1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 POP TOP CORP., Case No. 20-cv-04482-YGR (ASK)
8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 9 v. DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS AND 10 RAKUTEN KOBO INC., CIVIL CONTEMPT 11 Defendant. Re: Dkt. Nos. 200, 202, 203
12 Defendant Rakuten Kobo Inc. (“Defendant” or “Kobo”) has filed a motion to hold 13 Judgment Debtor Rohit Chandra in civil contempt and for sanctions. Dkt. No. 200 (“Motion”). 14 Chandra has opposed. Dkt. No. 202. Kobo has replied. Dkt. No. 203. The Court grants Kobo’s 15 Motion in part and denies it in part. 16 I. BACKGROUND 17 Judgment has been entered against Chandra. See Dkt. Nos. 77, 134, 187. On January 3, 18 2025, Kobo served discovery requests on him and noticed a debtor examination. See Dkt. No. 177- 19 1. On October 7, 2025, this Court ordered Chandra to “serve substantive responses” to the requests 20 for production and interrogatories and to produce documents by November 7, 2025. Dkt. No. 186. 21 It also ordered a debtor exam to take place by November 14, 2025. Id. Magistrate Judge Ryu (the 22 undersigned’s predecessor) and District Judge Gonzalez Rogers (the presiding judge) both notified 23 Chandra that “failure to comply” with the Court’s October 7 Order could result in “sanctions 24 and/or a finding of contempt.” Id., Dkt No. 195 (collectively, the “Discovery Orders”). 25 Chandra proceeded to not respond adequately to the discovery requests. On November 7, 26 Chandra served responses to Kobo’s requests for production and interrogatories. See Dkt. No. 27 200-5. His responses to the requests for production consisted of repeated boilerplate objections. 1 “overbroad, unduly burdensome, and disproportionate”; claimed that it was “vague, ambiguous, 2 and compound”; and asserted that “all responsive information…has already been previously 3 disclosed or shared”—but he did not provide any substantive information in response to the 4 request. Id. at 10–11. He took a similar approach to each subsequent request. Id. at 11–30. He did 5 not produce any documents on November 7. Dkt. No. 200 at 8. 6 His responses to the interrogatories, too, were evasive, repetitive, and lacking in substance. 7 For example, he responded to the first, about his bank accounts, by not sharing any information 8 and instead asserting that he had already disclosed it; that Kobo already had ample discovery 9 coverage; that Kobo’s instructions were “vague, ambiguous, and compound”; and that the request 10 “constitutes procedural abuse and overreach.” Id. at 34–35. Subsequent answers follow the same 11 pattern of repeating stock objections and not providing responsive information. See id. at 35–47. 12 Chandra’s answers at his November 14 debtor exam were also inadequate. There, he 13 refused to answer even basic questions. See Dkt. No. 200-6. He justified his evasions with a series 14 of inapposite objections. For example, he repeatedly raised relevance objections and continued to 15 do so after opposing counsel had told him that such objections are not allowed in depositions. Id. 16 at 13–16. He stated that for all inquiries aside from “narrow non-intrusive identity questions” he 17 would “stand on my written objections under Rule 26(b)(1) and 69(a)(2).” Id. at 18. He claimed 18 that questions were “duplicative,” “disproportionate and harassing,” and “unduly burdensome.” Id. 19 at 19. And when opposing counsel pressed him about his non-responsiveness, he repeatedly said 20 that he thought that he had “answered to the extent appropriate.” Id. 21 Kobo has moved the Court to hold Chandra in contempt. Dkt. No. 200. They seek three 22 forms of relief: first, that the Court impose on Chandra a coercive daily fine until he complies with 23 the Discovery Orders, id. at 14; second, that the Court order Chandra to sit for another debtor 24 exam, id. at 14–15; and, third, that the Court order Chandra to pay the attorney’s fees and costs 25 associated with Kobo’s efforts to compel Chandra’s compliance with discovery since the Court’s 26 entry of the Discovery Orders, id. at 15–16. 27 II. LEGAL STANDARD 1 A. Civil Contempt 2 District courts “have inherent power to enforce compliance with their lawful orders 3 through civil contempt.” Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265, 276 (1990) (quoting Shillitani v. 4 United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370 (1966)). Civil contempt “consists of a party’s disobedience to a 5 specific and definite court order by failure to take all reasonable steps within the party’s power to 6 comply.” Inst. of Cetacean Rsch. v. Sea Shepherd Conservation Soc’y, 774 F.3d 935, 945 (9th Cir. 7 2014) (quoting In re Dual-Deck Video Cassette Recorder Antitrust Ligit., 10 F.3d 693, 695 (9th 8 Cir. 1993)). The party alleging civil contempt “must demonstrate by clear and convincing 9 evidence that (1) the contemnor violated a court order, (2) the noncompliance was more than 10 technical or de minimis, and (3) the contemnor’s conduct was not the product of a good faith or 11 reasonable interpretation of the violated order.” Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., No. 08- 12 CV-05780-LHK, 2017 WL 3394754, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2017) (citing United States v. 13 Bright, 596 F.3d 683, 694 (9th Cir. 2010); Sea Shepherd, 774 F.3d at 945). “The burden then 14 shifts to the contemnors to demonstrate why they were unable to comply.” FTC v. Affordable 15 Media, LLC, 179 F.3d 1228, 1239 (9th Cir. 1999). 