Porter v. Bowman

2021 IL App (1st) 191641-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: May 17, 2021
• Docket: 1-19-1641
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2021 IL App (1st) 191641-U No. 1-19-1641 Order filed May 17, 2021 First Division

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ KECIA PORTER, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 18 M1 130599 ) TAWANDA BOWMAN, ) Honorable ) H. Yvonne Coleman Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, presiding.

JUSTICE HYMAN delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Walker and Justice Pierce concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: We affirm the judgment of the trial court, where plaintiff failed to provide a sufficiently complete record on appeal.

¶2 After a bench trial in this landlord-tenant suit, the trial court entered judgment in favor of

defendant Tawanda Bowman and against plaintiff Kecia Porter, who previously rented a

residential apartment from Bowman. Porter seeks reversal of the trial court’s findings that

Bowman was not liable to Porter for alleged violations of the Chicago Residential Landlord and

Tenant Ordinance (RLTO). Due to the inadequate record on appeal, we must affirm. No. 1-19-1641

¶3 Background

¶4 The record on appeal does not contain a report of proceedings. The facts gleaned from the

common law record indicate that in September 2018, Porter, who represented herself, filed a

complaint against Bowman, seeking $4,544 in damages due to Bowman’s alleged violations of the

RLTO. Porter alleged that in November 2017, she entered into a one-year lease agreement to rent

an apartment from Bowman, who “breached the agreement less than 4 months later” when she told

Porter that she “could not afford to make necessary repairs.” Porter alleged that Bowman failed to

maintain and make necessary repairs under section 5-12-070 of the RLTO. Chicago Municipal

Code § 5-12-070 (amended Nov. 6, 1991) (“The landlord shall maintain the premises in

compliance with all applicable provisions of the municipal code and shall promptly make any and

all repairs necessary to fulfill this obligation.”).

¶5 Porter also alleged (i) Bowman “would not clean up [the] property,” (ii) there was a “city

fine for excess garbage,” and (iii) Bowman refused to replace or repair a vandalized mailbox.

Porter further alleged Bowman “terminated [her] tenancy” in violation of section 5-12-150 of the

RLTO. Chicago Municipal Code, § 5-12-150 (amended Nov. 6, 1991) (prohibiting landlord from

engaging in retaliatory conduct for, among other conduct, requesting required repairs or

complaining of code violations to government authorities).

¶6 A default judgment was entered against Bowman on November 9, 2018. The trial court

granted Bowman’s motion to vacate the default judgment on December 4, 2018.

¶7 The case was set for trial on April 30, 2019. Although the record on appeal does not contain

a transcript or report of proceedings, on July 18, 2019, the trial court entered a judgment reflecting

that it held a bench trial at which Porter and Bowman testified. According to the judgment, Porter

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testified that she alerted Bowman to several major repair issues. Bowman testified that she

promptly arranged for a maintenance worker to make the repairs.

¶8 In its judgment, the court declined to find Bowman retaliated against Porter in violation of

section 5-12-150 of the RLTO. The court found: “[a]lthough the lease was for a term of one year,

the parties agreed to terminate the lease in February 2018” after Bowman informed Porter that she

would be unable to complete all of the requested repairs; that Porter “was released from her

obligations under the lease agreement”; and that Porter eventually moved out of the apartment in

July 2018. The court concluded that Bowman’s “desire to terminate the lease was not retaliatory.”

¶9 In addition, the court found in favor of Bowman with respect to Porter’s claim that Bowman

failed to maintain the premises in violation of section 5-12-070 of the RLTO:

“The court finds that there were certain repairs that were not in compliance with

the code, however, [Bowman] promptly made those repairs. Section 5-12-110

provides that if there is material noncompliance by the landlord which renders the

premises not reasonably fit and habitable, the tenant has the right to terminate the

lease upon proving proper notice. Here, the parties mutually agreed to terminate the

lease. The court further finds that [Bowman] was not in material noncompliance

with Section 5-12-070 as defined in Section 5-12-110. [Porter] vacated the premises

and she is not entitled to any damages.”

Accordingly, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Bowman.

¶ 10 On July 22, 2019, Porter filed a motion to reconsider, in which she asserted, among other

matters, that the court erred in finding that the parties mutually agreed to terminate the lease, and

that the evidence showed that Bowman retaliated against Porter after she complained to the

Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) about conditions at the apartment. The record on appeal

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reflects that the court heard argument on the motion, but the record on appeal contains no transcript

of proceedings.

¶ 11 While the motion to reconsider was pending, Porter filed a notice of appeal from the July

18, 2019 judgment. The trial court denied the motion to reconsider on September 12, 2019, and

the notice of appeal became effective on that date. Ill. S. Ct. R. 303(a)(2) (eff. July 1, 2017) (when

timely postjudgment motion has been filed, “a notice of appeal filed before the entry of the order

disposing of the last pending postjudgment motion * * * becomes effective when the order

disposing of said motion or claim is entered.”).

