NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2549-22
POPPY HOLDINGS, LLC, and TRYSTONE CAPITAL ASSETS, LLC,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
v.
RUSLAN MILOV and LYUDMILA MILOV, 1
Defendants-Appellants,
and
DIVISION OF CODES AND STANDARDS,
Defendant. ___________________________
341 CONNECTICUT, LLC and ITTA JACOBS,
Intervenors-Respondents. ___________________________
1 Improperly pled as Linda Milov. Argued September 10, 2024 – Decided October 2, 2024
Before Judges Perez Friscia and Bergman.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Passaic County, Docket No. F-004127-21.
Lisa C. Krenkel argued the cause for appellants (Krenkel & Krenkel, LLC, attorneys; Lisa C. Krenkel, on the briefs).
Anthony L. Velasquez argued the cause for respondents Poppy Holdings, LLC, and Trystone Capital Assets, LLC (Tryko Partners, attorneys; Anthony L. Velasquez, on the brief).
Patrick O. Lacsina argued the cause for respondents 341 Connecticut, LLC, and ITTA Jacobs (Patrick O. Lacsina Law Offices, LLC, attorneys; Patrick O. Lacsina, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
In this tax sale foreclosure matter, defendants Ruslan Milov and Lyudmila
Milov2 appeal from the April 27, 2023 Chancery Division order denying their
motion to vacate final judgment by default entered in favor of plaintiff Poppy
Holdings, LLC. Based on our review of the record, we conclude the trial court
2 For clarity, intending no disrespect, we refer to Ruslan Milov and Lyudmila Milov by their first names. A-2549-22 2 correctly determined service of process of the tax sale foreclosure complaint was
valid. We affirm.
I.
We summarize the pertinent facts from the testimony adduced at the two -
day hearing. In 1998, Ruslan purchased a commercial, four-family rental
property in Passaic. At the time of the purchase, defendants were married. In
2018, Ruslan failed to pay $2,771.94 in property taxes. Trystone Capital Assets,
LLC purchased the tax sale certificate for the property.
In accordance with the Fair Foreclosure Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:50-53 to -82,
Trystone served defendants a notice of intention to foreclose, dated June 30,
2021, by regular and certified mail at their home address. The certified mail
was unclaimed, but the regular mailed notice was not returned. On August 9,
Trystone filed a tax sale foreclosure complaint naming Ruslan and "Mrs. Milov,
spouse of Ruslan Milov" as defendants. Trystone certified defendants were
personally served the summons and complaint on August 23.
Process server William Sanchez provided Trystone two affidavits of
service, dated August 23, 2021, reflecting he effectuated personal service on
defendants. The affidavit of service for "Mrs. Milov" indicated service was
perfected by delivering a copy to "Mrs. Linda Milov" and notarized with the
A-2549-22 3 date of August 23. The affidavit of service for Ruslan indicated service was
perfected by delivering a copy to his "wife," "Mrs. Linda Milov, spouse of
Ruslan Milov," and notarized with an earlier date of June 23.
At the hearing, Sanchez testified that at the time of service, Esquire
Process Service employed him, and he used a mobile application software called
ServeManager. After effectuating service, Sanchez routinely entered the
information he learned into the ServeManager application, which generated a
report. Here, Sanchez's report detailed the date and time of service was August
23, at 9:25 a.m. Further, it indicated the service recipient as "Mrs. Linda Milov,
spouse of Ruslan Milov." Sanchez's report describes the person served as: over
forty-five years of age, caucasian, female, brown hair, over 135 pounds, and
5'6". The report additionally specified the person served had glasses and
described a "[v]ehicle bearing N[ew] J[ersey] [r]egistration ZHY[***]" was
observed at the location of service. The "[s]ervice [a]ddress" listed was
defendants' home address. The ServeManager report had a timestamp of August
28, 2031, which was ten years and five days later than Sanchez's entered date of
service.
On August 23, 2021, Trystone moved to amend the complaint, correcting
defendant "Mrs. Milov, spouse of Ruslan Milov" to "Linda Milov," which the
A-2549-22 4 court granted. On October 1, Trystone moved to enter default and for an order
setting the time, place, and amount of redemption. On October 15, the court
ordered the redemption amount of $20,695.64, the place of redemption as the
office of the Tax Collector of the City of Passaic, and the date of redemption as
December 14.
