Pollock v. Mullins

2024 Ohio 3423, 253 N.E.3d 629

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: September 6, 2024
• Docket: 30057
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as Pollock v. Mullins, 2024-Ohio-3423.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY

CAROL POLLOCK, INDIVIDUALLY : AND AS TRUSTEE, et al. : : C.A. No. 30057 Appellees : : Trial Court Case No. 2023 MSC 00342 v. : : (Appeal from Common Pleas Court- LARRY R. MULLINS, et al. : Probate Division) : Appellant :

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OPINION

Rendered on September 6, 2024

CHRISTINE M. HAAKER, ASHLEY A. WEYENBERG, & JORDAN L. SAVORY, Attorneys for Appellant

JEFFREY T. COX, STEPHEN A. WEIGAND, MELINDA K. BURTON, & MORGAN K. NAPIER, Attorneys for Appellees

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TUCKER, J.

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant Larry R. Mullins appeals from a judgment of the

Montgomery County Common Pleas Court, Probate Division, removing him as trustee of

the Roger S. Glass Revocable Living Trust. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm. -2-

I. Factual and Procedural History

{¶ 2} Mullins was married to Roger Glass, who died in August 2022. Prior to his

death, Glass executed various estate planning documents including a will and two trusts.

{¶ 3} Glass first executed a February 2022 will which appointed Mullins as

executor. The will devised Glass’s residuary estate to Mullins.

{¶ 4} Glass also executed a “Fourth Amended and Restated Revocable Living

Trust Agreement” (“Living Trust”) on March 22, 2022. According to Schedule A attached

to the trust, the trust estate consisted of a mix of voting and non-voting stock in Marene,

Inc., as well as an Ameriprise Brokerage Account. The beneficiaries of the trust were

Roger Glass’s nieces, Kristen Pollock, Elizabeth Pollock, and Meredith Pollock. Upon

the death of Roger Glass, Mullins became the trustee of the Living Trust. Relevant

hereto, the trust stated:

(A) The Grantor has [also] created the Roger S. Glass Stock Trust dated

March 22, 2022, to hold his shares of stock in Marene, Inc., an Ohio

Corporation. Since the stock being distributed to the beneficiaries of the

Roger S. Glass Stock Trust is closely-held corporate stock which is not

readily liquidated or marketable or convertible to cash, it is the obligation of

the Trustee of this Trust to pay all applicable federal estate taxes which are

attributed to the value of the stock included as part of the Grantor’s taxable

estate. The Trustee shall use the funds in the Trust Estate to pay all

applicable estate taxes, costs of administration, debts and claims prior to -3-

distribution pursuant to paragraph B.

(B) Upon the Grantor’s death, and after payment of all applicable taxes,

claims of administration, debts and expenses, the Trustee shall distribute

the Trust Estate to the Grantor’s nieces, to-wit, Kristen Pollock, Elizabeth

Pollock, and Meredith Pollock, in equal shares, or to the survivors of them.

{¶ 5} Glass also executed the Roger S. Glass Stock Trust (“Stock Trust”) on March

22, 2022. Under that trust, upon his death, Glass’s sister Carol Pollock became the

trustee. The trust provided that the Marene Inc. stock would be held as a separate Trust

solely for the benefit of Glass during his lifetime. The trust further provided that upon his

death, the voting stock would be distributed in equal shares to Kristin and Elizabeth

Pollock, and the non-voting stock would be equally distributed to Kristin, Elizabeth, and

Meredith Pollock.

{¶ 6} At some point following the death of Roger Glass, Mullins made a

determination that the Marene stock had not been transferred into either trust and that it

had become a part of Glass’s estate, which thus passed exclusively to Mullins.

{¶ 7} On July 25, 2023, Carol Pollock and her three daughters (“the Pollocks”) filed

suit against Mullins for specific performance, injunctive relief, damages, and removal of

Mullins as trustee of the Living Trust. Mullins filed a counterclaim seeking a declaratory

judgment that he was the sole beneficiary of Glass’s 2022 will, that the shares of Marene

stock passed through the estate, and that, as such, he was the legal owner of those

shares. On September 23, 2023, the Pollocks filed a motion to remove Mullins as trustee

of the Living Trust. Following the hearing, the probate court issued a judgment removing -4-

Mullins as trustee.

{¶ 8} Mullins appeals.

II. Due Process Arguments

{¶ 9} The first and second assignments of error state as follows:

THE PROBATE COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING NEW

HEARING ARGUMENTS NOT PRESENTED IN APPELLEES’ MOTION

TO REMOVE LARRY MULLINS AS TRUSTEE IN RENDERING ITS

DECISION ON THAT MOTION.

THE PROBATE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO CONSIDER

APPELLANTS’ EVIDENCE AND ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION TO

APPELLEES’ NEW HEARING ARGUMENTS IN RENDERING ITS

DECISION ON THE MOTION.