¶ 12 Analysis

¶ 13 On appeal, Porter seeks reversal of the judgment. Porter argues that the trial court erred

with respect to both her claim of retaliatory conduct as well as her claim that Bowman failed to

maintain the premises.

¶ 14 Regarding the retaliation claim, Porter asserts the “undisputed evidence from State

agencies” including the CHA, confirms that Bowman “ordered her to move” after Porter engaged

in protected activity. Porter also asserts that Bowman testified in court that she was “sick of

[Porter] calling the housing authority on me,” which established a violation of section 5-12-150.

To the extent that the trial court found the parties mutually agreed to terminate the lease, Porter

claims the finding is clearly erroneous, arbitrary, and “not supported by any evidence on record or

testimony.”

¶ 15 Regarding the section 5-12-070 claim, Porter contends that the trial court “abused its

discretion” in finding that Bowman made timely repairs. Porter contends that she presented

“undisputable” proof in the form of “testimony, witness corroboration, pictures[,] text messages

and a corporate letter from Com Ed to support [Bowman’s] failure to maintain the unit in violation

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of 5-12-070,” but the court “ignored” that evidence. Porter requests that we reverse the trial court’s

judgment and direct the circuit court to enter a judgment in her favor in the amount of $4,544.

¶ 16 Bowman did not file an appellee’s brief. As a result, on March 1, 2021, this court ordered

this appeal taken just on Porter’s brief and the record on appeal. See First Capitol Mortgage Corp.

v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 131-33 (1976).

¶ 17 In Illinois, it is well established that “an appellant has the burden to present a sufficiently

complete record of the proceedings at trial to support a claim of error, and in the absence of such

a record on appeal, it will be presumed that the order entered by the trial court was in conformity

with law and had a sufficient factual basis.” Foutch v. O'Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92 (1984).

Doubts that arise from the incompleteness of the record must be resolved against the appellant. Id.

¶ 18 The record does not contain a report of the trial court proceedings, specifically, the April

30, 2019, trial at which Porter and Bowman testified. Under Supreme Court Rule 323 (eff. July 1,

2017), in lieu of a trial court transcript, an appellant may file a bystander’s report (Rule 323(c)) or

an agreed statement of facts (Rule 323(d)). Porter has filed neither. As mentioned, the record before

us consists solely of common law documents.

¶ 19 The lack of an adequate record on appeal precludes us from ascertaining what evidence,

testimony, or arguments were presented to the trial court. “An issue relating to a circuit court’s

factual findings and basis for its legal conclusions obviously cannot be reviewed absent a report

or record of the proceedings.” Corral v. Mervis Industries, Inc., 217 Ill. 2d 144, 156 (2005). Under

these circumstances, this court must presume that the trial court acted in conformity with the law

and ruled properly after considering the evidence before it. Id. at 156-57 (“Without an adequate

record * * *, the reviewing court must presume the circuit court had a sufficient factual basis for

its holding and that its order conforms with the law.” (citing Webster v. Hartman, 195 Ill. 2d 426,

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433-34 (2001); Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d at 391-92.)). “ ‘Any doubts which may arise from the

incompleteness of the record will be resolved against the appellant.’ ” Corral, 217 Ill. 2d at 157

(quoting Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d at 392).

¶ 20 Applying these principles in landlord-tenant disputes, this court has held that we cannot

determine whether posttrial findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence without a

sufficient record of the proceedings. See, e.g., Salier v. Delta Real Estate Investments, LLC, 2020

IL App (1st) 181512, ¶ 48 (where record on appeal did not include landlord’s testimony at bench

trial, “we cannot find that the court’s decision to deny an award under section 60 [Chicago

Municipal Code § 5-12-060] was against the manifest weight of the evidence”); Benford v. Everett

Commons, LLC, 2014 IL App (1st) 131231, ¶ 32 (without transcript or report of proceedings, we

“have no basis for determining whether the jury’s findings were against the manifest weight of the

evidence” and we “presume the jury’s verdict was not against the manifest weight of the

evidence.”). These principles dispose of this appeal.

¶ 21 As appellant, Porter had the burden to present this court with a sufficient record to support

her claims of error, and this requirement applies to self-represented litigants like Porter. Wing v.

Chicago Transit Authority, 2016 IL App (1st) 153517, ¶ 7 (“An appellant’s pro se status does not

alleviate the duty to comply with our supreme court’s rules governing appellate procedure.

[Citations.]”).

¶ 22 Porter’s appeal boils down to claims that the trial court’s findings were contrary to the

evidence regarding (i) whether Bowman acted in retaliation pursuant to section 5-12-150 and (ii)

whether Bowman failed to maintain the premises in compliance with section 5-12-070. But, she

has not provided this court with a transcript or report of proceedings from which we can review

the testimony and other evidence before the trial court. In turn, we cannot evaluate Porter’s

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assertions that the trial court’s findings were not supported by the evidence. Accordingly, we must

presume that the trial court’s judgment conformed with the law and had a sufficient factual basis.

Webster, 195 Ill. 2d at 432. Thus, we are compelled to affirm the trial court.

¶ 23 Affirmed.

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