Plummer, C. v. Plummer, M.

Opinion

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

CARLISE ADELLE PLUMMER : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA

:

v. :

:

:

MAURICE D. PLUMMER :

:

Appellant : No. 182 WDA 2026

Appeal from the Order Entered January 15, 2026 In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Family Court at No: FD-25-001436

BEFORE: STABILE, J., DUBOW, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.* MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED: August 27, 2026 Appellant, Maurice D. Plummer, seeks review of an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Family Court (trial court), entered pursuant to the Protection From Abuse Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6101-6122 (PFA Act). He contends that the trial court erred in granting the petition for a final PFA order filed by Appellee, Carlise Adelle Plummer, because (a) there was insufficient evidence to establish that he posed a reasonable threat of ongoing abuse or imminent serious bodily injury, and (b) his daughter, M.P., was erroneously included as a protected person under the order. We affirm.

The trial court summarized the relevant facts and procedural history of this case as follows:

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

[Appellee] and [Appellant] are involved in ongoing dependency litigation where the court placed [Appellant’s] eldest child in the care and custody of [Appellee]. Before this litigation, [Appellant]

had very little contact with Mother. [Appellant] had not lived with [Appellee] since he was 17 or 18 years old, almost thirty years ago. In early 2025, [Appellant] lost his housing after ending a relationship with his girlfriend and was, living in his truck.

[Appellant] moved into [Appellee’s] home at [her] request.

[Appellant] had lived with [Appellee] for about six months before leaving [Appellee’s] home after [she] obtained the Temporary PFA Order based on the incident described below.

On July 7, 2025, [Appellee] filed a PFA Petition against [Appellant]. In the Petition, [Appellee] described the most recent incident of abuse which occurred on July 2, 2025, and July 3, 2025, as follows:

On 07/02/2025, I had a court hearing for my granddaughter [sic], in which my son did not get [his]

daughter back. [Appellant] came to my bedroom and [threatened] me, said how dangerous he was and if he doesn't get his daughter, he would hurt me. Told me to suck his d*** he going to piss on my grave. He said I'm going to kill you and burn the house down. I asked him to leave, he said make him. On 07/03/2025 he acted on his threat, came in my bedroom started call[ing] me name[s] said going to put fear in you and started strangling me until, I urinated on me after that he said I put fear in you.

PFA Petition, 07/07/2025, at 6.

[Appellee] also described the prior following incidents of abuse:

Threats, harassment. The court heard testimony at the Temporary PFA Hearing and granted [Appellee’s] Temporary PFA Order. The court scheduled a Final PFA Hearing for July 15, 2025 . . . . [B]oth [Appellant] and [Appellee] appeared and [Appellant]

requested a continuance to obtain counsel. [Appellee] consented to this request; the court granted the continuance and rescheduled the Final PFA Hearing for August 18, 2025. On that date, both [Appellant] and [Appellee] appeared and [Appellant]

requested a continuance because his counsel was not available.

[Appellee] consented to this request; the court granted the

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request and rescheduled the Final PFA Hearing for September 22, 2025. On that date, both [Appellant] and [Appellee] appeared and [Appellant] again requested a continuance because his counsel was not available. [Appellee] again consented to the request; the court again granted the request and rescheduled the Final PFA Hearing for October 21, 2025. On that date, both [Appellant] and [Appellee] appeared and [Appellee] requested a continuance to obtain counsel. [Appellant] consented to the request. Because [Appellant] had previously requested three separate continuances, [Appellee] had consented to all three requests, and this was the first request by [Appellee], the court granted this request and rescheduled the Final PFA Hearing for January 13, 2026.

On January 13, 2026, both [Appellee] and [Appellant] appeared, along with [Appellant’s] counsel. [The] Parties attempted to resolve the matter through consent but were unable to reach final resolution. The court held an on-the-record Final PFA Hearing.

[Appellee], [Appellant], and Maternal Aunt [(Leona Plummer)]

testified. Following completion of the Final PFA Hearing, the court entered a one-year Final PFA Order with the full protections, dated January 13, 2026, which remains in full force and effect until January 13, 2027.

