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SJC-12711
PLYMOUTH RETIREMENT BOARD vs. CONTRIBUTORY RETIREMENT APPEALS BOARD & another1
Plymouth. September 5, 2019. - December 3, 2019.
Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ.
Retirement. Police, Retirement. Municipal Corporations, Police, Retirement board. Public Employment, Police, Retirement. Statute, Construction. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board.
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on December 12, 2016.
The case was heard by Michael D. Ricciuti, J., on motions for judgment on the pleadings.
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court.
Andrew M. Batchelor, Assistant Attorney General, for the defendants. Michael Sacco for the plaintiff.
1 Public Employee Retirement Administration Commission. 2
LOWY, J. In this case, the parties ask that we determine
whether a police officer who is a member of a municipal
retirement system must remit payments under G. L. c. 32,
§ 4 (2), to obtain creditable service for prior work conducted
as a permanent-intermittent police officer (PIPO). A Superior
Court judge held that the Plymouth Retirement Board (Plymouth
board) did not have to collect remittance payments from such
members because G. L. c. 32, § 4 (2) (b), which expressly
discusses PIPO creditable service does not mention a payment
requirement. The Contributory Retirement Appeals Board (CRAB)
appeals, arguing that the provision, considered in the context
of the whole statute, mandates remittance payments by member
police officers for past intermittent work. We agree with CRAB
and therefore reverse.
Statutory scheme. The Legislature created a "contributory
retirement system" through which municipalities establish their
own employee retirement systems, and form "municipal retirement
boards to manage [those] systems." Retirement Bd. of Stoneham
v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 476 Mass. 130, 132
(2016), citing G. L. c. 32, § 20 (4) (b), (5) (b). Members
contribute to the system by payroll deductions. See G. L. c.
32, § 22. Retirement system members must be "regularly
employed." Retirement Bd. of Stoneham, supra, citing G. L. c.
32, § 3 (2) (a) (x). A member's retirement benefits depend on 3
the individual's years and months of "creditable service," among
other factors. See G. L. c. 32, §§ 5, 10. Creditable service
is governed by G. L. c. 32, § 4, and includes "all service
rendered" while an employee is a member of a retirement system.
See G. L. c. 32, § 4 (1) (a).
Some service rendered prior to an employee becoming a
member of the retirement system is creditable. G. L. c. 32,
§ 4 (2) (a). Local retirement boards have "full jurisdiction"
to determine whether a new member may receive creditable service
for "part-time, provisional, . . . or intermittent employment."2
G. L. c. 32, § 3 (2) (d). A retiree's benefits depend upon the
individual's years and months of "creditable service" among
other factors. See G. L. c. 32, §§ 5, 10. Once an intermittent
employee becomes a member of the retirement system, the member
may petition the relevant local retirement board to acquire
creditable service for past intermittent work. See G. L. c. 32,
§ 4 (2) (a).
The statute permits local retirement boards to determine
how much "service in any calendar year is equivalent to a year
2 The Legislature defines an employee as someone who is "regularly employed" and "whose regular compensation . . . is paid by any political subdivision of the [C]ommonwealth," including police officers, G. L. c. 32, § 1, and part-time workers. See Essex County Retirement Bd. v. North Andover, 349 Mass. 233, 235 (1965). The Legislature has left "regularly employed" undefined. Id. 4
of [creditable] service" and how much creditable service is
available for previous intermittent work. G. L. c. 32,
§ 4 (2) (b). However, for certain discrete employment
categories, such as permanent-intermittent police positions, the
statute limits the power of such boards to determine creditable
service by mandating specific calculations. Id. For example,
police officers must receive one year of creditable service,
with a maximum of five years, for any time spent during the
calendar year as "reserve or permanent-intermittent police
officer[s] . . . on [their] respective list[s] and eligible for
assignment to duty." Id.
To acquire creditable service for previous intermittent
work, members must remit payments "with buyback interest" in "an
amount equal to that which would have been withheld as regular
deductions" had they "been a member . . . during [that] previous
period." G.L. c. 32, § 4 (2) (c). Section 4 (2) (c) has no
express exemptions from the purchase formula.
Background and procedural history. Plymouth police officer
Antonio Gomes is a member of Plymouth's contributory retirement
system. Before becoming a permanent police officer, Gomes
served as a PIPO -- someone who worked "only on such days as [he
or she] might be called, and compensated accordingly." Costa v.