On November 15, Trystone assigned the tax sale certificate to its affiliate,
Poppy. The same day, Trystone moved to substitute the named captioned
plaintiff, which the court granted. Approximately two months later, Poppy
moved for the entry of a final judgment. On February 3, 2022, the court granted
the motion vesting Poppy with the property in "fee simple." On February 7,
plaintiff served the final judgment on defendants by certified and regular mail.
In March, 341 Connecticut, LLC purchased the property from Poppy for
$375,000 receiving a quitclaim deed, which was recorded. Trystone and its
successor Poppy certified that each motion and order was served on defendants
via regular and certified mail.
On March 24, defendants filed an emergent order to show cause to vacate
the final judgment by default. The matter was converted to a motion to vacate
final judgment, under Rule 4:50-1, "for lack of service and for any other relief
the [c]ourt deems equitable." In support of the motion, Ruslan certified his "wife
A-2549-22 5 is named Lyudmila Milov and is not named or known as Linda." Lyudmila
certified that "neither [she] nor [her] husband were home at the time the
[s]ummons and [c]omplaint were purportedly personally served on the non -
existent Linda Milov." On April 27, 341 Connecticut moved to intervene as the
new property owner seeking post-judgment discovery. The court granted 341
Connecticut's motion in part, permitting the filing of an opposition to
defendants' motion. The court thereafter ordered a hearing regarding service.
In March 2023, defendants' counsel asserted she held the funds to redeem the
tax certificate in her trust account.
At the hearing, on March 29, defendants argued plaintiff's failure to
perfect service mandated vacating the final judgment; thus, the court lacked
jurisdiction to hear the tax sale foreclosure. Defendants contended service was
invalid because: they were not personally served at their residence; the affidavit
of service for Lyudmila was dated August 23, 2021, but notarized two months
earlier on June 23; the relationship between plaintiff and Esquire created a
conflict of interest; Sanchez had a conflict of interest; and 341 Connecticut was
not a bona fide purchaser.
Lyudmila testified that on August 23, 2021, at 8:45 a.m., she left the
residence with her family for a vacation and was not personally served with the
A-2549-22 6 complaints. She asserted that after leaving home, they stopped at a family
member's house and a coffee shop. Further, she testified they arrived in Virginia
at around 5:14 p.m. on August 23. She produced time-stamped photos verifying
her travels and a parking ticket for their vehicle with the license plate ZHY***.
Ruslan corroborated Lyudmila's testimony regarding the family's
departure on the morning of August 23. He testified they traveled from their
home to the East Orange toll plaza approximately 9.1 miles away, and that it
took "anywhere from sixteen to twenty minutes" to get there. Relying on an E-
ZPass record, Ruslan testified they passed through the East Orange toll plaza at
9:36 a.m. He maintained unawareness of the foreclosure until February 22,
2022, when he received an email from the Passaic County Tax Collector in
response to his request to redeem the property. Ruslan testified he had
contemporaneously received communications from 341 Connecticut's
representative seeking to purchase the property for approximately $650,000, but
the tax foreclosure was never mentioned.
Defendants' qualified GPS expert David Allen Burgess testified the
timestamp on the ServeManager report "correspond[ed] to the date of August
28[], 2031" under the GPS timeline. Burgess clarified, however, "what that is
is a Unix timestamp and not a GPS timestamp." Burgess testified that if the
A-2549-22 7 ServeManager report "[wa]s interpreted as a Unix timestamp," as it likely should
have been, then "the time matches exactly the time, 9:25 a.m., given on the
affidavit on that day," August 23, 2021. The expert explained the timestamp
could not be altered. Therefore, he acknowledged the timestamp corresponded
to August 23, 2021—the date of the alleged service—under the Unix timeline.
He further testified the ServeManager report GPS location placed Sanchez at a
school "about 500 yards from the address given on the affidavit." Specifically,
the GPS location was a "line distance of 1,544 feet" from defendants' address.
The expert also agreed the GPS "information provided by ServeManager [wa]s
accurate and, importantly, was not altered."
