[Cite as PNC Bank, N.A. v. Price, 2016-Ohio-2887.]
COURT OF APPEALS MORGAN COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
JUDGES: PNC BANK, N.A., SUCCESSOR BY : Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J. MERGER WITH NATIONAL CITY : Hon. William B. Hoffman, J. BANK : Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J. : Plaintiff-Appellee : : Case No. 15AP0015 -vs- : : MARK J. PRICE, JR. AKA MARK J. : OPINION PRICE, ET AL
Defendant-Appellant
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from the Morgan County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 13CV0025
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: May 4, 2016
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant
ROBERT HOGAN BRUCE BROYLES STEPHANIE F. GILLEY 5815 Market Street, Ste. 2 700 Walnut Street, Ste. 302 Boardman, OH 44512 Cincinnati, OH 45202 [Cite as PNC Bank, N.A. v. Price, 2016-Ohio-2887.]
Gwin, P.J.
{¶1} Appellant appeals the October 15, 2015 judgment entry of the Morgan
County Court of Common Pleas granting appellee’s motion for summary judgment and
the November 12, 2015 judgment entry granting a decree of foreclosure.
Facts & Procedural History
{¶2} On March 29, 2002, appellant Mark H. Price, Jr. and Alberta Price opened
an Equity Reserve Line of Credit with National City Bank. The initial amount of the Line
of Credit was $50,000. The relevant terms of the Line of Credit Agreement stated as
follows:
Line of Credit. Your Line is an open-end line of credit which you may use
to obtain cash advances (Advances) from time to time for a period of 10
years (Term). Your line will mature on the last day of the billing cycle ending
in March 2012 (Maturity Date). If you continue to meet Bank’s then current
standards for credit criteria and collateral value, at Bank’s discretion, Bank
will either extend the Maturity Date for one or more additional Terms or Bank
will refinance your Line on the terms then being offered by Bank for Equity
Reserve Lines of Credit.
***
The Line Minimum Payment will not fully repay the principal that is
outstanding on your Line by the Maturity Date. If you use an FRP after the
first five years of your Agreement, then the FRP payment will not fully
amortize your FRP by the Maturity Date. Bank will refinance the remaining
unpaid balance of your Line and/or FRP on terms then offered by Bank, Morgan County, Case No. 15AP0015 3
provided you continue to meet Bank’s then current standards for credit
criteria and collateral value. Otherwise, you will be required to pay the entire
balance in a single payment. After the Maturity Date and prior to refinancing
or payment of the entire outstanding balance, you will continue to be bound
by this Agreement in that you will be liable for all finance charges and other
amounts and you will be required to continue making monthly payments.
Bank does not waive its right to receive payments in full by accepting partial
payments after the Maturity Date.
Termination of the Line. Bank can terminate your Line and require you to
pay the entire outstanding balance in one payment if:
You engage in fraud or material misrepresentation with your Line.
You do not meet the repayment terms of this Agreement.
Your action or inaction adversely affects the collateral or Bank’s rights in the
collateral.
{¶3} Appellant secured the Equity Reserve Line of Credit by executing a
mortgage with National City Bank on the real property located at 9850 North Greer Road
N.W., in McConnelsville, Ohio. The mortgage was recorded on April 11, 2002.
{¶4} Effective December 31, 2008, National City Corporation merged with and
into The PNC Financial Services, Group, Inc. On November 6, 2009, National City Bank
was merged with and into Plaintiff-appellee, PNC Bank, National Association.
{¶5} On February 11, 2013, appellee filed a complaint for foreclosure against
appellant in the Morgan County Court of Common Pleas. Appellee stated it was the Morgan County, Case No. 15AP0015 4
holder of the Equity Line of Credit Agreement and mortgage executed by appellant.
Copies of the Equity Line of Credit Agreement and mortgage were attached to the
complaint as exhibits. Appellee alleged that by reason of default in terms of the Equity
Reserve Line of Credit Agreement and the mortgage securing the same, appellant owed
the principal sum of $49,783.53 plus interest at the rate of 3.25% per annum from April
30, 2012 to December 6, 2012.
