Polyethylene Retail Carrier Bag Committee v. United States

232 F. App'x 965
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
DecidedMay 4, 2007
Docket2006-1601
StatusUnpublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 232 F. App'x 965 (Polyethylene Retail Carrier Bag Committee v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Polyethylene Retail Carrier Bag Committee v. United States, 232 F. App'x 965 (Fed. Cir. 2007).

Opinion

BRYSON, Circuit Judge.

This appeal concerns an antidumping investigation of polyethylene retail carrier bags (“PRCBs”) from China. The appellants, the Polyethylene Retail Carrier Bag Committee and two of its members (collectively “the PRCB Committee”), sought judicial review by the Court of International Trade of certain determinations made by the Department of Commerce in connection with the investigation. Those determinations resulted in respondents Hang Lung Plastic Manufactory, Ltd., (“Hang Lung”) and Nantong Huasheng Plastic Products Co. (“Nantong”) not being subject to antidumping duties on imported PRCBs. The Court of International Trade upheld Commerce’s determinations. No. 04-00319. We hold that those determinations were supported by substantial evidence, and we therefore affirm the trial court’s decision.

In 2003, Commerce began an investigation into whether PRCBs were being sold at less than fair value in the United States. Hang Lung and Nantong were among the companies investigated. After completing the investigation, Commerce determined that PRCBs were being sold at less than fair value and subsequently issued an anti-dumping order. Because Hang Lung and Nantong received de minimis margins as a result of the investigation, they were *968 excluded from the order. See 19 C.F.R. § 351.204(e).

The PRCB Committee brought this action to challenge the exclusion of Hang Lung and Nantong from the antidumping order. The Court of International Trade initially affirmed all but one of the challenged determinations by Commerce. With respect to the remaining issue, the court remanded for Commerce to provide a further explanation of the method it used to value Hang Lung’s consumption of electricity in the production process. After Commerce issued a response on remand, the Court of International Trade affirmed the agency’s determination as to Hang Lung’s electricity usage. The PRCB Committee then took this appeal.

I

The PRCB Committee first challenges Commerce’s method of calculating the value of the electricity consumed by Hang Lung in producing plastic bags exported to the United States. Because Hang Lung did not report the actual amount of electricity used in the production of those bags, Commerce acted pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1677e by applying “facts otherwise available” and drawing an inference adverse to Hang Lung with respect to those facts. In particular, Commerce calculated Hang Lung’s electricity consumption by allocating the value of the electricity Hang Lung used in the production of all of its exported bags to the production of those bags exported to the United States.

The PRCB Committee now argues that Commerce’s verification of Hang Lung’s data representing the total amount of electricity it used in producing bags was unsupported by substantial evidence. The methodology employed in this case, however, appears to be well within the discretion generally afforded to Commerce in such matters. See, e.g., Micron Tech, Inc. v. United States, 117 F.3d 1386, 1394-96 (Fed.Cir.1997); Lasko Metal Prods., Inc. v. United States, 43 F.3d 1442, 1446 (Fed.Cir.1994). Hang Lung presented Commerce with worksheets demonstrating how it attributed electricity usage based on meters in each of its departments. Commerce verified that the data on the worksheets matched the meter records that Hang Lung kept in the ordinary course of business. Although Commerce could not verify electricity usage on a per-unit basis, it was able to use the collected data to calculate total electricity usage. The PRCB Committee does not provide any affirmative evidence suggesting that the total usage data should be discredited, but instead argues that Commerce has failed to meet its burden of showing that substantial evidence supports its determination. In the absence of any reason to question the reliability of the data on which Commerce relied, we conclude that the calculation of total electricity consumption is supported by substantial evidence.

In the alternative, the PRCB Committee argues that Commerce’s constructed value for Hang Lung’s electricity costs was not adverse to Hang Lung and therefore was inconsistent with 19 U.S.C. § 1677e. That argument is without merit. As discussed above, Commerce attributed the total cost of electricity for producing all of Hang Lung’s exported bags to the production of those bags exported to the United States. Because the attributed electricity cost was greater than the actual cost of electricity used in the production of those bags, the attributed cost was clearly “adverse” to Hang Lung. The PRCB Committee argues that Commerce instead should have adopted the highest electricity usage rate reported by any respondent in the antidumping investigation, but that was not required. Commerce has broad *969 discretion in choosing which facts to rely on in applying an adverse inference. See, e.g., F.lli De Cecco Di Filippo Fara S. Martino S.p.A. v. United States, 216 F.3d 1027, 1032 (Fed.Cir.2000). Moreover, the application of adverse inferences is not intended to be punitive; rather, Congress “intended for an adverse facts available rate to be a reasonably accurate estimate of the respondent’s actual rate, albeit with some built-in increase intended as a deterrent to non-compliance.” Id. Commerce complied with that standard, and for that reason we find that Commerce’s calculation of the cost of Hang Lung’s electricity usage is “adverse” within the meaning of 19 U.S.C. § 1677e.

II

The PRCB Committee next argues that Commerce improperly accepted Nan-tong’s reported purchase price for polyethylene resin, which is one of the primary raw materials used to make PRCBs. To value factors of production in non-market economies, Commerce generally relies on the actual prices paid for materials if the materials are purchased from a market economy supplier and paid for in a market economy currency. See 19 C.F.R. § 351.408(c)(1). However, Commerce does not use actual prices if it finds that those prices are distorted or otherwise not market-determined. See Antidumping Duties; Countervailing Duties; Final Rule, 62 Fed.Reg. 27296, 27366 (May 19, 1997); see also Shakeproof Assembly Components v. United States, 268 F.3d 1376, 1382 (Fed.Cir.2001). In this case, Commerce accepted Nantong’s reported purchase price for resin. There is no dispute that Nantong purchased its resin from a market economy supplier and paid for the resin in a market economy currency. The PRCB Committee argues, however, that the resin prices reported by Nantong were not actually market-determined prices.

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Bluebook (online)
232 F. App'x 965, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/polyethylene-retail-carrier-bag-committee-v-united-states-cafc-2007.