16 B. Sanctions 17 “Federal courts have the authority to sanction litigants for discovery abuses both under the 18 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and pursuant to the court’s inherent power to prevent abuse of 19 the judicial process.” Network Appliance, Inc. v. Bluearc Corp., No. C 03–5665 MHP, 2005 WL 20 1513099, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jun. 27, 2005) aff’d, 205 F. App’x 835 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing 21 Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45–46 (1991); In re Matter of Yagman, 796 F.2d 1165, 22 1187 (9th Cir.1986)). 23 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b) provides that when a party “fails to obey an order to 24 provide or permit discovery” a court may issue various sanctions and “must order the disobedient 25 party, the attorney advising that party, or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s 26 fees, caused by the failure, unless the failure was substantially justified or other circumstances 27 make an award of expenses unjust.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2). “The definition of ‘order’ in Rule 1 37(b) has been read broadly,” Unigard Sec. Ins. Co. v. Lakewood Eng’g & Mfg. Corp., 982 F.2d 2 363, 368 (9th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted), and “[a] district court’s finding that one of its orders 3 was violated is entitled to considerable weight,” Payne v. Exxon Corp., 121 F.3d 503
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 POP TOP CORP., Case No. 20-cv-04482-YGR (ASK)
8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 9 v. DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS AND 10 RAKUTEN KOBO INC., CIVIL CONTEMPT 11 Defendant. Re: Dkt. Nos. 200, 202, 203
12 Defendant Rakuten Kobo Inc. (“Defendant” or “Kobo”) has filed a motion to hold 13 Judgment Debtor Rohit Chandra in civil contempt and for sanctions. Dkt. No. 200 (“Motion”). 14 Chandra has opposed. Dkt. No. 202. Kobo has replied. Dkt. No. 203. The Court grants Kobo’s 15 Motion in part and denies it in part. 16 I. BACKGROUND 17 Judgment has been entered against Chandra. See Dkt. Nos. 77, 134, 187. On January 3, 18 2025, Kobo served discovery requests on him and noticed a debtor examination. See Dkt. No. 177- 19 1. On October 7, 2025, this Court ordered Chandra to “serve substantive responses” to the requests 20 for production and interrogatories and to produce documents by November 7, 2025. Dkt. No. 186. 21 It also ordered a debtor exam to take place by November 14, 2025. Id. Magistrate Judge Ryu (the 22 undersigned’s predecessor) and District Judge Gonzalez Rogers (the presiding judge) both notified 23 Chandra that “failure to comply” with the Court’s October 7 Order could result in “sanctions 24 and/or a finding of contempt.” Id., Dkt No. 195 (collectively, the “Discovery Orders”). 25 Chandra proceeded to not respond adequately to the discovery requests. On November 7, 26 Chandra served responses to Kobo’s requests for production and interrogatories. See Dkt. No. 27 200-5. His responses to the requests for production consisted of repeated boilerplate objections. 1 “overbroad, unduly burdensome, and disproportionate”; claimed that it was “vague, ambiguous, 2 and compound”; and asserted that “all responsive information…has already been previously 3 disclosed or shared”—but he did not provide any substantive information in response to the 4 request. Id. at 10–11. He took a similar approach to each subsequent request. Id. at 11–30. He did 5 not produce any documents on November 7. Dkt. No. 200 at 8. 6 His responses to the interrogatories, too, were evasive, repetitive, and lacking in substance. 7 For example, he responded to the first, about his bank accounts, by not sharing any information 8 and instead asserting that he had already disclosed it; that Kobo already had ample discovery 9 coverage; that Kobo’s instructions were “vague, ambiguous, and compound”; and that the request 10 “constitutes procedural abuse and overreach.” Id. at 34–35. Subsequent answers follow the same 11 pattern of repeating stock objections and not providing responsive information. See id. at 35–47. 12 Chandra’s answers at his November 14 debtor exam were also inadequate. There, he 13 refused to answer even basic questions. See Dkt. No. 200-6. He justified his evasions with a series 14 of inapposite objections. For example, he repeatedly raised relevance objections and continued to 15 do so after opposing counsel had told him that such objections are not allowed in depositions. Id. 16 at 13–16. He stated that for all inquiries aside from “narrow non-intrusive identity questions” he 17 would “stand on my written objections under Rule 26(b)(1) and 69(a)(2).” Id. at 18. He claimed 18 that questions were “duplicative,” “disproportionate and harassing,” and “unduly burdensome.” Id. 19 at 19. And when opposing counsel pressed him about his non-responsiveness, he repeatedly said 20 that he thought that he had “answered to the extent appropriate.” Id. 21 Kobo has moved the Court to hold Chandra in contempt. Dkt. No. 200. They seek three 22 forms of relief: first, that the Court impose on Chandra a coercive daily fine until he complies with 23 the Discovery Orders, id. at 14; second, that the Court order Chandra to sit for another debtor 24 exam, id. at 14–15; and, third, that the Court order Chandra to pay the attorney’s fees and costs 25 associated with Kobo’s efforts to compel Chandra’s compliance with discovery since the Court’s 26 entry of the Discovery Orders, id. at 15–16. 