He opined that based on the service time of 9:25 a.m., it was unlikely
Sanchez could "have covered" the distance between defendants' residence and
the GPS location if there was only thirty seconds between the service of process
and completion of the ServeManager application. After verifying the E-ZPass
toll timestamp and timestamps of defendants' photos taken along their route,
Burgess concluded "it [was] very unlikely that [defendants] were at" their
residence at the time service was purportedly effectuated.
Sanchez testified he had been a process server for approximately twenty
years conducting "thousands" of services. He acknowledged having no
A-2549-22 8 "independent recollection of this service," but relayed he always entered the
information learned at the time of service into the ServeManager application.
Further, he did not always open and complete the application at the site of
service. Specifically, Sanchez relayed that after service, he would sometimes
"drive away, go around the corner and . . . input information."
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court issued an order accompanied
by an oral decision denying defendants' motion to vacate final judgment. The
court found Sanchez's testimony credible. Relying on the affidavits of service
and ServeManager report, the court found "service of process was effected,"
stating:
It's clear that the process server was there. He spoke to somebody and believed that somebody indicated her name was Linda Milov, and that's what he wrote, and the GPS coordinates proof. There's an expert who says you can't—the only thing on that form that can't be tampered with is the GPS coordinates. He was there.
....
. . . Was there enough time for them to get to . . . the toll plaza? I think there [wa]s.
On appeal, defendants argue the court erred because: the affidavits of
service were defective; a presumption of validity was afforded to the affidavits
of service improperly shifting the burden to defendants to prove defective
A-2549-22 9 service by clear and convincing evidence; the notary had insufficient contact
with the process server; a conflict existed, and the process server was not
independent; and a bona fide purchase by 341 Connecticut did not occur. In a
supplemental letter brief dated December 11, 2023, defendants further contend
because there was "substantial equity" in the property pipeline, retroactivity of
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Tyler v. Hennepin County, 598
U.S. 631 (2023) should be afforded. 257-261 20th Ave. Realty, LLC v. Roberto,
477 N.J. Super. 339, 366 (App. Div. 2023), certif. granted, 256 N.J. 535 (2024).
II.
We review a motion to vacate final judgment under Rule 4:50-1 for an
abuse of discretion. Roberto, 477 N.J. Super. at 366; see also BV001 REO
Blocker, LLC v. 53 W. Somerset St. Props., LLC, 467 N.J. Super. 117, 124 (App
Div. 2021). "An abuse of discretion occurs when a decision was 'made without
a rational explanation, inexplic[ably] departed from established policies, or
rested on an impermissible basis.'" Roberto, 477 N.J. Super. at 367 (quoting
Savage v. Township of Neptune, 472 N.J. Super. 291, 313 (App. Div. 2022),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 257 N.J. 204 (2024)). "When examining a trial court's
exercise of discretionary authority, we reverse only when the exercise of
discretion was 'manifestly unjust' under the circumstances." Newark Morning
A-2549-22 10 Ledger Co. v. N.J. Sports & Exposition Auth., 423 N.J. Super. 140, 174 (App.
Div. 2011) (quoting Union Cnty. Improvement Auth. v. Artaki, LLC, 392 N.J.
Super. 141, 149 (App. Div. 2007)).
"Rule 4:50-1 provides for relief from a judgment [or order] in six
enumerated circumstances." D.M.C. v. K.H.G., 471 N.J. Super. 10, 26 (App.
Div. 2022) (quoting In re Est. of Schifftner, 385 N.J. Super. 37, 41 (App. Div.
2006)). "[T]he rule is a carefully crafted vehicle intended to underscore the need
for repose while achieving a just result." Ibid. (quoting DEG, LLC v. Township
of Fairfield, 198 N.J. 242, 261 (2009)).
Rule 4:50-1 provides:
On motion, with briefs, and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or the party's legal representative from a final judgment or order for the following reasons: (a) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (b) newly discovered evidence which would probably alter the judgment or order and which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under [Rule] 4:49; (c) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (d) the judgment or order is void; (e) the judgment or order has been satisfied, released or discharged, or a prior judgment or order upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment or order should have prospective application; or (f) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment or order.
