Pomier v. Moreland
This text of 951 So. 2d 486 (Pomier v. Moreland) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
John POMIER
v.
Robert MORELAND, et al.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
David Groner, David Groner, P.L.C., New Iberia, Louisiana, for Plaintiff/Appellant, John Pomier.
Skylar J. Comeaux, Joseph H. Garbarino, Jeff R. Rytlewski, Law Offices of Jeff R. Rytlewski, Lafayette, Louisiana, for Defendant/Appellee, Hartford Insurance Company of the Midwest.
John W. Penny, Jr., Penny and Hardy, Lafayette, Louisiana, for Defendants/Appellees, Robert Moreland and Allstate Insurance Company.
Court composed of MARC T. AMY, J. DAVID PAINTER, and JAMES T. GENOVESE, Judges.
*487 GENOVESE, Judge.
Pursuant to non-jury trial in this personal injury action stemming from an automobile accident, the trial court assigned eighty-percent fault to Plaintiff and twenty-percent fault to Defendant. Subject to adjustment for comparative fault, the trial court awarded Plaintiff general damages in the amount of $25,000.00, and medical expenses of $12,406.20.[1] Plaintiff appeals the general damage award. For the following reasons, we affirm as amended.
FACTS
On January 3, 1997, Plaintiff, John Pomier (Pomier), was attempting to leave his home in the New Horizon Trailer Park in New Iberia, Louisiana, when he struck a parked vehicle owned by his neighbor, Defendant, Robert Moreland, Jr. (Moreland). Pomier filed suit for personal injuries naming as defendants Moreland and his automobile liability insurance carrier, Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate), and Hartford Insurance Company of the Midwest (Hartford), which issued the applicable uninsured/underinsured motorist policy. A joint stipulation was entered into by the parties wherein they agreed "that [Pomier's] cause of action does not exceed the amount of $50,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs. . . ."
At the trial of this matter, the parties stipulated to the amount of Pomier's medical expenses as well as to the existence of insurance coverage under the relevant policies. Following a bench trial, the trial court assessed Pomier with eighty-percent of the fault for the subject accident and Moreland with twenty-percent fault. The trial court further found that Pomier's medical condition was causally related to the accident of January 3, 1997. Notwithstanding comparative fault, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of Pomier in the amount of $25,000.00 in general damages and $12,406.20 in special damages. Based upon the trial court's finding of comparative fault on the part of Pomier, the total damage award of $37,406.20 was to be reduced by eighty-percent. Plaintiff appeals the general damage award.
ISSUE
The sole issue presented by Pomier in this appeal is the adequacy of the general damage award by the trial court. Pomier failed to raise the issue of negligence as an assignment of error. We acknowledge that in his appellate brief Pomier argues that the trial court "committed manifest error in finding the [P]laintiff to be eighty-percent (80%) at fault." However, since the negligence issue was not set forth by Pomier as an assignment of error, it will not be considered by this court. See Uniform Rules-Courts of Appeal, Rule 1-3; Atwood v. Grand Casinos of Louisiana, Inc., 04-715 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/10/04), 887 So.2d 634, writ not considered, 04-3046 (La.2/18/05), 896 So.2d 15. Therefore, we will review only the issue of the adequacy of the general damage award of $25,000.00.
LAW AND ARGUMENT
In Andrus v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 95-801, p. 8 (La.3/22/96), 670 *488 So.2d 1206, 1210 (citations omitted), the supreme court stated:
In appellate review of general damage awards, the court must accord much discretion to the trial court judge or jury. The role of an appellate court in reviewing awards of general damages is not to decide what it considers to be an appropriate award, but rather to review the exercise of discretion by the trial court. Only if the reviewing court determines that the trial court has abused its "much discretion" may it refer to prior awards in similar cases and then only to determine the highest or lowest point of an award within that discretion.
Because discretion vested in the trial court is "great," and even vast, an appellate court should rarely disturb an award of general damages. Reasonable persons frequently disagree about the measure of general damages in a particular case. It is only when the award is, in either direction, beyond that which a reasonable trier of fact could assess for the effects of the particular injury to the particular plaintiff under the particular circumstances that the appellate court should increase or reduce the award.
Pomier contends that the general damage award of $25,000.00 is an abuse of the trial court's discretion given the diagnosis of a herniated disc at C5-6 with cord compression. We note, as did the trial court, that the only medical evidence of record are the medical records of Pomier and that "[n]either party introduced medical testimony either by [deposition] testimony or calling a live witness."
The subject accident occurred on January 3, 1997. On January 8, 1997, Pomier was treated by Dr. Jaikishen for complaints of neck pain. An MRI was performed on January 23, 1997, which evidenced a herniated disc at C5-6 with mild cord compression.
On February 5, 1997, Pomier sought treatment with Dr. Michel Heard, an orthopedic specialist. Dr. Heard diagnosed Pomier with posttraumatic headaches, neck pain, and low back pain. Dr. Heard also noted that the MRI of January 23, 1997 evidenced a C5-6 disc herniation. Dr. Heard scheduled Pomier for a CT of the cervical and lumbar spine. On a subsequent visit of February 12, 1997, Dr. Heard noted that the "CT of the cervical spine show[ed] mild spondylosis at C5-6 with question of a small disc and/or spur at this level." Dr. Heard, therefore, ordered another cervical MRI which "show[ed] C5-6 disc herniation to the right." Pomier continued to treat with Dr. Heard through December 1997, at which time the doctor noted that "[s]urgery is an option on the neck if it becomes frequent and severe."
Thereafter, Pomier presented for treatment with University Medical Center (UMC) in Lafayette, Louisiana. A subsequent CT scan was performed at UMC on March 3, 1998, which showed "no evidence for osseous narrowing of the spinal canal or neural foramina with no significant degenerative change identified within the facet joints." Pomier was then referred to the Medical Center of Louisiana in New Orleans, Louisiana.
Another cervical MRI was performed on Pomier in New Orleans on December 22, 1998 which revealed a "right posterior lateral disk protrusion at the level of C5-6 . . . with mild spondylosis." This MRI indicated no cord compression. Though Dr. Heard noted that surgery was an option, Pomier did not undergo surgery on his neck. Basically, as a result of the accident, Pomier suffered a cervical injury with disc involvement without surgical intervention.
*489 We find that the medical records clearly establish that Pomier suffered a cervical injury with disc involvement as a result of the accident. We find no manifest error in the trial court's ruling that "there is a clear indication that there is a herniated disc." Accordingly, we find that the trial court abused its discretion in only awarding Pomier $25,000.00 in general damages for a herniated cervical disc.
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951 So. 2d 486, 2007 WL 397064, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pomier-v-moreland-lactapp-2007.