Trial Court 1925(a) Opinion, 3/25/2026, at 2-3.

On January 15, 2026, the trial court entered the Final PFA order now on review. See Final PFA Order 1/15/2026, at paras. 1-14. The Final PFA order prohibited Appellant from having contact with the protected persons identified in the order, except as permitted by the order’s terms. The protected persons included Appellee and Appellant’s children, M.P., J.J., and K.J. The order was set to expire on January 13, 2027.

Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal, as well as a 1925(b) statement, which contained the following claims:

1. [Appellee] failed to prove that there was ongoing abuse or a threat of future abuse. [Appellee] testified that she had not had any contact with [Appellant] since the date of the incident on July

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3, 2025, other than in-court proceedings, and had virtually no contact with him since he moved out of her home as a child, and for the brief period of time during which he lived with her, at her request;

2. [T[he relief awarded in the final order was not supported by the record. The evidence did not support the inclusion of J.J., M.P., and K.J. as protected persons;

3. [T]he facts of this case are outside of the scope of the Protection from Abuse Act, 23 Pa C.S. §6101, et. seq. The PFA Act is not a substitute for, or a circumvention of, the crimes code. In this case, despite the police responding to the alleged incident, no criminal charges were filed against [Appellant]. The purpose of the PFA Act is not to impose the civil equivalent of a no-contact order, immediately enforceable through the quasi-criminal remedy of indirect criminal contempt proceedings rather than the general provisions of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code, the Pennsylvania rules of criminal procedure, and the constitutional requirements of due process of law. The final PFA order functionally puts [Appellant] on probation insofar as alleged conduct, which would not ordinarily result in incarceration, will now result in incarceration without criminal charges ever being filed, let alone proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Appellant’s 1925(b) Statement of Issues Complained of on Appeal, 3/7/2026.

The trial court filed in response a 1925(a) opinion giving the reasons why the Final PFA order should be upheld. See Trial Court 1925(a) Opinion, 3/25, 2026, at 1-11. Appellant now raises two issues for our consideration:

I. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it granted the final PFA order because the plaintiff failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that there was ongoing abuse or a reasonable threat of imminent serious bodily injury?

II. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it granted the final PFA because the evidence was insufficient to include M.P. as a protected person because M.P. was an adult, the plaintiff was not her parent, and the plaintiff presented no evidence that she had been appointed M.P.’s guardian under Title 20, Chapter 51, subchapter B of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes?

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Appellant’s Brief, at 4 (suggested answers omitted).

Appellant’s first claim is that the evidence was legally insufficient to sustain the Final PFA order. He argues primarily that Appellee did not establish that she was in reasonable fear of imminent injury because she was not credible, and over six months had elapsed between the alleged violent incident and the date of the evidentiary hearing. See Appellant’s Brief, at 13-24.

“The purpose of the PFA Act is to protect victims of domestic violence from those who perpetrate such abuse, with the primary goal of advance prevention of physical and sexual abuse.” Buchhalter v. Buchhalter, 959 A.2d 1260, 1262 (Pa. Super. 2008). “In the context of a PFA case, the court's objective is to determine whether the victim is in reasonable fear of imminent serious bodily injury[.]” Raker v. Raker, 847 A.2d 720, 725 (Pa. Super. 2004). The past acts of a party are a significant factor in determining the reasonableness of a PFA petitioner's fear. See K.B. v. Tinsley, 208 A.3d 123, 128 (Pa. Super. 2019). “Abuse,” for purposes of the PFA Act, is defined in pertinent part as an act “between family or household members” which places “another in reasonable fear of imminent serious bodily injury.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6102(a)(2).

“The PFA Act does not seek to determine criminal culpability. A petitioner is not required to establish abuse occurred beyond a reasonable doubt, but only to establish it by a preponderance of the evidence.” K.B., 208 A.3d at 128 (citation and brackets omitted). A “preponderance of the evidence

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standard is defined as the greater weight of the evidence, i.e., [enough] to tip a scale slightly.” Raker, 847 A.2d at 724.

