Popkave v. Ramapo Radiology Associates, P.C.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Popkave v. Ramapo Radiology Associates, P.C.

44 A.D.3d 920, 845 N.Y.S.2d 362

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedOctober 23, 2007

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 44 A.D.3d 920 (Popkave v. Ramapo Radiology Associates, P.C.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Popkave v. Ramapo Radiology Associates, P.C., 44 A.D.3d 920, 845 N.Y.S.2d 362 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2007).

Pincite

Opinion

In an action to recover damages for medical malpractice, the plaintiff appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Rockland County (Berliner, J.), entered April 20, 2006, which, upon a jury verdict, is in favor of the defendants and against her, dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.

Contrary to the plaintiffs contention, the trial court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in refusing to preclude one of the defendants’ medical experts from testifying on the ground that his testimony varied from the expert witness statement served before trial (see CPLR 3101 [d] [1] [i]; McGlauflin v Wadhwa, 265 AD2d 534 [1999]). The principal issues in the case involved whether the plaintiffs breast cancer was present and detectable in a mammogram taken in 2002, and whether, given the absence of clinical symptoms at that time, and a comparison with prior mammograms, the defendant Dr. Victor Todisco’s finding of no abnormality in the 2002 mammogram was a departure from good and accepted medical practice. Upon review of the trial record, we find that the expert’s testimony with re[921]*921spect to those issues was fully consistent with the pretrial disclosure statement. Moreover, any additional testimony the witness gave regarding the plaintiff’s social history and the causes of breast cancer in general either was of collateral significance or constituted general background information, which did not render the pretrial disclosure statement inadequate or misleading, and did not result in prejudice or surprise to the plaintiff (see Casimir v Bar-Zvi, 36 AD3d 578 [2007]; Suhr v Long Beach Med. Ctr., 35 AD3d 440 [2006]; Gagliardotto v Huntington Hosp., 25 AD3d 758 [2006]; Andaloro v Town of Ramapo, 242 AD2d 354 [1997]).

The plaintiffs remaining contentions are unpreserved for appellate review or without merit. Schmidt, J.P., Fisher, Lifson and Carni, JJ., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

In an action to recover damages for medical malpractice, the plaintiff appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Rockland County (Berliner, J.), entered April 20, 2006, which, upon a jury verdict, is in favor of the defendants and against her, dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.

Contrary to the plaintiffs contention, the trial court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in refusing to preclude one of the defendants’ medical experts from testifying on the ground that his testimony varied from the expert witness statement served before trial (see CPLR 3101 [d] [1] [i]; McGlauflin v Wadhwa, 265 AD2d 534 [1999]). The principal issues in the case involved whether the plaintiffs breast cancer was present and detectable in a mammogram taken in 2002, and whether, given the absence of clinical symptoms at that time, and a comparison with prior mammograms, the defendant Dr. Victor Todisco’s finding of no abnormality in the 2002 mammogram was a departure from good and accepted medical practice. Upon review of the trial record, we find that the expert’s testimony with re[921]*921spect to those issues was fully consistent with the pretrial disclosure statement. Moreover, any additional testimony the witness gave regarding the plaintiff’s social history and the causes of breast cancer in general either was of collateral significance or constituted general background information, which did not render the pretrial disclosure statement inadequate or misleading, and did not result in prejudice or surprise to the plaintiff (see Casimir v Bar-Zvi, 36 AD3d 578 [2007]; Suhr v Long Beach Med. Ctr., 35 AD3d 440 [2006]; Gagliardotto v Huntington Hosp., 25 AD3d 758 [2006]; Andaloro v Town of Ramapo, 242 AD2d 354 [1997]).

The plaintiffs remaining contentions are unpreserved for appellate review or without merit. Schmidt, J.P., Fisher, Lifson and Carni, JJ., concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

44 A.D.3d 920, 845 N.Y.S.2d 362, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/popkave-v-ramapo-radiology-associates-pc-nyappdiv-2007.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack