1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 Polaris Processing, LLC, Case No.: 2:24-cv-01907-JAD-MDC
4 Plaintiff v. Order Granting Polaris’s Motion for 5 Attorneys’ Fees New Rise Renewables Reno, LLC, 6 [ECF No. 69] Defendants 7
8 Polaris Processing, LLC sued New Rise Renewables Reno, LLC after New Rise failed to 9 pay the full amount required by the parties’ settlement agreement resolving an earlier dispute 10 over Polaris’s services. New Rise opposed those claims and also filed a negligence counterclaim 11 premised on the theory that Polaris should bear responsibility for New Rise’s misdirected wire 12 payments to hackers. I rejected that theory, dismissed the counterclaim, and later granted 13 summary judgment for Polaris on its breach-of-contract claim. Final judgment was entered in 14 Polaris’s favor for $1,061,586.00. Polaris now moves unopposed for $46,111.00 in attorneys’ 15 fees under the settlement agreement’s prevailing-party provision. Because I find that Polaris is 16 the prevailing party and that its requested fees are reasonable under Nevada law, I grant the 17 motion. 18 Discussion 19 A. Polaris is entitled to recover its reasonable attorneys’ fees under the settlement 20 agreement.
21 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(2) authorizes a party to seek attorneys’ fees by 22 motion, but the rule itself does not supply the substantive basis for such an award. So Polaris 23 seeks its fees under the prevailing-party provision in its settlement agreement with New Rise. 1 Under both federal and Nevada law, valid contractual provisions for the payment of 2 attorneys’ fees constitute a sufficient source of authority for such an award.1 The agreement 3 provides that “the prevailing party in any action to enforce the terms of this settlement agreement 4 is entitled to its reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in association with such action at
5 the trial and appellate level.”2 The parties’ agreement doesn’t define “prevailing party.” But 6 under Nevada law generally,3 a party prevails “if it succeeds on any significant issue in litigation 7 [that] achieves some of the benefit it sought in bringing [or defending] suit.”4 I find that Polaris 8 is the prevailing party because it obtained dismissal of New Rise’s counterclaim, summary 9 judgment on its breach-of-contract claim, and final judgment in its favor. 10 B. Polaris’s requested fees are reasonable. 11 Federal courts sitting in diversity determine the reasonableness of attorneys’ fees 12 awarded using state law.5 Under Nevada law, “the method upon which a reasonable fee is 13 determined is subject to the discretion of the court, which is tempered only by reason and 14
15 1 See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 257 (1975) (“[A]bsent statute or enforceable contract, litigants pay their own attorneys’ fees.”); MRO Commc’ns, Inc. v. 16 AT&T, 197 F.3d 1276, 1281 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[E]ach party must bear its own attorneys’ fees in the absence of a rule, statute[,] or contract authorizing such an award.”); Schouweiler v. Yancey 17 Co., 712 P.2d 786, 788 (Nev. 1985) (“It is well established in Nevada that attorney’s fees are not recoverable unless allowed by express or implied agreement or when authorized by statute or 18 rule.”) (citing Sun Realty v. Dist. Ct., 542 P.2d 1072 (Nev. 1975)). 2 ECF No. 69-2 at 3. 19 3 I look to Nevada law to resolve this question because, “[i]n an action involving state law 20 claims,” courts “apply the law of the forum state to determine whether a party is entitled to attorneys’ fees, unless it conflicts with a valid federal statute or procedural rule.” MRO 21 Commc’ns, 197 F.3d at 1282. 4 Valley Elec. Ass’n v. Overfield, 106 P.3d 1198, 1200 (Nev. 2005) (cleaned up) (explaining that 22 “‘prevailing party’ is broadly construed so as to encompass plaintiffs, counterclaimants, and defendants”); see also Davis v. Beling, 278 P.3d 301, 322 (Nev. 2012) (noting that parties prevail 23 “if they succeed on any substantial aspect of the case”). 5 Mangold v. Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 67 F.3d 1470, 1478 (9th Cir. 1995). 1 fairness.”6 One permissible method is the lodestar approach, which involves “multiplying the 2 number of hours reasonably spent on the case by a reasonable hourly rate.”7 3 Nevada courts must also review the requested amount “in light of the factors set forth in” 4 the Supreme Court of Nevada’s decision in Brunzell.5 They include:
5 (1) the qualities of the advocate: his ability, training, education, experience, professional 6 standing, and skill; 7 (2) the character of the work to be done: its difficulty, intricacy, and importance; the time, 8 and skill required; the responsibility imposed; and the prominence and character of the 9 parties where they affect the importance of the litigation; 10 (3) the work actually performed by the lawyer: the skill, time, and attention given to the 11 work; 12 (4) the result: whether the attorney was successful and what benefits were derived. 13 Finally, Local Rule 54-14 requires any application for attorneys’ fees to include an attorney 14 affidavit, “[a] reasonable itemization and description of the work performed[,]” and “[a] brief
