Popov v. Blanche

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: July 14, 2026
• Docket: 25-2185
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 14 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

IGOR POPOV, No. 25-2185 Agency No. Petitioner, A072-940-428 v. MEMORANDUM*

TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted June 10, 2026 Pasadena, California

Before: BYBEE, COLLINS, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.

Igor Popov, a native and citizen of Russia and former lawful permanent

resident, petitions for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) order

dismissing his appeal of an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his motion

for reconsideration of the IJ’s denial of his motion to reopen. The IJ had denied

Popov’s motion to reopen as untimely. “We review the denial of a motion to

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. reconsider for abuse of discretion.” B.R. v. Garland, 26 F.4th 827, 835 (9th Cir.

2022). We likewise review the denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion.

Cano-Merida v. INS, 311 F.3d 960, 964 (9th Cir. 2002). We have jurisdiction under

8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.

1. A motion to reopen must generally be filed within 90 days of a final order

of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); Hernandez-Ortiz v. Garland, 32 F.4th

794, 800 (9th Cir. 2022). Here, Popov was ordered removed in January 2015 based

on his convictions for crimes of moral turpitude, but he did not move to reopen his

removal proceedings until more than nine years later. Therefore, Popov’s motion is

timely only if the deadline is equitably tolled. See Hernandez-Ortiz, 32 F.4th at 801.

Popov claims that the agency erred in denying him equitable tolling because

he moved to reopen within 90 days of a California court order under Cal. Penal Code

§ 1473.7(a)(1) vacating his convictions. That California law allows “[a] person who

is no longer in criminal custody” to “file a motion to vacate a conviction or sentence”

on the ground that “[t]he conviction or sentence is legally invalid due to prejudicial

error damaging the moving party’s ability to meaningfully understand, defend

against, or knowingly accept the actual or potential adverse immigration

consequences of a conviction or sentence.” Cal. Penal Code § 1473.7(a)(1); see Bent

v. Garland, 115 F.4th 934, 940 (9th Cir. 2024).

2 25-2185 “A petitioner seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing two

elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some

extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.” Bent, 115

F.4th at 941 (quoting Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 634 (2010)). “In assessing

a petitioner’s diligence, we ‘consider the petitioner’s overall level of care and caution

in light of his or her particular circumstances.’” Id. at 943 (quoting Smith v. Davis,

953 F.3d 582, 599 (9th Cir. 2020)).

In this case, the agency did not commit any error of fact or law in determining

that Popov did not act diligently in moving to reopen, and it adequately considered

Popov’s personal circumstances. “‘[W]e measure a petitioner’s diligence from the

date’ on which ‘a reasonable person in the petitioner’s position is put on notice that

something was wrong,’” which is “the date that [the petitioner] received the [notice

to appear].” Id. at 942 (quoting Avagyan v. Holder, 646 F.3d 672, 680 (9th Cir.

2011)) (alterations omitted). As the IJ observed, Popov did not challenge his

removal in 2015, or at any point until he filed his motion to reopen in 2024. Further,

in the approximately three years after 2017—when § 1473.7(a)(1) went into effect—

Popov made no apparent efforts to vacate his conviction. While Popov argues that

he was located in Russia and lacked financial resources to afford legal assistance

until late 2020, the IJ correctly noted nothing in the record demonstrated that Popov

took any “steps on his own to challenge his conviction or removal order.” The IJ

3 25-2185 fairly observed that Popov did not “provide any details or evidence to support his

vague suggestion that he lacked sufficient financial resources.” The IJ also

reasonably concluded that Popov’s efforts after obtaining legal assistance did not

reflect sufficient diligence. Regardless of whether we would have weighed the

circumstances differently, we cannot say that the agency abused its discretion.

2. Popov also argues that the agency erred in declining to exercise its sua

sponte authority to reopen proceedings. However, our review on this issue “is

limited to those situations where it is obvious that the agency has denied sua sponte

relief not as a matter of discretion, but because it erroneously believed that the law

forbade it from exercising its discretion or that exercising its discretion would be

futile.” Lona v. Barr, 958 F.3d 1225, 1234 (9th Cir. 2020) (internal citations

omitted). That is not the case here.

PETITION DENIED.

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