{¶6} After appellee filed a motion for default, the trial court granted a judgment
entry and decree of foreclosure on September 17, 2013. On December 16, 2013,
appellant filed a motion to vacate default judgment and motion for leave to file answer to
complaint instanter. The trial court granted appellant’s motions on December 19, 2013.
Appellant thus filed his answer on December 19, 2013. In his answer, appellant raised
as an affirmative defense that appellee lacked standing. Appellant further alleged as an
affirmative defense that appellee breached the terms of the credit line agreement because
appellee did not extend the maturity date or refinance the credit line.
{¶7} After the parties were unable to agree on a loan modification agreement,
appellee moved for summary judgment on December 1, 2014. In support of its motion
for summary judgment, appellee attached the affidavit of Marika Dienes (“Dienes”), loan
support analyst with PNC Bank. She averred that in the regular performance of her job
functions, she was familiar with the business records maintained by PNC Bank. The
affidavit stated PNC Bank was the holder of the Line of Credit Agreement, appellant failed
to make the payment due for April 30, 2012, and did not satisfy the payments that came
due thereafter. Morgan County, Case No. 15AP0015 5
{¶8} Appellant filed a response to the motion for summary judgment and a
motion to strike the affidavit of Dienes. Appellant argued Dienes’ affidavit was
inadmissible hearsay and Dienes lacked knowledge or capacity to testify and authenticate
the records. Finally, appellant argued there was a novation of the original debt. Attached
to his opposition and motion to strike was appellant’s affidavit in which he stated he began
working with PNC in April of 2012 to work out a new loan agreement. Appellant averred
he and appellee were negotiating an extension of the line of credit and Issac Wilcox told
him for a term of thirty (30) years, the payment amount would be $100.05 per month at
1% interest for the first five (5) years of the agreement, and the remainder of the loan
payment fixed at 5.25% interest with a monthly payment of $280.50.
{¶9} Appellee filed a reply to appellant’s opposition on December 11, 2014. On
March 19, 2015, appellant filed an additional affidavit, stating he recorded his phone
conversations with the employees of PNC. Attached to his affidavit were transcripts of
these conversations. Appellee filed a motion to strike appellant’s affidavit on April 2, 2015,
and argued the trial court should strike appellant’s March 2015 affidavit because appellant
did not request leave to supplement his response to summary judgment and because the
conversations were not relevant to the issues at hand in the instant case.
{¶10} On July 28, 2015, the trial court granted appellee’s motion to strike the
March 2015 affidavit of appellant as being out of rule. The trial court granted appellee’s
motion for summary judgment on October 15, 2015. On November 12, 2015, the trial
court entered a judgment entry and decree of foreclosure.
{¶11} Appellant appeals the judgment entries of the Morgan County Court of
Common Pleas and assigns the following as error: Morgan County, Case No. 15AP0015 6
{¶12} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO STRIKE THE
AFFIDAVIT OF MARIKA DIENES AND RELYING UPON HER AFFIDAVIT IN
DETERMINING THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
{¶13} “II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
TO APPELLEE WHEN APPELLEE FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT IT WAS ENTITLED
TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.
{¶14} “III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
TO APPELLEE WHEN THERE REMAINED A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT
IN DISPUTE ON THE ISSUE OF WHETHER A NOVATION OF THE OBLIGATION HAD
OCCURRED.”
Summary Judgment Standard
Summary Judgment
{¶15} Civ. R. 56 states in pertinent part:
Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits,
transcripts of evidence, and written stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in
the action, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. No evidence or
stipulation may be considered except as stated in this rule. A summary
judgment shall not be rendered unless it appears from the evidence or
stipulation, and only from the evidence or stipulation, that reasonable minds
can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party
against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that party being Morgan County, Case No. 15AP0015 7
entitled to have the evidence or stipulation construed mostly strongly in the
party’s favor. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be
rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as
to the amount of damages.
{¶16} A trial court should not enter a summary judgment if it appears a material
fact is genuinely disputed, nor if, construing the allegations most favorably towards the
non-moving party, reasonable minds could draw different conclusions from the
undisputed facts. Hounshell v. Am. States Ins. Co., 67 Ohio St.2d 427, 424 N.E.2d 311
(1981). The court may not resolve any ambiguities in the evidence presented. Inland
Refuse Transfer Co. v. Browning-Ferris Inds. of Ohio, Inc., 15 Ohio St.3d 321, 474 N.E.2d
271 (1984). A fact is material if it affects the outcome of the case under the applicable
substantive law. Russell v. Interim Personnel, Inc., 135 Ohio App.3d 301, 733 N.E.2d
1186 (6th Dist. 1999).
