Poppe v. Poppe

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Poppe v. Poppe

2 A.D.2d 866, 156 N.Y.S.2d 1011, 1956 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4134

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedOctober 29, 1956

StatusPublished

This text of 2 A.D.2d 866 (Poppe v. Poppe) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Poppe v. Poppe, 2 A.D.2d 866, 156 N.Y.S.2d 1011, 1956 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4134 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1956).

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Opinion

In an action for separation the appeal is from a judgment entered after trial insofar as it dismisses the complaint on the merits. Judgment insofar as appealed from affirmed, without costs. No opinion. Murphy, Ughetta and Hallinan, JJ., concur; Nolan, P. J., and Wenzel, J., dissent and vote to reverse the judgment insofar as it dismisses the complaint and to grant a new trial, with the following memorandum: In our opinion it was error to receive in evidence respondent’s testimony as to a conversation between him and the appellant in which she is alleged to have admitted acts of adultery. It appears that such conversation and such admission were induced by the existing marital relationship between the parties and arose from it, and that, were it not for the relationship of husband and wife, such conversation and such admission would not have occurred. Such testimony, therefore, constitutes the disclosure of “ a confidential communication made by one [spouse] to the other during marriage ”, which is prohibited by section 349 of the Civil Practice Act (Warner v. Press Pub. Co., 132 N. Y. 181, 185-186; Hanor v. Housel, 128 App. Div. 801, 803-804).

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In an action for separation the appeal is from a judgment entered after trial insofar as it dismisses the complaint on the merits. Judgment insofar as appealed from affirmed, without costs. No opinion. Murphy, Ughetta and Hallinan, JJ., concur; Nolan, P. J., and Wenzel, J., dissent and vote to reverse the judgment insofar as it dismisses the complaint and to grant a new trial, with the following memorandum: In our opinion it was error to receive in evidence respondent’s testimony as to a conversation between him and the appellant in which she is alleged to have admitted acts of adultery. It appears that such conversation and such admission were induced by the existing marital relationship between the parties and arose from it, and that, were it not for the relationship of husband and wife, such conversation and such admission would not have occurred. Such testimony, therefore, constitutes the disclosure of “ a confidential communication made by one [spouse] to the other during marriage ”, which is prohibited by section 349 of the Civil Practice Act (Warner v. Press Pub. Co., 132 N. Y. 181, 185-186; Hanor v. Housel, 128 App. Div. 801, 803-804).

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Bluebook (online)

2 A.D.2d 866, 156 N.Y.S.2d 1011, 1956 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4134, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/poppe-v-poppe-nyappdiv-1956.

Opinion

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