'binds herself to hold Lessors harmless from' any injury [664]*664or damage to any person or property upon the leased premises' or adjacent thereto, caused by reason of said Lessee’s failure to keep same in good condition and repair, and agrees- to hold Lessors harmless from any such claim or damage.”

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Bluebook (online)
73 So. 2d 661, 1954 La. App. LEXIS 839, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/poss-v-brown-lactapp-1954.