{¶17} When reviewing a trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment, an
appellate court applies the same standard used by the trial court. Smiddy v. The Wedding
Party, Inc., 30 Ohio St.3d 35, 506 N.E.2d 212 (1987). This means we review the matter
de novo. Doe v. Shaffer, 90 Ohio St.3d 388, 2000-Ohio-186, 738 N.E.2d 1243.
{¶18} The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of
informing the trial court of the basis of the motion and identifying the portions of the record
which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of fact on a material element of the
non-moving party’s claim. Drescher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 662 N.E.2d 264 (1996).
Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party
to set forth specific facts demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact does exist. Id. Morgan County, Case No. 15AP0015 8
The non-moving party may not rest upon the allegations and denials in the pleadings, but
instead must submit some evidentiary materials showing a genuine dispute over material
facts. Henkle v. Henkle, 75 Ohio App.3d 732, 600 N.E.2d 791 (12th Dist. 1991).
I.
{¶19} Appellant first argues the trial court erred in relying on the affidavit of Dienes
because the affidavit was not based on personal knowledge and was thus inadmissible
hearsay.
{¶20} Evidence Rule 803(6) provides that records of regularly conducted business
activity are admissible, as an exception to the rules of hearsay, if shown to be such “by
the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness.” The question of who may lay
a foundation for the admissibility of business records as a custodian or other qualified
witness must be answered broadly. U.S. Bank Trustee, N.A. v. Herman, 5th Dist.
Delaware No. 14 CAE 04 0023, 2015-Ohio-586. It is not a requirement the witness have
firsthand knowledge of the transaction giving rise to the business record. Id. “Rather, it
must be demonstrated that: the witness is sufficiently familiar with the operation of the
business and with the circumstances of the record’s preparation, maintenance and
retrieval; he can reasonably testify on the basis of this knowledge the record is what it
purports to be; and it was made in the ordinary course of business consistent with the
elements of Rule 803(6).” Id.; PNC Bank, N.A. v. Bradford, 5th Dist. Stark No.
2014CA00029, 2015-Ohio-4092.
{¶21} Civil Rule 56(E) states an affidavit must “be made on personal knowledge
[and] set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence.” Civil Rule 56(E). Ohio
law recognizes personal knowledge may be inferred from the contents of an affidavit. Morgan County, Case No. 15AP0015 9
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Dawson, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2013CA00095, 2014-Ohio-269.
The assertion of personal knowledge in an affidavit satisfies Rule 56(E) if the nature of
the facts in the affidavit combined with the identity of the affiant creates a reasonable
inference the affiant has personal knowledge of the facts in the affidavit. Id. In her
affidavit, Dienes stated as follows:
I am the Loan Support Analyst of PNC Bank, N.A., successor by
merger with National City Bank, and in this position I have reviewed certain
business files, documents and other business records of PNC Bank, N.A.
successor by merger with National City Bank’s account for Mark H. Price,
Jr. and Alberta Price. I am over the age of 18 and I make this affidavit based
upon my personal knowledge obtained from my personal review of such
business records, and I am competent to testify to its content.
In the regular performance of my job functions, I am familiar with
business records maintained by PNC Bank, N.A. successor by merger with
National City Bank for the purpose of servicing mortgage loans. Based on
my knowledge of PNC Bank, N.A. successor by merger with National City
Bank’s business practices, the entries in these records (which include data
compilations, electronic image documents, and others) are made at the time
of the events and conditions they describe, either by people with firsthand
knowledge of those events and conditions or form information provided by
people with such firsthand knowledge. It is PNC Bank, N.A. successor by
merger with National City Bank’s business practice to electronically store Morgan County, Case No. 15AP0015 10
duplicates of the originals of all notes or other debt instruments,
endorsements, allonges, mortgages, and assignments thereof.