On review of a PFA order, we must evaluate “the trial court's legal conclusions for an error of law or abuse of discretion.” Boykai v. Young, 83 A.3d 1043, 1045 (Pa. Super. 2014) (quoting Stamus v. Dutcavich, 938 A.2d 1098, 1100 (Pa. Super. 2007)). An insufficiency claim in this context requires this Court to review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. See K.B., 208 A.3d at 128. A PFA order must be upheld if the record establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that the party challenging the order placed the protected persons in reasonable fear of bodily injury. See id. Further, this Court must defer to the trial court’s determinations as to the credibility of the witnesses who appeared before it. See id.

Here, Appellee testified that on July 2, 2025, Appellant had, at a court hearing, failed to regain custody of one of his children, who was residing with Appellee. See PFA Hearing, 7/7/2025, at 6. Appellant, who himself was residing with Appellee at the time, threatened to kill Appellee and burn down her house in retaliation. See id. A day later, according to Appellee, Appellant entered her bedroom, strangled her, and said he was going to “put fear” into her. See id. This incident occurred in the presence of Appellant’s daughter. See id., at 26, 28-30.

Appellee testified that Appellant later posted implied threats against her on social media, that he had “filmed” her for unknown reasons, and that she lived in constant fear of Appellant because they lived in the same

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neighborhood. See id., at 8, 20-21. Leona Plummer corroborated Appellee’s account by testifying that she overheard the incident on July 3, 2025, witnessed Appellant straddling Appellee, and saw Appellant ball his fist as if to strike someone when she responded to the bedroom where the attack occurred. See id., at 26-30. Leona Plummer testified that Appellee was so disturbed by the incident that for days afterward she armed herself with a knife inside her own home. See id., at 29-30.

The trial court found Appellee and her sister to be credible, and Appellant’s grounds for overturning that determination are unpersuasive. Appellant argues that Appellee could not have reasonably been in fear of imminent abuse because, as of the date of the PFA hearing, over six months had elapsed since the incident occurred, and he no longer resided with Appellee.

However, the trial court credited the evidence that Appellant strangled Appellee and threatened to kill her. While Appellant may no longer reside with Appellee, he still lives nearby. Moreover, the apparent reason for Appellant’s anger toward Appellee – a court order depriving him of custody over his daughter – remained in effect as of the date of the PFA hearing held on January 13, 2026. See PFA Hearing, 1/13/2026, at 46. These circumstances

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were legally sufficient to sustain the trial court’s finding that Appellant was in reasonable fear of imminent bodily injury.1 Appellant’s second claim is that the trial court erroneously included his child, M.P., as a protected person under the final PFA order because she is legally an adult, and Appellee did not establish that she had been appointed as M.P.’s guardian. See Appellant’s Brief, at 24-27. However, such issues cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (providing that, as a general rule, “[i]ssues not raised in the trial court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”).

The record reflects that this specific issue was not litigated by the parties before the trial court, and that, as a result, the trial court has not considered the merits of the issue in the first instance. See Appellant’s 1925(b) Statement of Issues Complained of on Appeal, 3/7/2026; see also Trial Court 1925(a) Opinion, 3/25/2026, at 5-10.2 Accordingly, the issue was not preserved for appellate review, and its merits cannot be considered at this

stage of the proceedings. Thus, the final PFA order must be upheld.

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1 To the extent that Appellant made additional arguments regarding Appellee’s credibility and the sufficiency of the evidence, we rely upon our reasoning above (as well as the rationale provided by the trial court in its 1925(a) opinion) in concluding that the record supports the trial court’s findings justifying the entry of the Final PFA order. See Trial Court 1925(a) Opinion, 3/25/2026, at 5-10.

2 Appellant contended vaguely in his 1925(b) Statement of Issues Complained of on Appeal that “[e]vidence did not support the inclusion of J.J., M.P., and K.J. as protected persons.” The precise claim that Appellant now raises in his brief regarding the lack of evidence that M.P. is a child, or in the custody of Appellee, was asserted for the first time in his appellate brief.

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Order affirmed.

DATE: 8/27/2026