15 summary” of 13 categories of information designed to elicit more information about the case and 16 the work that the attorneys performed.8 17 Having reviewed Polaris’s motion, its counsel’s affidavit, the itemized billing records, 18 and the docket in this case, I find that Polaris’s requested $46,111 in attorneys’ fees is 19 reasonable. The affidavit shows that the requested fees reflect work performed from September 20 21
22 6 Shuette v. Beazer Homes Holdings Corp., 124 P.3d 530, 548–49 (Nev. 2005) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). 23 7 Id. at 549 & n.98 (internal quotation marks omitted). 8 L.R. 54-14 (a)–(b). 1 23, 2024, through January 7, 2026, and that Polaris does not seek all fees incurred, requesting 2 only a small amount for preparing this motion.9 3 The qualities of the advocates support this award. Polaris was primarily represented by 4 partner Charles Gianelloni and associate Markie Betor, with limited assistance from paralegal
5 Michelle Ashcroft and a small amount of help from other timekeepers whose time Polaris does 6 not seek to recover for. Gianelloni’s affidavit details his more than 13 years of experience in 7 commercial litigation, his role as managing partner of Snell & Wilmer’s Las Vegas office, and 8 the professional recognition he has received.10 It also details Betor’s experience litigating 9 complex commercial disputes, her clerkship with the Nevada Supreme Court, and her 10 commercial-litigation background.11 Ashcroft, the primary paralegal whose time is included, has 11 more than 11 years of commercial-litigation experience.12 I find that these professionals have 12 the skill and experience to justify their rates. 13 I also find that the rates requested are reasonable in light of the billing judgment that 14 counsel exercised. Gianelloni’s standard hourly rate increased from $615 to $675 and then to
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1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 Polaris Processing, LLC, Case No.: 2:24-cv-01907-JAD-MDC
4 Plaintiff v. Order Granting Polaris’s Motion for 5 Attorneys’ Fees New Rise Renewables Reno, LLC, 6 [ECF No. 69] Defendants 7
8 Polaris Processing, LLC sued New Rise Renewables Reno, LLC after New Rise failed to 9 pay the full amount required by the parties’ settlement agreement resolving an earlier dispute 10 over Polaris’s services. New Rise opposed those claims and also filed a negligence counterclaim 11 premised on the theory that Polaris should bear responsibility for New Rise’s misdirected wire 12 payments to hackers. I rejected that theory, dismissed the counterclaim, and later granted 13 summary judgment for Polaris on its breach-of-contract claim. Final judgment was entered in 14 Polaris’s favor for $1,061,586.00. Polaris now moves unopposed for $46,111.00 in attorneys’ 15 fees under the settlement agreement’s prevailing-party provision. Because I find that Polaris is 16 the prevailing party and that its requested fees are reasonable under Nevada law, I grant the 17 motion. 18 Discussion 19 A. Polaris is entitled to recover its reasonable attorneys’ fees under the settlement 20 agreement.
21 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(2) authorizes a party to seek attorneys’ fees by 22 motion, but the rule itself does not supply the substantive basis for such an award. So Polaris 23 seeks its fees under the prevailing-party provision in its settlement agreement with New Rise. 1 Under both federal and Nevada law, valid contractual provisions for the payment of 2 attorneys’ fees constitute a sufficient source of authority for such an award.1 The agreement 3 provides that “the prevailing party in any action to enforce the terms of this settlement agreement 4 is entitled to its reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in association with such action at
5 the trial and appellate level.”2 The parties’ agreement doesn’t define “prevailing party.” But 6 under Nevada law generally,3 a party prevails “if it succeeds on any significant issue in litigation 7 [that] achieves some of the benefit it sought in bringing [or defending] suit.”4 I find that Polaris 8 is the prevailing party because it obtained dismissal of New Rise’s counterclaim, summary 9 judgment on its breach-of-contract claim, and final judgment in its favor. 10 B. Polaris’s requested fees are reasonable. 11 Federal courts sitting in diversity determine the reasonableness of attorneys’ fees 12 awarded using state law.5 Under Nevada law, “the method upon which a reasonable fee is 13 determined is subject to the discretion of the court, which is tempered only by reason and 14
15 1 See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 257 (1975) (“[A]bsent statute or enforceable contract, litigants pay their own attorneys’ fees.”); MRO Commc’ns, Inc. v. 16 AT&T, 197 F.3d 1276, 1281 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[E]ach party must bear its own attorneys’ fees in the absence of a rule, statute[,] or contract authorizing such an award.”); Schouweiler v. Yancey 17 Co., 712 P.2d 786, 788 (Nev. 1985) (“It is well established in Nevada that attorney’s fees are not recoverable unless allowed by express or implied agreement or when authorized by statute or 18 rule.”) (citing Sun Realty v. Dist. Ct., 542 P.2d 1072 (Nev. 1975)). 2 ECF No. 69-2 at 3. 