{¶22} Dienes’ affidavit goes on to state the details of the Equity Reserve Line of
Credit Agreement and the mortgage executed by Price on March 29, 2002. Dienes avers
appellant failed to make the payment due for April 30, 2012 and did not satisfy the
payments that came thereafter. Further, Dienes stated as of November 24, 2014, there
was due and owing the amount of $49,783.53.
{¶23} From her position as the loan support analyst and her statement that she
examined the records in this case, it may be reasonably inferred Dienes had personal
knowledge to qualify the documents as an exception to the hearsay rule as business
documents.
{¶24} Appellant contends Dienes does not describe her job duties or how she
obtained personal knowledge and thus she does not demonstrate personal knowledge.
We disagree. The affiant in this case is clearly identified as a Loan Support Analyst of
PNC Bank. She specifically attests to her job duties and states, “in the regular
performance of my job functions, I am familiar with business records maintained by PNC
bank, N.A. successor by merger with National City Bank for the purpose of servicing
mortgage loans.” She provides that, based upon this knowledge of PNC Bank’s business
practices, the entries in the record are made at the time of the events and conditions they
describe.
{¶25} Though appellant contends this case is analogous to Deutsche Bank Nat’l
Trust Co. v. Dvorak, 9th Dist. Summit No. 27120, 2014-Ohio-4652, we find the instant
case is factually and legally distinguishable from Dvorak. Further, this Court has held Morgan County, Case No. 15AP0015 11
similar affidavits by PNC Bank were sufficiently based on personal knowledge and
affirmed lower courts’ granting of summary judgment. PNC Bank, N.A. v. Olivieri, 5th
Dist. Delaware No. 15 CAE 08 0061, 2016-Ohio-1078; PNC Bank, N.A. v. Bradford, 5th
Dist. Stark No. 2014CA00029, 2015-Ohio-4092.
{¶26} Finally, appellant contends the affidavit was insufficient and not based upon
personal knowledge because the affiant authenticated copies of the electronically stored
duplicates of the original note and mortgage.
{¶27} Evidence Rule 901 governs authentication or identification of evidence. It
states, “the requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to
admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in
question is what its proponent claims.” Evidence Rule 901(A). Evidence Rule 901(B)(1)
provides the testimony of a witness with knowledge, who testifies that a matter is what it
is claimed to be, conforms with the requirements of Evidence Rule 901. Thus, “any
competent witness who has knowledge that a matter is what its proponent claims may
testify to such pertinent facts, thereby establishing, in whole or in part, the foundation for
identification.” Id.
{¶28} Thus, verification of documents attached to an affidavit supporting or
opposing a motion for summary judgment is generally satisfied by an appropriate
averment in the affidavit itself, for example, that “such copies are true copies and
reproductions.” State ex rel. Corrigan v. Seminatore, 66 Ohio St.2d 459, 423 N.E.2d 105
(1981). In the present case, Dienes averred the note and mortgage attached to the
affidavit were true and accurate copies of the electronically stored duplicates of the
originals. Evidence Rule 1003 governs the admissibility of duplicates and provides a Morgan County, Case No. 15AP0015 12
duplicate, “is admissible to the same extent as an original unless: (1) a genuine question
is raised as to the authenticity of the original or (2) in the circumstances it would be unfair
to admit the duplicate in lieu of the original.” The party seeking to exclude a duplicate
cannot rely on mere speculation as to its authenticity. Evidence Rule 1003. Furthermore,
“the decision to admit duplicates, in lieu of originals, is one that is left to the sound
discretion of the trial court.” Fannie May v. Bilyk, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 15AP-11, 2015-
Ohio-554.
{¶29} Here, appellant does not raise any issues about the actual authenticity of
the business records and does not contend it would be unfair under the circumstances to
accept the duplicate in lieu of the original. Appellant’s argument relates to whether Dienes
was qualified to authenticate the documents because she lacked firsthand knowledge
regarding their creation and whether the facts Dienes swore to in her affidavit regarding
the authenticity of the note and mortgage constituted hearsay. Appellant fails to set forth
any bona fide argument that the note and mortgage documents are not what they purport
to be and has not met his burden to demonstrate a genuine question as to the authenticity
of the duplicate copy of the note and mortgage introduced for the purposes of summary
judgment. Fannie May v. Bilyk, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 15AP-11, 2015-Ohio-554; U.S.