A-2549-22 11 We similarly "review a 'trial court's determinations, premised on the
testimony of witnesses and written evidence at a bench trial, in accordance with
a deferential standard.'" Nelson v. Elizabeth Bd. of Educ., 466 N.J. Super. 325,
336 (App. Div. 2021) (quoting D'Agostino v. Maldonado, 216 N.J. 168, 182
(2013)). "[W]e defer to the trial court's credibility determinations, because it
'hears the case, sees and observes the witnesses, and hears them testify, affording
it a better perspective than a reviewing court in evaluating the veracity of a
witness.'" City Council of Orange Twp. v. Edwards, 455 N.J. Super. 261, 272
(App. Div. 2018) (quoting Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). We will "'not disturb the factual findings and legal
conclusions of the trial judge' unless convinced that those findings and
conclusions were 'so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the
competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests
of justice.'" Griepenburg v. Township of Ocean, 220 N.J. 239, 254 (2015)
(quoting Rova Farms Resort v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)).
"The primary method of obtaining in personam jurisdiction over a
defendant in this State is by causing the summons and complaint to be personally
served within this State pursuant to [Rule] 4:4-3." U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v.
Curcio, 444 N.J. Super. 94, 105 (App. Div. 2016) (quoting R. 4:4-4(a)). Rule
A-2549-22 12 4:4-3(a) requires a summons and complaint "be served . . . by the sheriff, or by
a person specially appointed by the court for that purpose, or by plaintiff's
attorney or the attorney's agent, or by any other competent adult not having a
direct interest in the litigation." The person serving the complaint and summons
must submit proof of service in the form of an affidavit. R. 4:4-7. The return
of service creates a "presumption that the facts recited therein are true."
Jameson v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 363 N.J. Super. 419, 426 (App. Div. 2003)
(quoting Resol. Tr. Corp. v. Associated Gulf Contractors, Inc., 263 N.J. Super.
332, 343 (App. Div. 1993)). This presumption may only be rebutted by clear
and convincing evidence establishing the return is false. Ibid.
A tax sale foreclosure judgment is typically void where service of process
on the property owner was defective. See M & D Assocs. v. Mandara, 366 N.J.
Super. 341, 352-53 (App. Div. 2004). "If defective service renders the judgment
void, a meritorious defense is not required to vacate the judgment under [ Rule]
4:50-1(d)." Jameson, 363 N.J. Super. at 425. Further, "[w]here due process has
been afforded [to] a litigant, technical violations of the rule concerning service
of process do not defeat the court's jurisdiction." Rosa v. Araujo, 260 N.J.
Super. 458, 463 (App. Div. 1992) (citing O'Connor v. Altus, 67 N.J. 106, 127-
28 (1975)). "Thus, 'not every defect in the manner in which process is served
A-2549-22 13 renders the judgment upon which the action is brought void and unenforceable.'"
Citibank, N.A. v. Russo, 334 N.J. Super. 346, 352 (App. Div. 2000) (quoting
Rosa, 260 N.J. Super. at 462-63).
III.
We address together defendants' contentions that the affidavits of service
should not have been afforded the presumption of validity and that the burden
of rebutting the presumption by clear and convincing evidence did not apply.
Rule 4:4-3 was amended in 2000 to permit service by private process servers
who do not have an interest in the litigation. See Pressler & Verniero, Current
N.J. Court Rules, cmt. on R. 4:4-3 (2024). The presumption of validity
applicable to a sheriff's return was afforded to affidavits of service submitted
"by a person other than a sheriff or a court appointee" authorized to serve process
under Rule 4:4-3. See R. 4:4-7. Here, the court correctly found the presumption
of validity applied to Sanchez's affidavits of service and held an evidentiary
hearing to address the material issues of fact regarding service. See Intek Auto
Leasing, Inc. v. Zetes Microtech Corp., 268 N.J. Super. 426, 433 (App. Div.
1993) (holding an evidentiary hearing was required to determine the authenticity
of an affidavit of service). In seeking to vacate final judgment by default,
defendants had the burden of producing clear and convincing evidence that the
A-2549-22 14 affidavits of service were false. See Jameson, 363 N.J. Super. at 426; see also
Garley v. Waddington, 177 N.J. Super. 173, 180 (App. Div. 1981) (stating a
defendant's burden was to establish "evidence that the return [wa]s false").
