Port Blakely Mill Co. v. Royal Ins.

186 F. 716, 108 C.C.A. 586, 1911 U.S. App. LEXIS 4162
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedFebruary 6, 1911
DocketNo. 1,805
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 186 F. 716 (Port Blakely Mill Co. v. Royal Ins.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Port Blakely Mill Co. v. Royal Ins., 186 F. 716, 108 C.C.A. 586, 1911 U.S. App. LEXIS 4162 (9th Cir. 1911).

Opinion

"ROSS, Circuit Judge.

This was an action upon a policy of fire insurance to recover for a loss sustained by the plaintiff in error, the Port Blakely Mill Company, a corporation, which was plaintiff below, by the burning of a portion of the sawmill plant owned and operated by it at Port Blakely, in the state of Washington. Upon the conclusion of the plaintiff mill company’s evidence, the trial court, on motion of the defendant company, directed a verdict in its favor, which was accordingly returned. Judgment followed against the plaintiff mill company, which brings the case here upon writ of error.

'['he printed portion of the policy contained a provision to the effect that it should be void if the plaintiff’s plant should be operated at night later than 10 o’clock, or if its operation should be suspended for more than 10 consecutive days, or if mechanics should be employed in altering or repairing the plant for more than 15 consecutive days, or if certain prohibited materials should be kept upon the premises; but those provisions of the printed portion of the policy were modified by the following provision, prepared by the plaintiff’s insurance broker, and inserted in the policy by mutual consent of the respective parties thereto, to wit:

‘•rrivilege to make additions, alterations, and repairs, and to deplete without limit of lime * * * to work overtime and at nights, to do such work and keep and use such materials and products as may be incidental to the business, any prohibition of the same contained in the printed conditions of this policy being waived.”

It is not disputed-that by virtue of the clause just quoted the assured was entitled to make additions to the plant, alterations therein, and repairs thereto, without regard to the printed portions of the policy, and could operate the plant throughout the night and employ such mechanics and do such work and keep such materials upon the premises as it desired, and as were incidental to the prosecution of the business in which it was engaged; and, as its sprinkler equipment was by the policy expressly made a part of the machinery insured, it is conceded that the assured was entitled, under the policy, to make any additions to the sprinkler equipment, .and such extensions and alterations thereof and repairs thereto as it might desire, all of which concessions, however, are coupled with this other provision of the policy:

“Warranted by the assured that due diligence be used that the automatic sprinkler system shall at all times be maintained in good working order.”

As a matter of course, if in making additions to or extensions of the plant or alterations therein permitted by the policy it became necessary to move or disconnect the sprinkler system or any part thereof, it could not in the nature of things be kept in good working order during the time of temporary suspensions for those purposes, and therefore in the nature.of things it could not be maintained in good-working order “at all times.” The clear meaning of the clause relied upon by the defendant in error therefore is in our opinion this: Warranted by the assured that it will use due diligence to maintain its automatic sprinkler system in good working order.

Did the assured use that required diligence was the real question in the case. The trial court refused to submit it to the jury; itself de[718]*718ciding the question as a matter of law against the plaintiff. To test the correctness of the court’s action, we have therefore to consider the evidence introduced by the plaintiff.

The evidence showed that the mill in question is 450 feet long by about 100 feet in width. The sprinkler system was installed by the company for the purpose of extinguishing fire, should it occur. Water therefor was supplied by reservoirs owned by the company. The system was divided into divisions, those numbered 3, 4, and 5 covering that portion of the mill plant comprising the mill building, in the eastern part of which was the lath mill. Each division was connected with the supply pipes leading from the reservoirs by a large vertical pipe, called a “riser.” Lateral pipes containing sprinkler heads were extended from each riser over the area intended to be covered by its division of the sprinkler system. Until a fire occurred, the water supply was usually kept out of the lateral pipes by means of the air pressure, which closed and held down the gate in an automatic air valve placed in the riser; the operation of the system being that, upon the happening of a fire, such fire would fuse and melt'the sprinkler heads, thus releasing the air pressure and opening the air valve, thereby permitting the water to flow from the riser into the lateral pipes and out upon the fire through the sprinkler heads. In each riser immediately below .the air valve there -was a gate, operated by hand, by means of which the water supply in any division could be shut off.

In its answer to the plaintiff’s complaint the defendant company set up affirmatively that on or about April 1, 1907, the plaintiff caused the gate valve in division No. 3 of the sprinkler system to be' closed and the connecting pipes to be removed, thereby wholly cutting off the water from that division, and that the plaintiff “carelessly and negligently and without the exercise of due diligence” caused and permitted division 3 of the sprinkler system to remain in the condition last above indicated without water, and useless as a means of fire protection, from April 1, 1907, continuously until after the fire on April 22, 1907. The record shows that the fire occurred in the night of the day last mentioned, which was Monday, in that portion of the plant covered by division 3 of the sprinkler system. In its reply filed to this affirmative defense the plaintiff mill company put in issue the averments of negligence and lack of due diligence on its part, and also denied that division 3 of its sprinkler system was without a supply of water at the time the fire occurred. It further set up that on or about April 1, 1907, its business required that additions, alterations, and repairs be made to that portion of its mill building known as the lath mill, and also to division 3 of its sprinkler system, in order to make it more effective and to extend it to the lath mill, and that'accordingly, and in conformity with the conditions and provisions of the policy in suit, the plaintiff proceeded with the execution of that work, and as expeditiously and rapidly as possible; that it could not be performed without turning off the water from division 3 of the sprinkler system; that on April 31, 1907,' the work had been so far completed that the water could be and was on that day turned into division 3,.which was the earliest time possible, and that at the time of and during the fire in question division 3, as well as all other divisions of the sprinkler sys[719]*719tem, was in good and thorough working order; and that the plaintiff mill company had at all times used due diligence to maintain the whole of its said sprinkler system in good working order at all times.

There was evidence on the part of the plaintiff mill company to the effect that one Ford, a man experienced in the construction and operation of sawmills and sprinkler systems connected therewith, was appointed superintendent of the plaintiff mill company’s sprinkler system in March, 1903, and was such superintendent continuously to the time of the fire in question.

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Bluebook (online)
186 F. 716, 108 C.C.A. 586, 1911 U.S. App. LEXIS 4162, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/port-blakely-mill-co-v-royal-ins-ca9-1911.