Bank v. Lavette, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101348, 2015-Ohio-765.
{¶30} Upon review, we find the trial court did not err in relying upon Dienes’
affidavit in support of its motion for summary judgment. Appellant’s first assignment of
error is overruled. Morgan County, Case No. 15AP0015 13
II.
{¶31} In his second assignment of error, appellant contends the trial court erred
in granting summary judgment because appellee failed to establish it was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.
{¶32} To properly support a motion for summary judgment in a foreclosure action,
a plaintiff must show:
(1) The movant is the holder of the note and mortgage, or is a party entitled
to enforce the instrument;
(2) If the movant is not the original mortgagee, the chain of assignments
and transfers;
(3) All conditions precedent have been met;
(4) The mortgage is in default; and
(5) The amount of principal and interest due.
Wachovia Bank of Delaware, N.A. v. Jackson, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2010-CA-00291, 2011-
Ohio-3202.
{¶33} To have standing to pursue a foreclosure action, a plaintiff “must establish
an interest in the note or mortgage at the time it filed suit.” Home Loan Mtge. Corp. v.
Schwartzwald, 134 Ohio St.3d, 2012-Ohio-5017, 979 N.E.2d 1214. The current holder of
the note and mortgage is the real party in interest in a foreclosure action. U.S. Bank Nat’l.
Assn v. Marcino, 181 Ohio App.3d 328, 2009-Ohio-1178, 908 N.E.2d 1032 (7th Dist.),
citing Chase Manhattan Corp. v. Smith, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C061069, 2007-Ohio-5874.
{¶34} In this case, appellee presented Civil Rule 56(C) evidence to properly
support a motion for summary judgment in a foreclosure action. The affidavit of Dienes Morgan County, Case No. 15AP0015 14
provides the amount of principal and interest due and states appellant has failed to make
the payment due for April 30, 2012 and has not satisfied the payments that have come
due thereafter. Further, that PNC has elected to call the entire balance of said account
due and payable, in accordance with the terms of the Note and Mortgage. Dienes’
affidavit establishes appellee is the holder of and has the right to enforce the Note.
{¶35} The affidavit submitted by PNC demonstrated National City Bank merged
with PNC Bank in 2009. “When two banks merge, the absorbed bank becomes a part of
the resulting bank, and the merged bank has the ability to enforce agreements as if the
resulting bank had stepped into the shoes of the absorbed one.” Bank of Am., N.A. v.
Laster, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100606, 2014-Ohio-2536, citing Acordia of Ohio, L.L.C.
v. Fishel, 133 Ohio St.3d 356, 2012-Ohio-4648, 978 N.E.2d 823. Once an existing bank
takes the place of another bank after a merger, no further action is necessary to become
a real party in interest in regard to its property. Huntington Nat’l Bank v. Hoffer, 2nd Dist.
Greene No. 2010-CA-31, 2011-Ohio-242. Further, Dienes’ affidavit stated, “PNC Bank,
N.A. is the holder of, and has the right to enforce, the Note * * *.” Accordingly, reasonable
minds can only conclude PNC Bank is the real party in interest with standing to bring the
foreclosure suit against appellant.
{¶36} Appellant maintains the trial court erred in entering a decree of foreclosure
when the bank failed to provide and attach to Dienes’ affidavit business records which
support a history of payment delinquency and default.
{¶37} However, this Court has held there is no requirement that a party seeking
foreclosure submit a payment history to demonstrate entitlement to summary judgment.
Fifth Third Mtge. v. Fantine, 5th Dist. Fairfield No. 15-CA-5, 2015-Ohio-4260. Rather, an Morgan County, Case No. 15AP0015 15
averment of outstanding indebtedness in the affidavit of a bank loan officer with personal
knowledge of the debtor’s account is sufficient to establish the amount due and owing on
the note, unless the debtor refutes the averred indebtedness with evidence that a different
amount is owed. Id. Dienes’ affidavit provided the amount due and payable on the
account was $49,783.53 plus interest at the rate of 3.25% as of April 31, 2012 and 0% as
of November 24, 2014. Further, Dienes averred appellant failed to make the payment
due for April 30, 2012 and those due thereafter. Appellant did not provide evidence which
would controvert Dienes’ averments regarding the $49,783.53 balance amount.