{¶ 10} Mullins claims the probate court violated his right to due process by

permitting the Pollocks to raise issues during the hearing that were not contained in the

motion to remove him as trustee. Specifically, Mullins contends the “removal motion,

including briefing, was based on the alleged failure of Mr. Mullins to transfer the [Marene]

Shares (despite the ownership issues). However, at the later Removal Hearing, [the

Pollocks] introduced the New Arguments surrounding Mr. Mullins[’s] alleged failure to

provide [the beneficiaries] a copy of the 2022 Revocable Trust and information on the

Ameriprise account.” In conjunction with this argument, Mullins contends that the court

erred by failing to consider the evidence set forth in his post-hearing brief, which he claims -5-

rebutted the allegations surrounding whether he had provided the beneficiaries with

information about the trust and the Ameriprise account.

{¶ 11} We first note that the complaint, which expressly sought to have Mullins

removed as trustee, stated that Mullins had failed to keep the beneficiaries properly

informed about the administration of the trust and the material facts necessary for them

to protect their interests in violation of R.C. 5808.03(A). It further alleged that Mullins

had violated his duty to notify the beneficiaries of his acceptance of the trusteeship and

his duty to provide them with his contact information in violation of R.C. 5808.03(B)(2).

Finally, the complaint alleged that Mullins had failed to notify the beneficiaries of the

“trust’s existence, of the identity of the settlor or settlors, of the right to request a copy of

the trust instrument, and of the right to a trustee’s report * * *.” R.C. 5808.13(B)(3).

{¶ 12} Although the motion to remove did not cite the above-referenced statutory

duties, it did state that Mullins had violated his duties to the trust beneficiaries. It further

stated that he had “persistently failed” to administer the trust and that he had shown that

he did not intend to perform the duties imposed by law upon trustees. The motion also

stated that Mullins had committed a breach of trust as defined under R.C. 5810.01.1

{¶ 13} In its judgment, the probate court noted Mullins’s argument in his post-

hearing brief that the Pollocks improperly raised new arguments during the hearing.

However, the court stated that it did not “interpret [the Pollocks’] argument regarding

failure to keep beneficiaries informed as ‘new’ or surprising.” We agree.

1 R.C. 5810.01 provides that the “violation by a trustee of a duty the trustee owes to a beneficiary is a breach of trust” which may be remedied by the removal of the trustee as provided in R.C. 5807.06. See R.C. 5810.01(A) and (B)(7). -6-

{¶ 14} The motion to remove contained language sufficient to inform Mullins of the

claim that he had failed to meet his duties as trustee. Further, the complaint set forth

with specificity the duties Mullins allegedly failed to fulfill. Thus, Mullins’s claim that he

was ambushed by “new” arguments lacks merit. Moreover, Mullins, as trustee, should

have been aware at the time of the hearing, and been able to confirm, whether he had

complied with his statutory duties as trustee. As stated by the probate court, R.C.

5808.13 imposes statutory duties upon trustees, and “any trustee that argues otherwise

probably should not be serving as a trustee.”

{¶ 15} Because we conclude that the Pollocks did not raise any new arguments

during the hearing on the motion to remove, we conclude that Mullins’s claim that the

court should have considered the rebuttal evidence raised in his post-hearing brief is

without merit. Further, even had the court considered his “rebuttal” evidence, there was

nothing in the post-trial brief or the affidavit attached thereto to support the claim that

Mullins had complied with his statutory duties to the beneficiaries.

{¶ 16} The first and second assignments of error are overruled.

III. Probate Court’s Decision

{¶ 17} Mullins asserts the following as his third and fourth assignments of error:

THE PROBATE COURT ERRED BY GRANTING APPELLEES’

MOTION TO REMOVE LARRY MULLINS AS TRUSTEE FOR

PURPORTEDLY FAILING TO ADMINISTER THE GLASS TRUST

EFFECTIVELY UNDER R.C. 5807.06(B)(3). -7-

PURPORTEDLY COMMITTING A SERIOUS BREACH OF TRUST

UNDER 5807.06(B)(1).

{¶ 18} Mullins contends the court’s decision to remove him as trustee was not

supported by the evidence.

{¶ 19} R.C. 5807.06 provides, in pertinent part:

(B) The court may remove a trustee for any of the following reasons:

(1) The trustee has committed a serious breach of trust;

...

(3) Because of unfitness, unwillingness, or persistent failure of the trustee

to administer the trust effectively, the court determines that removal of the

trustee best serves the interests of the beneficiaries.

{¶ 20} “The removal of a trustee is generally considered a drastic action and the

party seeking to remove a trustee must show a basis for removal by clear and convincing

evidence.” Tomazic v. Rapoport, 2012-Ohio-4402, ¶ 33 (8th Dist.), citing Diemert v.