Selectmen of Billerica, 377 Mass. 853, 854 (1979). Gomes 5
actively engaged in police work and earned money for his
intermittent work.
In 1998, Gomes purchased full-time retirement credit for
his prior intermittent service, with interest. In 2003, the
Public Employee Retirement Administration Commission (PERAC)
informed the Plymouth board that under G. L. c. 32, § 4 (2) (b),
the board incorrectly had charged Gomes for the creditable
service he earned as a PIPO. Despite the policy of the Plymouth
board that member police officers must remit payments to obtain
full-time credit for previous uncredited PIPO work, the board
refunded Gomes's remitted payment, including the buyback
interest.
Ten years later, CRAB decided MacAloney vs. Worcester
Regional Retirement Sys., No. CR-11-19 (amended June 21, 2013),
ruling that member firefighters must remit payments to purchase
retirement credit for past intermittent work under G. L. c. 32,
§ 4 (2) (c). See G. L. c. 32, § 4 (2) (b) (addressing credit to
intermittent work of firefighters). As a result of the
MacAloney decision, the Plymouth board advised Gomes that he
must "remit those funds previously refunded, together with
buyback interest," in part because "it had always been the
policy of the [Plymouth board] to require members . . . who
rendered prior service as a reserve police officer to remit
contributions and interest . . . in order to receive credit 6
rendered as a reserve police officer pursuant to [G. L. c. 32,
§ 4 (2) (b)]."
Gomes appealed from the Plymouth board's determination to
the Division of Administrative Law Appeals (DALA). Siding with
Gomes, the Plymouth board shifted course and claimed that it
"disagree[d] with PERAC's interpretation of § 4 (2) (b) post-
MacAloney," and asked that DALA join PERAC as a necessary party-
defendant. DALA rejected the argument of Gomes and the Plymouth
board that the MacAloney decision did not apply to Gomes. Gomes
and the Plymouth board appealed to CRAB, which upheld DALA's
ruling and affirmed the MacAloney decision.
CRAB rejected the argument that, because G. L. c. 32,
§ 4 (2) (b), does not explicitly state that a member is required
to buy creditable service earned as a PIPO, the member is
entitled to receive the creditable service at no cost. CRAB
stated that that provision had to be considered in context, and
that G. L. c. 32, § 4 (2) (c), set forth the requisite terms of
payment for creditable service. The latter section, CRAB
pointed out, did not contain an exemption for creditable service
as a PIPO. CRAB also stated that § 4 (2) (c) listed general
types of employment or service subject to the buyback
calculation, and therefore, the absence of the specific phrase
"permanent-intermittent police officer" in that provision did
not matter. Finally, CRAB pointed out that to consider G. L. 7
c. 32, § 4 (2) (b), in isolation would produce an anomalous
result: a disincentive to become a member of the retirement
system and to be subject to regular payments via payroll
deductions. The Plymouth board sought review in the Superior
Court pursuant to G. L. c. 30, § 14.3
On cross motions for judgment on the pleadings, the
Superior Court judge accepted the Plymouth board's view that the
plain language of G. L. c. 32, § 4 (2) (b), does not require
remittance payments by member police officers for past PIPO
service because the statute states that local retirement boards
"shall credit" police officers for up to five years of prior
PIPO work. CRAB timely appealed to the Appeals Court, and we
transferred the case on our own motion. We now reverse.
Discussion. 1. Standard of review. Statutory
interpretation is "a pure question of law," and we therefore
"exercise de novo review" of CRAB's analysis (citation omitted).
Retirement Bd. of Stoneham, 476 Mass. at 134. This court
"typically defer[s] to CRAB's expertise and accord[s] great
weight to its interpretation and application of the statutory
provisions" it administers, such as G. L. c. 32, § 4 (2), and
will reverse only if the "decision was based on an erroneous
3 Gomes did not appeal from the decision by CRAB. Although CRAB disputed the standing of the Plymouth board in the Superior Court, CRAB did not raise the issue on appeal. Thus, the issue is waived, and we assume that the Plymouth board has standing. 8
interpretation of law" (quotations and citations omitted).
Retirement Bd. of Stoneham, supra. See G. L. c. 30A,
§ 14 (7) (c), (e).
2. Statutory interpretation. Both parties urge that the
plain language of G. L. c. 32, § 4 (2), supports their argument.
