Political Civil Voters Organization v. City of Terrell

565 F. Supp. 338, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17889
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Texas
DecidedApril 8, 1983
DocketCiv. A. 3-81-1103-H
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 565 F. Supp. 338 (Political Civil Voters Organization v. City of Terrell) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Political Civil Voters Organization v. City of Terrell, 565 F. Supp. 338, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17889 (N.D. Tex. 1983).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

SANDERS, District Judge.

This case arises out of a challenge to the Charter for the City of Terrell, Texas. The Charter currently provides for the election of five city councilmen for staggered terms *340 in at-large elections. Councilmen run for numbered positions, and they must receive a majority of votes. The Charter was last amended in 1973. The 1973 amendment provided residency requirements for three of the council positions. The other two positions, Mayor and Mayor Pro Tem, do not have residency requirements.

Plaintiffs Political Civil Voters Organization (“PCVO”) and J.R. Roberson (“Roberson”) challenge the charter on several grounds. First, they claim that the Charter was created and is maintained for purposes of invidious discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Second, they assert that the Charter has the effect of diluting the Black minority vote in contravention of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973.

Although the determination of discriminatory intent, as opposed to discriminatory effect, involves a different legal standard, there are many factors in voting dilution cases which are relevant both to intent and effect. Cross v. Baxter, 604 F.2d 875, 880 n. 9 (5th Cir.1979). Specifically, in Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1305 (5th Cir.1973), aff’d on other grounds sub nom. East Carroll Parish School Board v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636, 96 S.Ct. 1083, 47 L.Ed.2d 296 (1975), the Fifth Circuit listed eight relevant factors. Later cases interpret Zimmer as presenting four “primary” factors and four “enhancing” factors. See Cross v. Baxter, 604 F.2d 875, 879 (5th Cir.1979); Lodge v. Buxton, 639 F.2d 1358, 1379-80 (5th Cir.1981), aff’d sub nom. Rogers v. Herman Lodge,- U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 3272, 73 L.Ed.2d 1012 (1982). The Zimmer criteria are not exclusive, and can be replaced or supplemented as is appropriate to the individual facts of a case. See Lodge v. Buxton, supra, 639 F.2d at 1375. The Court has carefully considered the Zimmer criteria, as well as other factors, and its findings and conclusions as to those criteria and factors are as follows.

A. Primary Factors

1. Lack of Access to the Political System

In Zimmer, the Court considered the “lack of access” factor solely in terms of access to the candidate slating process. 485 F.2d at 1305. Terrell does not employ a candidate slating process, and, as such, the “access” factor is inapplicable in this case. In Cross v. Baxter, however, the Fifth Circuit expanded the “access” factor to encompass access to the political system generally. 604 F.2d 875, 878 (5th Cir.1979); see also McIntosh County Branch of the NAACP v. City of Darien, 605 F.2d 753, 757 (5th Cir. 1979). The Court specifically included in the “lack of access” factor “such direct governmentally sanctioned exclusions as the poll tax.... ”

In this case, Terrell has employed a “direct governmentally sanctioned exclusion” similar to the poll tax. The Terrell City Charter requires all candidates for public office in Terrell to be owners of real property. See Plaintiffs’ Exhibit (“PX”) 7. This requirement, like the poll tax, impacts more adversely on blacks than on whites in Terrell. Although about one-third of Terrell’s population is black, Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 65 shows that substantially fewer than one-third of the owner-occupied homes in Terrell are found in census track 505, the predominantly black area. See also Lodge v. Buxton, 639 F.2d 1358, 1378 (5th Cir.1981). In fact, the overall effect of a property requirement on minority political participation is generally so acute that the Fifth Circuit has stated that “[C]ases involving literacy tests, or property requirements are, by comparison, easier to decide. The most obvious purpose for the creation of such systems is clearly discrimination.” Id. at 1363. (Emphasis added).

Several persons testified at trial and during depositions that Terrell does not enforce its property ownership requirement. See, e.g., Deposition of Bobby Bishop (“Bishop Deposition”), p. 75, line 17 to p. 76, line 1. The requirement, however, is not an ancient relic that remains on the books through inadvertence. In 1973, the Charter Revision Committee set aside the old city charter, started from scratch, considered the property requirement, reworded it, and *341 again included it in the Terrell Charter. Deposition of Arther Fineout (“Fineout Deposition”), p. 35, lines 8-12; p. 101, line 15 to p. 103, line 14. Moreover, Terrell has admittedly never publicized its alleged policy of nonenforcement. Bishop Deposition, p. 75, line 17 to p. 76, line 25. Thus, the existence of the requirement may well discourage otherwise qualified candidates from running for public office. Terrell’s property ownership requirement, then, acts to impede minority access to the political system.

2. Tenuousness of the state policy underlying use of the at large voting system

Another “primary” factor under Zimmer is the “tenuousness” of the state policy underlying use of the at large voting system. In this case, the original justification for instituting an at large system does not appear to be tenuous. There is no state policy against at-large systems, cf. Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1304 (5th Cir. 1973), and members of the 1973 Charter Revision Committee expressed apparently sincere concerns over the “ward politics” they believed to result from single member districts. Fineout Deposition, p. 66, lines 14-20.

Terrell’s reason for maintaining an at-large system, however, is quite tenuous. In April of 1979, the first black candidate for Mayor of Terrell was defeated at the polls. He filed an election contest, alleging that poll workers improperly refused to let certain black citizens vote. As part of a settlement agreement in that case, Terrell agreed to set aside its objections to “ward politics” and to submit the question of single member districts to the electorate. See PX 27, page 4.

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565 F. Supp. 338, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17889, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/political-civil-voters-organization-v-city-of-terrell-txnd-1983.