Diemert, 2003-Ohio-6496, ¶ 15-16 (8th Dist.); Kidd v. Alfano, 2016-Ohio-7519, ¶ 34 (2d

Dist.). “The decision whether to remove a trustee lies within the sound discretion of the

probate court, and an appellate court will not reverse that decision absent a showing of a

clear abuse of that discretion.” Ulinski v. Byers, 2015-Ohio-282, ¶ 14 (9th Dist.) citing In

re Trust Estate of CNZ Trust, 2007-Ohio-2265, ¶ 16 (9th Dist.). An abuse of discretion

occurs when the decision demonstrates the trial court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary, -8-

or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983).

{¶ 21} We begin with the claim that the evidence did not support removal for a

serious breach of trust under R.C. 5807.06(B)(1). As stated above, R.C. 5810.01(A)

provides that a breach of trust occurs when a trustee violates a duty owed to a beneficiary.

In determining what constitutes a “serious” breach of trust, this court has noted that “the

term ‘serious’ is not defined in R.C. 5807.06[,] . . . and there is scant case law discussing

the term.” Kidd at ¶ 34. In further discussion of the definition, this court stated:

R.C. 5807.06 is Ohio's version of Uniform Trust Code § 706. Although

the entire uniform section was not adopted, the Ohio “serious breach of

trust” reason for removal of a trustee is the same as the uniform code. The

official comment to the 2006 version of the Uniform Code states:

[N]ot every breach of trust justifies removal of the trustee. The

breach must be “serious.” A serious breach of trust may consist of

a single act that causes significant harm or involves flagrant

misconduct. A serious breach of trust may also consist of a series

of smaller breaches, none of which individually justify removal

when considered alone, but which do so when considered

together. A particularly appropriate circumstance justifying

removal of the trustee is a serious breach of the trustee's duty to

keep the beneficiaries reasonably informed of the administration

of the trust or to comply with a beneficiary's request for information

as required by Section 813. Failure to comply with this duty may -9-

make it impossible for the beneficiaries to protect their interests. It

may also mask more serious violations by the trustee.

Kidd at ¶ 37.

{¶ 22} R.C. 5808.13, which sets forth duties of a trustee, provides:

(A) A trustee shall keep the current beneficiaries of the trust reasonably

informed about the administration of the trust and of the material facts

necessary for them to protect their interests. . . .

(B) A trustee shall do all of the following:

(1) Upon the request of a beneficiary, promptly furnish to the beneficiary a

copy of the trust instrument. . . .

(2) Within sixty days after accepting a trusteeship, notify the current

beneficiaries of the acceptance and of the trustee's name, address, and

telephone number;

(3) Within sixty days after the date the trustee acquires knowledge of the

creation of an irrevocable trust, or the date the trustee acquires knowledge

that a formerly revocable trust has become irrevocable, whether by the

death of the settlor or otherwise, notify the current beneficiaries of the trust's

existence, of the identity of the settlor or settlors, of the right to request a

copy of the trust instrument, and of the right to a trustee's report as provided

in division (C) of this section;

(C) A trustee of a trust that has a fiscal year ending on or after January 1, -10-

2007, shall send to the current beneficiaries, and to other beneficiaries who

request it, at least annually and at the termination of the trust, a report of

the trust property, liabilities, receipts, and disbursements, including the

source and amount of the trustee's compensation, a listing of the trust

assets, and, if feasible, the trust assets' respective market values. . . .

{¶ 23} At the hearing, evidence was presented that Mullins, as trustee, had failed

to advise the beneficiaries about the existence of the trust or their right to request a copy

of the trust document and the trustee’s reports. He failed to provide them with notification

of his acceptance of the trusteeship or his contact information. He further failed to keep

them “reasonably informed about the administration of the trust” or of any material facts

necessary for them to protect their interests. Although Mullins argues that both Carol

Pollock and the attorney for Marene were aware of all the above, there is no indication

that the actual beneficiaries were provided such information.

{¶ 24} Further, it is not even clear whether Mullins has taken any steps in the

administration of the trust. At the very least, Mullins does not contest that the Ameriprise

account is an asset of the trust. Thus, regardless of the dispute regarding the Marene

stock, he should have taken steps to administer this asset. Yet Mullins was unable to

provide information regarding that account other than to testify that it was being held by

his financial advisor. He presented no competent evidence that he had taken any steps

to provide the beneficiaries any information about that account.

{¶ 25} The record demonstrates that Mullins failed to meet his statutory duties as

trustee. As such, we cannot conclude that the probate court abused its discretion in -11-

removing him as Trustee of the Living Trust. Accordingly, the third and fourth

assignments of error are overruled.

IV. Conclusion

{¶ 26} All of Mullins’s assignments of error being overruled, the judgment of the

probate court is affirmed.

WELBAUM, J. and LEWIS, J., concur.