We agree with CRAB's interpretation that § 4 (2) only makes
sense when read as a coherent whole, because this interpretation
is consistent with the statute's plain language, correctly
interprets § 4 (2) within the entire statute without creating
surplusage, and accords with the apparent legislative purpose
behind G. L. c. 32 generally and § 4 (2) specifically.
a. Plain language. When conducting statutory
interpretation, this court strives "to effectuate" the
Legislature's intent by looking first to the statute's plain
language (citation omitted). Matter of E.C., 479 Mass. 113, 118
(2018). The express language of § 4 (2) (b) and (c)
demonstrates that the Legislature constructed the latter
provision to work together with the former. First, § 4 (2) (c)
lays out a formula for "any employee of any governmental unit"
to purchase creditable service for past intermittent employment
rendered "prior to becoming eligible for membership in a
retirement system", see Gallagher v. Contributory Retirement
Appeal Bd., 4 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 11 (1976). Section 4 (2) (c)
neither announces the necessary qualifications to measure 9
creditable service nor determines the amount of creditable
service for which a member may be eligible; rather, it states
that "the board may allow [such] credit" and merely requires
payment. G. L. c. 32, § 4 (2) (c).
Additionally, the purchase formula for past intermittent
work in G. L. c. 32, § 4 (2) (c), does not exempt police
officers or any other employees from its general applicability.
Where the Legislature did not include an exception in a statute,
this court will not create one. See Joslyn v. Chang, 445 Mass.
344, 352 (2005) ("[T]he duty of the court [is] to adhere to the
very terms of the statute, and not, upon imaginary equitable
considerations, to escape from the positive declarations of the
text" [citation omitted]).
The plain language of G. L. c. 32, § 4 (2) (c),
demonstrates the Legislature's intent to apply the payment
formula without exemption to police officers for "creditable
prior service" as defined by G. L. c. 32, § 4 (2) (b). See
Matter of E.C., 479 Mass. at 118 ("Ordinarily, where the
language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, it is conclusive
as to legislative intent"). Where § 4 (2) (c) describes how to
purchase creditable service for previous PIPO work, § 4 (2) (b)
explains how boards can or must measure the amount of that
"creditable prior service" for intermittent work, subject to
specific criteria for categories of members, like PIPOs, to whom 10
local retirement boards "shall credit" up to five years. Colo
v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 37 Mass. App. Ct. 185,
186–187 (1994). In limiting retirement boards' discretion to
measure creditable service regarding prior PIPO service, the
Legislature nonetheless did not amend the instructions for how
to obtain that creditable service found in the purchase
provisions of § 4 (2) (c). We conclude that § 4 (2) (b)
therefore is silent on payment for creditable service not
because the Legislature intended for member police officers to
receive credit for past permanent-intermittent service without
payment, but because the Legislature intended § 4 (2) (b) only
as a measurement scheme. Cf. Commonwealth v. Nascimento, 479
Mass. 681, 684 (2018) ("The Legislature's silence on a subject
cannot be ignored," especially where it had opportunity to add
language at issue [citation omitted]).
b. Statute construed as a whole. Beyond plain language,
"[c]ourts must look to the statutory scheme as a whole,"
Retirement Bd. of Stoneham, 476 Mass. at 135, so as "to produce
an internal consistency" within the statute (citation omitted).
Matter of E.C., 479 Mass. at 118. Even clear statutory language
is not read in isolation. See Casseus v. Eastern Bus Co., 478
Mass. 786, 795 (2018).
Considering the provisions of G. L. c. 32, § 4 (2), as an
interrelated whole within the larger context of G. L. c. 32 11
supports CRAB's conclusion that member police officers must
remit payments for creditable service for previous intermittent
work. Indeed, G. L. c. 32 "create[d] and describe[d] a
contributory retirement system, i.e. a system maintained" by
payments of members. Rockett v. State Bd. of Retirement, 77
Mass. App. Ct. 434, 439-440 (2010). This court thus adheres to
the legislative intent to mandate payment by interpreting the
subsections of § 4 (2) as codependent cogs within a contributory
retirement mechanism.
Each subsection of G. L. c. 32, § 4 (2) has a clear,
connected role. See L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 178–
179 (2014) (reading statute's sections together to construe
harmonious whole). Subsection (a) demands that new members
seeking to "claim credit as provided for in" subsection (c) file
"a detailed statement of any other [past temporary or permanent]
service," and subsection (d) directs a local retirement board to
"verify [the statement] as soon as practicable" after filing.
