P.O. v. Department of Children & Families

District Court of Appeal of Florida

P.O. v. Department of Children & Families

117 So. 3d 878, 2013 WL 3716899, 2013 Fla. App. LEXIS 11229

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedJuly 17, 2013

DocketNo. 4D13-1252

StatusPublished

This text of 117 So. 3d 878 (P.O. v. Department of Children & Families) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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P.O. v. Department of Children & Families, 117 So. 3d 878, 2013 WL 3716899, 2013 Fla. App. LEXIS 11229 (Fla. Ct. App. 2013).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

We affirm the trial court’s final judgment terminating the father’s parental rights to his children, as the trial court’s findings are supported by competent substantial evidence. See In re Baby E.A.W., 658 So.2d 961, 967 (Fla.1995).

As to the father’s claim that his constitutional right to free association with the mother was infringed, his contact with the mother was a factor in the trial court’s decision to terminate rights. The mother’s rights had also been terminated, and the court had determined that she remained a danger to the children. Despite this, the father remained in contact with the mother and indicated that he would continue to involve the mother in the children’s lives. The trial court did not violate the father’s constitutional rights. The right to free [879]*879association in personal relationships, which includes a parent’s right to the care and upbringing of his child, is not absolute, and infringements may be justified by a compelling state interest in the protection of children. See D.D. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 849 So.2d 478 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (state has compelling interest in protection of children and does not violate that test when it interferes with father’s fundamental right to parent child through the exercise of its authority under Chapter 39, Florida Statutes).

Affirmed.

WARNER, Conner, JJ., and LEVENSON, JEFFREY R., Associate Judge, concur.

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PER CURIAM.

We affirm the trial court’s final judgment terminating the father’s parental rights to his children, as the trial court’s findings are supported by competent substantial evidence. See In re Baby E.A.W., 658 So.2d 961, 967 (Fla.1995).

As to the father’s claim that his constitutional right to free association with the mother was infringed, his contact with the mother was a factor in the trial court’s decision to terminate rights. The mother’s rights had also been terminated, and the court had determined that she remained a danger to the children. Despite this, the father remained in contact with the mother and indicated that he would continue to involve the mother in the children’s lives. The trial court did not violate the father’s constitutional rights. The right to free [879]*879association in personal relationships, which includes a parent’s right to the care and upbringing of his child, is not absolute, and infringements may be justified by a compelling state interest in the protection of children. See D.D. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 849 So.2d 478 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (state has compelling interest in protection of children and does not violate that test when it interferes with father’s fundamental right to parent child through the exercise of its authority under Chapter 39, Florida Statutes).

Affirmed.

WARNER, Conner, JJ., and LEVENSON, JEFFREY R., Associate Judge, concur.

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117 So. 3d 878, 2013 WL 3716899, 2013 Fla. App. LEXIS 11229, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/po-v-department-of-children-families-fladistctapp-2013.

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