Porter v. Gaylord Chemical Corp.

721 So. 2d 27, 1998 WL 683050
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedSeptember 25, 1998
Docket98 CA 0222
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 721 So. 2d 27 (Porter v. Gaylord Chemical Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Porter v. Gaylord Chemical Corp., 721 So. 2d 27, 1998 WL 683050 (La. Ct. App. 1998).

Opinion

721 So.2d 27 (1998)

Gurvis PORTER
v.
GAYLORD CHEMICAL CORPORATION and Continental Casualty Company.

No. 98 CA 0222.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.

September 25, 1998.

*28 Kirk L. Landry, Baton Rouge, for Defendants/Appellants.

Edward Robinson, III, Baton Rouge, for Plaintiff/Appellee.

Before SHORTESS, C.J., and CARTER and WHIPPLE, JJ.

*29 WHIPPLE, Judge.

This action is a suit for workers' compensation benefits. The workers' compensation judge rendered judgment in favor of the employee, Gurvis Porter, III, finding that Porter was entitled to temporary total disability benefits and payment of medical expenses and that the employer, Gaylord Chemical Corporation ("Gaylord") was liable to Porter for penalties and attorney's fees. For the following reasons, we affirm in part and amend in part.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Porter's claim for workers' compensation benefits arises out of a chemical release which took place at the Gaylord Chemical Plant in Bogalusa, Louisiana in October of 1995. On October 12, 1995, a rail car on the Gaylord plant site began leaking nitrogen tetroxide. Porter, who was a chemical plant operator for Gaylord at the time, worked in direct proximity to the rail car during this period of time assisting in efforts to contain the leak.

Despite these efforts, the tank car finally exploded on October 23, 1995, resulting in a large release of nitrogen tetroxide. Although Porter was not at work at the time of the explosion, he was called in to work within an hour and a half after the explosion, worked through the night, and worked his regular shifts for the two days following the explosion, until the situation was brought under control.

Following the explosion, Porter was hospitalized on two occasions for treatment of chemical rhinitis, which is an inflammation of the upper respiratory airway, and chemical bronchitis. Despite the persistence of his symptoms, Dr. Lee Roy Joyner, Jr., Porter's treating pulmonologist, released him to return to work on January 11, 1996, with the express stipulation that if Porter experienced any difficulties, he was to report to the clinic immediately for testing. Porter did return to work as of January 11, 1996, and at that time, Gaylord discontinued paying him weekly compensation benefits. However, because of an increase in symptoms, Porter could not continue to work after three weeks on the job. Thereafter, by report dated March 7, 1996, Dr. Joyner recommended that Porter not return to work at Gaylord due to his worsening symptoms.

However, at that point, Gaylord did not reinstate Porter's workers' compensation benefits. Gaylord did continue to pay for Porter's prescriptions until June 1996, at which time all workers' compensation payments to Porter were stopped.

Accordingly, plaintiff filed a disputed claim for compensation, and a hearing was conducted on September 24, 1997. Following the hearing, the workers' compensation judge found that Porter had met his burden of proving that he was temporarily, totally disabled as a result of the October 23, 1995 chemical release and that Gaylord had "acted arbitrarily, capriciously and without probable cause" in terminating Porter's compensation benefits. Thus, judgment was rendered, ordering Gaylord to pay Porter weekly compensation benefits from October 23, 1995, until Porter's condition changes, and medical expenses, with a credit to Gaylord for payments already made.[1] The judgment further provided that because Gaylord had acted arbitrarily, capriciously and without probable cause in terminating benefits, Gaylord was liable to Porter for "12% interest on his weekly workers' compensation payments" and $3,500.00 in attorney's fees.

From this judgment, Gaylord and its insurer, Continental Casualty Company, appeal, asserting that the workers' compensation judge: (1) committed manifest error in awarding Porter temporary total disability benefits and in awarding indemnity benefits; *30 and (2) committed legal and manifest error in awarding 12% interest and $3,500.00 in attorney's fees.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. ONE

Gaylord first contends that the workers' compensation judge erred in finding that Porter had proved that he was temporarily totally disabled as a result of the chemical release. Additionally, Gaylord contends that Porter has also failed to establish any entitlement to supplemental earnings benefits because Gaylord made available to him a job within his restrictions at Porter's pre-injury wage rate.

Benefits for temporary total disability shall be awarded only if a claimant proves by clear and convincing evidence that he is physically unable to engage in any employment. LSA-R.S. 23:1221(1)(c); Gordon v. Sandersons Farms, 96-1587, p. 8 (La.App. 1st Cir. 5/9/97); 693 So.2d 1279, 1285. A claimant is entitled to temporary total disability benefits if he shows that he is disabled at the time of trial and is still undergoing medical testing with an indefinite period of recovery, even if it appears reasonably certain that he will be able to engage in gainful occupation within a foreseeable period of time. Gordon, 96-1587 at p. 8; 693 So.2d at 1285.

The factual finding regarding whether a workers' compensation claimant has met his burden of proving disability must be given great weight and will not be overturned on appeal absent manifest error. Bazar v. Hull, 95-1427, p. 2 (La.App. 1st Cir. 2/23/96); 669 So.2d 603, 604. If there is evidence before the workers' compensation judge that furnishes a reasonable factual basis for such a finding, the workers' compensation judge's determination of facts will not be disturbed on appeal. Moreover, where there is a conflict in testimony, reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact will not be disturbed upon review. Bazar, 95-1427 at p. 2; 669 So.2d at 604.

In the instant case, Dr. Joyner, Porter's treating pulmonologist, testified at length at the hearing. Dr. Joyner has continued to treat Porter since the time of the accident, and he explained that Porter had developed both RADS and RUDS, conditions which are permanent. RADS is an asthma-like condition where the entire bronchial lining has been irreversibly injured, and RUDS is a condition where the membrane of the sinuses has been permanently and irreversibly injured. As a result of the chemical irritant, Porter's bronchial tubes show scarring and marked derangement, and the bronchial tubes are now unable to maintain themselves free of infection. Additionally, there are large holes and gaps in the respiratory membrane of the nose and bronchial lining, which permit allergens to get deeper into the pores. As a result of these conditions, Porter is susceptible to asthma-like symptoms of spasm and tightness in the chest when exposed to any type of irritant or odor, which can result in a 50 to 60% drop in lung capacity.

Dr. Joyner also testified that in addition to RADS and RUDS, which have resulted in repeated infections, increased allergies and asthma-like symptoms, Porter has also suffered a neurotoxic injury as a result of his exposure to the nitrogen tetroxide. The symptoms of this disorder include profound short-term memory disorder, concentration skill abnormalities, severe chronic headaches, difficulty falling asleep, difficulty maintaining sleep, profound chronic fatigue syndrome and profound changes in temperament. Dr. Joyner explained that a new technology called a SPECT brain scan, which can measure cognitive brain function, demonstrated substantial injury to Porter's frontal lobes, temporal lobes and basal ganglia. Dr.

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