Given the express interconnected language of § 4 (2) (a), (c),
and (d), we conclude that the Legislature did not intend for § 4
(b) to stand on its own statutory island. Subsection (b)
functions with the other provisions by providing a measurement
criteria to local retirement boards. The whole scheme, then,
operates so that subsection (d) requires such boards to verify
and certify the statement of service filed in subsection (a) as 12
soon as possible so that members who have been granted
creditable service, as determined by those boards in subsection
(b), may receive and begin paying for that service according to
the buyback formula found in subsection (c). Moreover, our
reading of § 4 (2) follows the Plymouth board's long-standing
interpretation of this section and conforms to the backbone of a
contributory retirement system: employees investing a portion
of their earnings towards a future pension.4
Not only does reading all subsections within § 4 (2)
clarify its meaning, comparing the structure and language of
§ 4 (2) against the other sections of G. L. c. 32, § 4, such as
§ 4 (1), it also elucidates legislative intent. See Scione v.
Commonwealth, 481 Mass. 225, 235 (2019), citing Ginther v.
Commissioner of Ins., 427 Mass. 319, 324 (1998) (one well-
established rule of statutory construction compares use of
4 The CRAB decision in Grimes vs. Malden Retirement Bd., No. CR-15-5 (Nov. 18, 2016), is not inconsistent with our holding. In that decision, CRAB found that former PIPOs who were available to be called into service, yet never were, could obtain creditable service under G. L. c. 32, § 4 (2) (b), without any remittance payments, because their purchase price under the formula set forth in G. L. c. 32, § 4 (2) (c), was zero, given that they never earned any money as PIPOs. Although contributory retirement systems inevitably result in some inequities, we will not remedy possible unfairness in the face of clear legislative intent. See Housman v. LBM Fin., LLC, 80 Mass. App. Ct. 213, 218 (2011). Further, to the extent that this appears unfair, in 2009, the Legislature addressed such outcomes in the new G. L. c. 32, § 4 (1) (o), discussed infra. See St. 2009, c. 21, § 5. 13
language employed within different subsections of same statute).
Section 4 (1) has dozens of separate paragraphs, each of which
describes a discrete and mutually exclusive employment
circumstance, the method by which local retirement boards
measure creditable service, and the process by which employees
can obtain that creditable service. Most sections require
payment expressly, see, e.g., G. L. c. 32, § 4 (1) (q), which
permits an inference that other subsections of § 4 (1) provide
exemptions for payment for past work.5 Unlike the structure of
§ 4 (1), specifically its independent subsections, each
subsection of § 4 (2) must be read together for the statute to
make sense. The absence of an explicit payment provision in
§ 4 (2) (b) does not then operate as it would in § 4 (1),
because the payment provision of § 4 (2) (c) works alongside the
measurement criteria of § 4 (2) (b).
By reading § 4 (2) (b) in isolation, as the Plymouth board
requests, § 4 (2) (c) would be devoid of any purpose. "The
5 The Plymouth board cites to a memorandum and order by a panel of the Appeals Court that was issued pursuant to that court's rule 1:28, Lawrence Retirement Bd. v. Contributory Retirement Appeals Bd., 87 Mass. App. Ct. 1124 (2015), to argue that G. L. c. 32, § 4 (2) (b), exempts police officers from remitting payment. Such memoranda and orders, however, have no precedential value. In any event, the case concerned G. L. c. 32, § 4 (1) (b), covering service in a governmental unit before the unit became part of the retirement system, not the provisions at issue in this case. 14
canon against surplusage is strongest when an interpretation
would render superfluous another part of the same statutory
scheme" (citation omitted). City Elec. Supply Co. v. Arch Ins.
Co., 481 Mass. 784, 790 (2019). Section 4 (2) (b) is the sole
place in G. L. c. 32 where the Legislature instructs local
retirement boards about how to quantify the amount of credited
service available for previous intermittent work.6 If the amount
of credit to provide to a member does not derive from § 4 (2)
(b), then the purchase formula of § 4 (2) (c) would become
obsolete.