27 II. LEGAL STANDARD 1 A. Civil Contempt 2 District courts “have inherent power to enforce compliance with their lawful orders 3 through civil contempt.” Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265, 276 (1990) (quoting Shillitani v. 4 United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370 (1966)). Civil contempt “consists of a party’s disobedience to a 5 specific and definite court order by failure to take all reasonable steps within the party’s power to 6 comply.” Inst. of Cetacean Rsch. v. Sea Shepherd Conservation Soc’y, 774 F.3d 935, 945 (9th Cir. 7 2014) (quoting In re Dual-Deck Video Cassette Recorder Antitrust Ligit., 10 F.3d 693, 695 (9th 8 Cir. 1993)). The party alleging civil contempt “must demonstrate by clear and convincing 9 evidence that (1) the contemnor violated a court order, (2) the noncompliance was more than 10 technical or de minimis, and (3) the contemnor’s conduct was not the product of a good faith or 11 reasonable interpretation of the violated order.” Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., No. 08- 12 CV-05780-LHK, 2017 WL 3394754, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2017) (citing United States v. 13 Bright, 596 F.3d 683, 694 (9th Cir. 2010); Sea Shepherd, 774 F.3d at 945). “The burden then 14 shifts to the contemnors to demonstrate why they were unable to comply.” FTC v. Affordable 15 Media, LLC, 179 F.3d 1228, 1239 (9th Cir. 1999). 16 B. Sanctions 17 “Federal courts have the authority to sanction litigants for discovery abuses both under the 18 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and pursuant to the court’s inherent power to prevent abuse of 19 the judicial process.” Network Appliance, Inc. v. Bluearc Corp., No. C 03–5665 MHP, 2005 WL 20 1513099, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jun. 27, 2005) aff’d, 205 F. App’x 835 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing 21 Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45–46 (1991); In re Matter of Yagman, 796 F.2d 1165, 22 1187 (9th Cir.1986)). 23 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b) provides that when a party “fails to obey an order to 24 provide or permit discovery” a court may issue various sanctions and “must order the disobedient 25 party, the attorney advising that party, or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s 26 fees, caused by the failure, unless the failure was substantially justified or other circumstances 27 make an award of expenses unjust.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2). “The definition of ‘order’ in Rule 1 37(b) has been read broadly,” Unigard Sec. Ins. Co. v. Lakewood Eng’g & Mfg. Corp., 982 F.2d 2 363, 368 (9th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted), and “[a] district court’s finding that one of its orders 3 was violated is entitled to considerable weight,” Payne v. Exxon Corp., 121 F.3d 503, 507 (9th 4 Cir. 1997) (citations and quotation marks omitted). 5 III. DISCUSSION 6 By not serving substantive responses to Kobo’s discovery requests, Chandra has failed to 7 obey the Court’s Discovery Orders—which expressly notified him that failure to comply could 8 result in sanctions or a finding of contempt. See Discovery Orders. While Mr. Chandra’s conduct 9 likely amounted to contempt, the Court need not make any such finding to resolve this Motion. 10 “[T]he contempt power, like other inherent powers of the judiciary, must be exercised with 11 restraint and discretion.” Sea Shepherd, 774 F.3d at 951 (citations and quotation marks omitted). 12 Kobo has requested three forms of relief. The first, a coercive daily fine, is denied. The 13 purpose of such fines is to coerce future compliance. See N.L.R.B. v. Ironworkers Loc. 433, 169 14 F.3d 1217, 1222 (9th Cir. 1999). But coercing Chandra to comply with additional discovery does 15 not make sense at present. The purpose of the discovery was to provide Kobo with the information 16 it needed to identify Chandra’s assets. Given that Kobo has moved the Court to order liquidation 17 of certain assets whose value is sufficient to satisfy the judgment, Dkt. No. 217, it appears that 18 Kobo has since obtained the information it requires. Until the Court rules on that motion, further 19 discovery is unnecessary. The second form of requested relief, to order Chandra to sit for another 20 deposition, is denied for the same reason. 21 As to the third form of relief, the Court grants the Motion and orders Chandra to pay 22 Kobo’s reasonable expenses relating to bringing the Motion. The Court awards these fees not as a 23 contempt sanction but as a discovery sanction. Because the Court has found that Chandra failed to 24 obey its Discovery Orders, under Rule 37(b) it must order him to pay the reasonable expenses 25 26 27 ] caused by his failure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2). The Court accordingly orders Chandra to pay 2 || Kobo for its reasonable attorney’s fees and other costs associated with bringing the instant Motion. 3 4 IT IS SO ORDERED. 5 Dated: March 5, 2026 6 7 AJA SHNAN 8 United States Magistrate Judge 9 10 1] a 12
13 14
15 16
Z 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28