Rule 4:50-1(d) permits a court to relieve a party from a final judgment if
"the judgment or order is void." See also N.J.S.A. 54:5-87 (permitting a court
to vacate a tax sale foreclosure after the strict three-month time limitation "only
upon the grounds of lack of jurisdiction or fraud"). The Rule is "designed to
reconcile the strong interests in finality of judgments and judicial efficiency with
the equitable notion that courts should have authority to avoid an unjust result
in any given case." US Bank Ass'n v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449, 467 (2012)
(quoting Mancini v. EDS ex rel. N.J. Auto. Full Ins. Underwriting Ass'n, 132
N.J. 330, 334 (1993)).
Defendants next contend service was invalid because it was conducted "by
an in-house [p]rocess [s]ervice [c]ompany that has an interest in the litigation."
We are unpersuaded. While Esquire maintained an office in the same location
as plaintiff, the record demonstrates they are separate and distinct entities.
Notably, defendants failed to produce evidence refuting Esquire had different
ownership. The businesses' location in the same office alone does not establish
an interest in the litigation. Sanchez's uncontroverted testimony was that he was
A-2549-22 15 an Esquire employee. Further, defendants failed to demonstrate proof of a
conflict.
We also reject defendants' argument that Sanchez's affidavits were
defective and "facially invalid." Having concluded defendants did not
demonstrate Esquire had a personal interest in the action, we also observe
Sanchez's independence as a process server was unrefuted. Sanchez signed the
affidavits of service, and the affidavits were dated August 23, 2021. Although
the notary incorrectly dated one affidavit as June 23, we have recognized not
every defect in "service will . . . constitute per se grounds to vacate a final
judgment." See MTAG v. Tao Invs., LLC, 476 N.J. Super. 324, 339 (App. Div.
2023). Sanchez had worked as a process server for over nineteen years and was
employed by Esquire for almost two years. He testified to following a routine
when effectuating service. Sanchez would drive his vehicle to the service
address, exit near the location, perfect service, walk back to enter his vehicle,
and then complete inputting information into the electronic ServeManager
application at the location or in the vicinity. Notably, before effectuating
service, Sanchez would not receive a "description" of the person to be served
and would not know if they would "be home, or what car they dr[o]ve." He
A-2549-22 16 testified he never "assume[d]" information and only entered into ServeManager
descriptive details learned from the person served.
Sanchez's ServeManager report detailed: an accurate description of
Lyudmila; the person served provided a similar name of "Linda"; the person
served self-identified herself as Ruslan's spouse; and defendants' correct vehicle
license plate. The vehicle defendants undisputedly drove on vacation had the
same license plate number Sanchez entered into the ServeManager application
on August 23. Further, the GPS data coordinates placed Sanchez in the vicinity
of defendants' home. The record supports the notarization date defect did not
rebut service on defendants. Based on the totality of evidence in the record, we
discern no error in the court's finding that defendants failed to demonstrate the
affidavits were defective.
Defendants next posit they sufficiently rebutted the presumption of
validity "by clear and convincing evidence that they were not served." We
disagree. Sanchez explained different circumstances existed for each service of
process location. He testified that generally the service information was entered
in "under five minutes," but acknowledged "[i]t could be a few seconds" to "a
few minutes." This testimony was unrebutted. The ServeManager report, which
defendants moved into evidence without objection, reported a 9:25 a.m.
A-2549-22 17 timestamp and Sanchez's GPS location near defendants' home. Specifically, the
GPS data corroborated Sanchez's location approximately a quarter of a mile
away from defendants' home when the application was completed, and the Unix
timestamp confirmed the date of service. Burgess's testimony failed to refute
service and, in fact, confirmed Sanchez's location near defendants' home and
that defendants were in the vicinity at the East Orange toll plaza shortly after
the time of service.
The court found it credible that after perfecting service, Sanchez would
sometimes walk back to his vehicle and drive away before entering the
information learned during the process into the ServeManager application.
Here, multiple pieces of information were entered into ServeManager thus
aligning with Sanchez's testimony that only after effectuating service would he
complete the application and send the service confirmation. Therefore, the
timestamp was only generated after completion and submission of the
application and not generated at the exact time of process.
The record amply supports the court's finding that defendants failed to
refute Sanchez effectuated service. The court soundly determined sufficient
time existed between service upon Lyudmila, the completion of the
ServeManager data at 9:25 a.m., and defendants' arrival at the toll plaza 9.1
A-2549-22 18 miles from their home at 9:36 a.m. Defendants' contention that the timestamps
proved service was "impossible" is unsupported. We discern no abuse of
discretion by the court's determination that in this "forfeiture of . . . real
property," there was sufficient "adherence to procedural requirements" of
service. See MTAG, 476 N.J. Super. at 340.
Defendants next argue the affidavits of service are invalid because
Sanchez "never had contact with the notary who notarized the [a]ffidavit." We
observe that in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Legislature enacted an
emergency act to temporarily provide for the remote notarization of documents.
L. 2020, c. 26 (codified at N.J.S.A. 52:7-10.10). The statute permitted a notarial
officer "in this State to . . . perform notarial acts using communication
technology for a remotely located individual." Id. at 2. A notarial act could be
performed if the identity of the remote individual was verified; the notary was
able to "reasonably . . . confirm that a record . . . is the same record in which the
remotely located individual made a statement or on which the remotely located
individual executed a signature," and the notary "create[d] an audio-visual
recording of the performance of the notarial act." Ibid. The Legislature
provided that the identification of a remote individual was sufficient if the
notarial officer had: "personal knowledge of the identity of the individual" or
A-2549-22 19 obtained "satisfactory evidence of the identity of the remotely located individual
by using at least two different types of identity proofing." Ibid.
Here, the same licensed notary notarized both affidavits of service.
Defendants did not call the notary to testify regarding the affidavits of service.
We note "[i]n foreclosure matters, equity must be applied to plaintiffs as well as
defendants." Deutsche Bank Tr. Co. Ams. v. Angeles, 428 N.J. Super. 315, 320
(App. Div. 2012). The evidence in the record does not refute that the statutory
requirements were met.
Finally, defendants argue vacating the final judgment was warranted
because plaintiff committed a "fraudulent tax foreclosure" and 341 Connecticut
was not a bona fide purchaser. The record does not support defendants'
argument that plaintiff committed fraud warranting the final judgment to be
vacated. See R. 4:50-1(c). Plaintiff properly obtained the tax certificates, timely
filed the notice of intent to foreclose, served the complaint, and timely served
each motion thereafter. 341 Connecticut's managing member Yehoshua Frenkel
testified there was no common business interest with plaintiff or its predecessor
Trystone. Frenkel's uncontroverted testimony was he learned of the tax
certificate foreclosure online. He explained attempting to purchase the property
directly from defendants before entry of the final judgment. See Green Knight
A-2549-22 20 Cap., LLC v. Calderon, 252 N.J. 265, 271 (2022) (highlighting investors have
the right to purchase a tax sale foreclosure property for fair market value).
Frenkel knew Ike Schwab, a member of Poppy, from their Lakewood community
and had purchased "two . . . to four properties [over] [ten] years" from Trystone
and Poppy. These facts do not negate 341 Connecticut was a bona fide
purchaser. Defendants demonstrated no evidence establishing fraud to rebut
service. We have long recognized that mere unsupported statements and
"uncorroborated testimony of [a] defendant alone is not sufficient" to reject the
validity of the return of process. Goldfarb v. Roeger, 54 N.J. Super. 85, 90 (App.
Div. 1959).
Having found as a threshold matter that vacating the final judgment was
not warranted, because service of process was proper, we need not address
defendants' supplemental argument seeking the application of pipeline
retroactivity of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Tyler, 598 U.S. at
631, in accordance with our decision in Roberto, 477 N.J. Super. at 349. We
note defendants raised before the trial court the application of equitable
principles but did not fully establish their loss of property equity before the
court. As we conclude the court had jurisdiction to enter final judgment against
defendants, pipeline retroactivity is not afforded to defendants.
A-2549-22 21 To the extent not addressed, defendants' remaining arguments lack
sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
A-2549-22 22