On the Plymouth board's contrary reading of § 4 (2),
subsection (c) would retain a purpose without acting as the
purchase formula for PIPO service because it would continue as
the formula for other categories of employment cited in
6 Ten sections of G. L. c. 32 mention "intermittent" employment. General Laws c. 32, § 3 (2) (a) (iv), discusses whether teachers can become members. General Laws c. 32, § 3 (2) (d), outlines the jurisdiction of retirement boards to determine whether temporary or intermittent employees can become members. General Laws c. 32, § 5 (3) (c), discusses "intermittent" in the context of how an actuary can "determin[e] the normal yearly amount of any retirement allowance in accordance" with the rest of G. L. c. 32. General Laws c. 32, §§ 85H and 85H1/2, provide for disability retirement compensation for intermittent employees. General Laws c. 32, §§ 89, 89A, 89B, and 89E, provide annuities to dependents of intermittent employees killed in the performance of duties. General Laws c. 32, § 100A, provides benefits for intermittent employees killed in the line of duty. Only G. L. c. 32, § 4, titled "creditable service," explains how boards can measure creditable time for intermittent employees. See G. L. c. 32, § 4 (2) (b). 15
subsection (b): "part-time, provisional, temporary, temporary
provisional, seasonal or intermittent." Although we have found
the statutory language to be clear, that does not mean that the
Legislature drafted it perfectly. Sometimes, it is challenging
to "harmoniz[e] the provisions" of an imperfectly crafted
statute so as to prevent surplusage. Commonwealth v. Rodriguez,
482 Mass. 366, 370–371 (2019). The drafting of § 4 (2) (b)
undoubtedly leaves room for improvement, but that imperfection
does not convince us that the Plymouth board was correct.
As the Plymouth board notes, although seasonal employees
must complete "actual full-time service" of not less than seven
months to receive a year of creditable time, local retirement
boards "shall credit" members for past PIPO service even if
members were solely on an eligibility list7 and have never
performed work while PIPOs. G. L. c. 32, § 4 (2) (b). Because
PIPOs who did not work would still receive creditable service
without any remittance, the Plymouth board infers that the
Legislature intended the same for all PIPOs. This court will
not rewrite statutory language to find a meaning contrary to
legislative intent. See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2492
7 According to G. L. c. 32, § 4 (2) (b), local retirement boards "shall credit" as full-time service, not to exceed a maximum of five years, the period of time that PIPOs are on an eligibility list and are "eligible for assignment to duty subsequent to [their] appointment." 16
(2015) ("inartful drafting" does not permit court to interpret
statute against clear legislative intent). Therefore, we
decline to read § 4 (2) (b) as providing up to five years of
creditable service without remittance payments to member police
officers even if they were being paid and not making
contributions to the retirement system.
The Plymouth board also contends that the provisions of
G. L. c. 32, § 4 (2) (b) and (c), do not speak to one another
regarding PIPOs because subsection (b) uses the phrase
"permanent-intermittent" employment and subsection (c) only
talks of "intermittent employment." We do not agree. First,
the introductory clauses of both subsections (b) and (c) cover
the same universe of "part-time, provisional, temporary,
temporary provisional, seasonal or intermittent employment."
"Where words in a statute are used in one part of a statute in a
definite sense, they should be given the same meaning in another
part of the statute." Hallett v. Contributory Retirement Appeal
Bd., 431 Mass. 66, 69 (2000). Second, the parties have not
identified, and we have not found, a definition of "intermittent
employment" in G. L. c. 32 or elsewhere.8 Although § 4 (2) (b)
8 The Legislature seems not to have defined intermittent employment, even when related to permanent-intermittent police officers, see G. L. c. 31, §§ 60, 60A, but the category is often lumped with part-time employment. See, e.g., G. L. c. 30, § 46 (administration of classification and pay plans); G. L. c. 32B, 17
is the only place in G. L. c. 32 in which the phrase "permanent-
intermittent" appears, we agree with CRAB that permanent-
intermittent employment reasonably may be considered a
subcategory of "intermittent employment," a category identical
to those captured by the payment provisions of § 4 (2) (c).