19 3 I look to Nevada law to resolve this question because, “[i]n an action involving state law 20 claims,” courts “apply the law of the forum state to determine whether a party is entitled to attorneys’ fees, unless it conflicts with a valid federal statute or procedural rule.” MRO 21 Commc’ns, 197 F.3d at 1282. 4 Valley Elec. Ass’n v. Overfield, 106 P.3d 1198, 1200 (Nev. 2005) (cleaned up) (explaining that 22 “‘prevailing party’ is broadly construed so as to encompass plaintiffs, counterclaimants, and defendants”); see also Davis v. Beling, 278 P.3d 301, 322 (Nev. 2012) (noting that parties prevail 23 “if they succeed on any substantial aspect of the case”). 5 Mangold v. Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 67 F.3d 1470, 1478 (9th Cir. 1995). 1 fairness.”6 One permissible method is the lodestar approach, which involves “multiplying the 2 number of hours reasonably spent on the case by a reasonable hourly rate.”7 3 Nevada courts must also review the requested amount “in light of the factors set forth in” 4 the Supreme Court of Nevada’s decision in Brunzell.5 They include:
5 (1) the qualities of the advocate: his ability, training, education, experience, professional 6 standing, and skill; 7 (2) the character of the work to be done: its difficulty, intricacy, and importance; the time, 8 and skill required; the responsibility imposed; and the prominence and character of the 9 parties where they affect the importance of the litigation; 10 (3) the work actually performed by the lawyer: the skill, time, and attention given to the 11 work; 12 (4) the result: whether the attorney was successful and what benefits were derived. 13 Finally, Local Rule 54-14 requires any application for attorneys’ fees to include an attorney 14 affidavit, “[a] reasonable itemization and description of the work performed[,]” and “[a] brief
15 summary” of 13 categories of information designed to elicit more information about the case and 16 the work that the attorneys performed.8 17 Having reviewed Polaris’s motion, its counsel’s affidavit, the itemized billing records, 18 and the docket in this case, I find that Polaris’s requested $46,111 in attorneys’ fees is 19 reasonable. The affidavit shows that the requested fees reflect work performed from September 20 21
22 6 Shuette v. Beazer Homes Holdings Corp., 124 P.3d 530, 548–49 (Nev. 2005) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). 23 7 Id. at 549 & n.98 (internal quotation marks omitted). 8 L.R. 54-14 (a)–(b). 1 23, 2024, through January 7, 2026, and that Polaris does not seek all fees incurred, requesting 2 only a small amount for preparing this motion.9 3 The qualities of the advocates support this award. Polaris was primarily represented by 4 partner Charles Gianelloni and associate Markie Betor, with limited assistance from paralegal
5 Michelle Ashcroft and a small amount of help from other timekeepers whose time Polaris does 6 not seek to recover for. Gianelloni’s affidavit details his more than 13 years of experience in 7 commercial litigation, his role as managing partner of Snell & Wilmer’s Las Vegas office, and 8 the professional recognition he has received.10 It also details Betor’s experience litigating 9 complex commercial disputes, her clerkship with the Nevada Supreme Court, and her 10 commercial-litigation background.11 Ashcroft, the primary paralegal whose time is included, has 11 more than 11 years of commercial-litigation experience.12 I find that these professionals have 12 the skill and experience to justify their rates. 13 I also find that the rates requested are reasonable in light of the billing judgment that 14 counsel exercised. Gianelloni’s standard hourly rate increased from $615 to $675 and then to
15 $765 during the life of this matter, but he wrote off time—including his time attending the 16 motion-to-dismiss hearing—resulting in an effective rate of $583.66.13 Betor’s standard rate 17 increased from $385 to $435 and then to $510, but her time was also discounted on multiple 18 assignments, resulting in an effective rate of $344.09.14 Ashcroft’s rate was $335 and later $360, 19
20 9 ECF No. 69-1 at 3, ¶ 6. 21 10 Id. at ¶ 15(a). 11 Id. at ¶ 15(b). 22 12 Id. at ¶ 16. 23 13 Id. at ¶ 15(a). 14 Id. at ¶ 15(b). and Polaris seeks fees for only her limited work while omitting the time of other paralegals and assistants.!° I find that these effective rates are reasonable for this market and this matter. 3 The character of the work and the work actually performed also support the requested 4!|amount. This case was not especially complex, but it did require Polaris to enforce the settlement agreement, defeat New Rise’s negligence counterclaim, and obtain summary 6|| judgment on its breach-of-contract claim. Counsel represents that Polaris incurred $11,039.50 in 7|| fees dismissing the counterclaim and $16,071.00 through summary judgment, with the remainder incurred in the ordinary course of the litigation. 9 So I find that the requested fees are reasonable in light of the skill and experience of 10]| counsel, the character of the work required, the work actually performed, and the result obtained. 11 Conclusion 12 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Polaris’s motion for attorneys’ fees [ECF No. 69] is 13] GRANTED. Polaris is awarded fees of $46,111.00 based on the parties’ settlement 14] agreement. The Clerk of Court is directed to ENTER an AMENDED JUDGMENT accordingly. Pre U.S. District Judge Jennifer/A. Dorsey 17 May 5, 2026 18 19 20 21 22 23 Td. at § 16.