{¶38} PNC, via the Dienes affidavit, provided evidence to satisfy the Jackson
criteria. Thus, PNC set forth sufficient evidence to support its motion for summary
judgment. Because appellant failed to meet his reciprocal burden of submitting evidence
which would create a genuine issue of material fact for trial, we conclude the trial court
did not err in granting summary judgment and entering the decree of foreclosure. See
Fifth Third Mtge. Co. v. Fantine, 5th Dist. Fairfield No. 15-CA-5, 2015-Ohio-4260; PNC
Bank, N.A. v. Bradford, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2014CA00029, 2015-Ohio-4092.
{¶39} Appellant’s second assignment of error is overruled.
III.
{¶40} In his final assignment of error, appellant argues the trial court erred in
granting appellee’s motion for summary judgment because there is a material fact in
dispute on the issue of novation. Appellant contends he submitted evidence, in the form
of his affidavit, that PNC Bank offered a new line of credit agreement and he accepted
the agreement by sending payment to PNC Bank. Morgan County, Case No. 15AP0015 16
{¶41} Novation is an affirmative defense. Sheet Metal Workers Nat’l Pension
Fund v. Bryden House Ltd. Partnership, 130 Ohio App.3d 132, 719 N.E.2d 646 (10th Dist.
1998); Hollish v. Maners, 5th Dist. Knox No. 2011CA000005, 2011-Ohio-4823. A
novation “is created where a previous valid obligation is extinguished by a new valid
contract, accomplished by substitution of parties or of the undertaking, with the consent
of all the parties, and based on valid consideration.´ Swayne v. Beeble Investments, Inc.,
176 Ohio App.3d 293, 2008-Ohio-1839, 891 N.E.2d 1216 (10th Dist.). The Ohio Supreme
Court in Jim’s Steakhouse, Inc. v. Cleveland, 81 Ohio St.3d 18, 688 N.E.2d 506 (1998),
provides for waiver of an affirmative defense if it is not raised in a pleading or an amended
pleadings. See also Civ.R. 8.
{¶42} In this case, appellant did not assert novation in his answer or through an
amended pleading. Appellant first argued a novation existed in his response to appellee’s
motion to summary judgment. Because appellant did not assert novation as an
affirmative defense in the pleadings, we find appellant has waived this issue pursuant to
Civil Rule 8(C). See Hollish v. Maners, 5th Dist. Knox No. 2011CA000005, 2011-Ohio-
4823.
{¶43} Further, even if appellant did not waive this issue, we find the trial court did
not err in granting summary judgment to appellee on the novation issue. In order to effect
a valid novation, all parties to the original contract must clearly and definitely intend the
second agreement to be a novation and intend to completely disregard the original
contract obligation. Boulden v. Boulden, 5th Dist. Richland No. 01-CA-21, 2001-Ohio-
1430. To be enforceable, a novation requires consideration and a novation can never be
presumed. Id. “Intent, knowledge and consent are the essential elements in determining Morgan County, Case No. 15AP0015 17
whether a purported novation has been accepted.” Id. A party’s knowledge of and
consent to the terms of a novation need not be express, but may be implied from
circumstances or conduct. Id. There must be a common understanding between the
parties to the arrangement, and a clear and definite expression of both knowledge and
consent. Id.
{¶44} In this case, appellant failed to present any evidence that all parties to the
line of credit agreement and mortgage, including appellee and Alberta Price, consented
to any change in terms or new obligations. While appellant stated in his affidavit that he
and PNC Bank were negotiating an extension of the line of credit, appellant failed to
submit any evidence demonstrating a clear and definite expression of consent by PNC
Bank and/or Alberta Price to a new agreement. Further, as in Boulden v. Boulden,
appellant offered no evidence of any consideration. Accordingly, even if appellant did not
waive the defense of novation, appellant has failed to provide evidence to create a
genuine issue of material fact with regards to novation.
{¶45} Appellant’s third assignment of error is overruled. Morgan County, Case No. 15AP0015 18
{¶46} Based on the foregoing, we overrule appellant’s assignments of error. The
judgment entries of the Morgan County Court of Common Pleas are affirmed.
By Gwin, P.J.,
Hoffman, J., and
Baldwin, J., concur