Matter of E.C., 479 Mass. at 118 (where "words used are not
otherwise defined in the statute, we afford them their plain and
ordinary meaning"). Through consideration of "the ordinary and
approved usage of the language," Matter of E.C., supra, we
conclude that the category of intermittent employment, occurring
at irregular, noncontinuous intervals, includes a permanent-
intermittent police officer, who works as needed by the police
department. See Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 598 (1980)
(defining intermittent as "not continuous" and "coming and going
at intervals"). See also Selectmen of Oxford v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 37 Mass. App. Ct. 587, 588 (1994).
c. Legislative history. This court interprets a statute's
plain language "in connection with the cause of its enactment"
(citation omitted). Stearns v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 481
Mass. 529, 532 (2019). Although "legislative history is not
ordinarily a proper source of construction," we use it to
augment our interpretation of the language of a statute
§ 9C1/2 (discussing insurance benefits for spouse and dependents of deceased intermittent firefighters). See also note 6, supra. 18
(citation omitted). AIDS Support Group of Cape Cod, Inc. v.
Barnstable, 477 Mass. 296, 301 (2017). The legislative history
of G. L. c. 32 generally and § 4 (2) specifically buttress our
conclusion about the meaning of § 4 (2) (b).
First, the Legislature established a special commission to
look into all retirement systems of the Commonwealth. 1945
House Doc. No. 1950. According to its 1945 report, issued a few
months before the enactment of G. L. c. 32, see St. 1945,
c. 658, the original intent of that chapter was to establish a
system where "every government employee should contribute to his
own retirement allowance" because "[n]on-contributory retirement
allowances are unsound and at variance with the generally
prevailing concept that both the employee and the employer
should furnish funds to sustain employee pension plans." 1945
House Doc. No. 1950 at 5. In addition, subsequent amendments to
the statute also reinforce legislative intent to require members
to purchase creditable service. In 1947, the Legislature
amended G. L. c. 32 to prevent certain unpaid intermittent
workers from receiving creditable time towards their retirement.
The amendment eliminated "person[s] holding a position" with
"annual compensation" at "two hundred dollars or less" from
membership eligibility. G. L. c. 32, § 3 (2) (d), as amended by
St. 1947, c. 667, § 2. The Legislature limited membership in
this way, in part, "because retirement boards will always have a 19
legitimate interest in denying membership to individuals" who
provided little service or who would pay marginal amounts into
the contribution system. Rotondi v. Contributory Retirement
Appeal Bd., 463 Mass. 644, 650 (2012). In 2009, the Legislature
reiterated its preference that members, including PIPOs on
eligibility lists who were never called into service, remit
payments to obtain creditable service by inserting G. L. c. 32,
§ 4 (1) (o), which asserted that no "state, county, or municipal
employee" who earns less than $5,000 starting on July 1, 2009,
can accrue creditable time for that service. See St. 2009,
c. 21.
Finally, amendments to § 4 (2) (b) that added special
creditable provisions for police officers discuss "credit[ing]
. . . as full-time service" periods of permanent-intermittent
work, see St. 1964, c. 125; St. 1964, c. 738; St. 1965, c. 73,
or "count[ing] as full-time service," see St. 1966, c. 509.
None of these amendments relative to PIPOs mentions payment or
waives payment in a manner that suggests diverging from the
generally applicable language of § 4 (2) (c). We conclude that
the Legislature intended these amendments to provide former
PIPOs with creditable years of service in recognition of their
service as police officers; any PIPO who worked even the minimal
amount of qualifying work within one calendar year could receive
one year of creditable service, and local retirement boards are 20
denied any discretion to interfere.9 See G. L. c. 32,
§ 4 (2) (b). Nowhere do the amendments suggest that former
PIPOs would receive the credited time without repayment into the
retirement system for the years that they were PIPOs once they
become member police officers. The legislative history
demonstrates the legislative purpose to create a contributory
retirement system worthy of its name into which all but those
explicitly exempted must pay.
Conclusion. For the reasons stated supra, we reverse the
decision of the Superior Court and vacate the judgment. A
judgment affirming CRAB's decision shall enter.10
So ordered.
9 Until 2009, the minimal amount of qualifying work for PIPOs was zero. So long as they were on call, they could receive credit even if they were never called into duty. See note 4, supra.
10The Plymouth board has the power to waive the interest payment on its own initiative, see G. L. c. 32, § 20 (5) (c) (2), or on the petition of Gomes. See G. L. c. 32, § 20 (5) (c) (3). We thus assume that the Plymouth board will consider whether "fairness [may] dictate" that Gomes should not have to pay interest on his second purchase of creditable service. Cf. Doe v. Harbor Schools, Inc., 446 Mass. 245, 254 (2006) (noting that where legislation is silent regarding statute of limitations, "basic fairness dictates a more flexible approach").