Pond v. Vermont Val. R.

19 F. Cas. 968, 1876 U.S. App. LEXIS 1846
U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Vermont·Decided October 19, 1876·Published

Opinion

JOHNSON, Circuit Judge.

The decision of this court made by Judge Woodruff in the first of the above-entitled causes established two propositions: The one, that the case disclosed by the plaintiffs belonged to the cognizance of courts of equity; the second, that the plaintiffs were entitled to assert their equities in this court. Those propositions are consequently out of the field of debate, upon this final hearing of both causes. Assuming them to be established, the question in each case now is whether, upon the proofs, a case in equity is made out in favor of the plaintiffs.

The contest in each case relates to the control of the railroad of the Vermont Valley Railroad Company of 1S71.

In the Chase and Butler suit, which was commenced in August, 1873, the plaintiffs, as shareholders in the said railroad company, asked a decree against that company establishing a lease, or an agreement for a lease, to the Rutland Railroad Company, for a period of 20 years from the expiration of a prior term of 10 years, which would expire on the 1st of June, 1875. In this suit only the Vermont Valley Railroad Company of 1S71 is defendant. In the Pond suit, which was commenced in January, 1874, not only the Vermont Valley Railroad Company of 1S71, but also the Rutland Railroad Company and the Central Vermont Railroad Company, and two sets of persons who claim to be directors of the Vermont Valley Railroad Company of 1S71, are made defendants.

The relief sought by the bill is that the extended or new lease before mentioned may be given up or canceled, and that the Vermont Valley Railroad Company of 1S71, and one set of the persons who claim to be directors of that company, being those who support the validity of the lease, or the pretensions of the Rutland Railroad Company to be entitled to a lease, viz. Page, Butler, Chase, Prout, Williams, and Slate, be perpetually enjoined from executing any lease of the road, unless it shall first have been authorized by a legal vote of the stockholders of the company at a meeting duly called and holden for that purpose, and also that the road itself, and the moneys and personal property belonging thereto, may be decreed to be surrendered, by such of the defendants as may hold and control the same, to the company, at such time as it should be entitled thereto, or to a receiver to be appointed by the court. The-lease referred to in both bills is dated August S, 1S71, and is shown to have been executed, in so far as an execution had taken place, on the 7th of November, 1S72. The parties named are the Vermont Valley Railroad Company of 1871, as lessor, and the Rutland Railroad Compa-[969] my, as lessee. The clause' of execution is: ■“In testimony -whereof, the said Vermont Talley Railroad Company of 1871, Govern-•eur Morris & James H. Williams, their -agents, duly authorized in that behalf, as -appears by the rote or votes of said corporation, have caused the seal of said corporation to be hereto affixed, and the said Morris & Williams, for said Vermont Valley Railroad Company of 1871, have subscribed their names the day and year first above written.” Beneath is affixed the seal of ■each corporation, and. the signatures, “Vermont Valley Railroad Company of 1871, by •J. H. Williams, Treasurer,” “Rutland Railroad Company, by J. B. Page, President.” Mr. Morris’ signature, called for by the tes-timonium clause, is not put to the instrument. Its execution, therefore, appears to lae imperfect inasmuch as a joint authority to two is recited, and but one appears to have acted. The only formal corporate action proved to sustain the execution of the instrument consists in the resolutions of -July 3, 1871, and of November 7, 1872. In •each of these, the authority conferred to execute a lease is given to the president and treasurer of the corporation. The resolutions are “that the president and treasurer ef this corporation be authorized, and they 4i re hereby authorized, to execute and deliver to the Rutland Railroad Company a lease;” etc.

Reaving out of view all other questions in respect to this corporate action, it is plain that the authority to the two officers is joint, that neither alone has power to execute, and that the instrument executed by one alone ■does not bind the corporation, and is to be regarded, for legal purposes, as an unexe-cuted and inoperative instrument. Assuming it to be established that no lease has been executed, extending the right of the Rutland Railroad Company to a further term in the Vermont Valley Railroad beyond the period limited by the lease to Birchard and Page, the question arises whether, out of the matters whieh have occurred, an equitable right has accrued to the Rutland Railroad Company, or its as•signees, to have such a lease executed.

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Pond v. Vermont Val. R., 19 F. Cas. 968, 1876 U.S. App. LEXIS 1846 (circtdvt 1876).

19 F. Cas. 968 (Pond v. Vermont Val. R.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.