Plumbers & Steamfitters, Local 52 v. Alabama Department of Environmental Management

647 So. 2d 793, 1994 Ala. Civ. App. LEXIS 477, 1994 WL 528454
CourtCourt of Civil Appeals of Alabama
DecidedSeptember 30, 1994
DocketAV93000566
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 647 So. 2d 793 (Plumbers & Steamfitters, Local 52 v. Alabama Department of Environmental Management) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Plumbers & Steamfitters, Local 52 v. Alabama Department of Environmental Management, 647 So. 2d 793, 1994 Ala. Civ. App. LEXIS 477, 1994 WL 528454 (Ala. Ct. App. 1994).

Opinion

ROBERTSON, Presiding Judge.

This is the third time this case has been before this court. Except as follows, the procedural background of this case is as set forth in our initial opinion, Plumbers & Steamfitters, Local 52 v. Alabama Dep’t of Envtl. Management, 622 So.2d 343 (Ala.Civ. App.1992), and in the opinion of our supreme court, Ex parte Plumbers & Steamfitters, Local 52, 622 So.2d 347 (Ala.1993).

On March 5, 1993, in compliance with our supreme court’s holding, we reversed the judgment of the Montgomery County Circuit Court and remanded the cause to that court for further proceedings. Plumbers & Steamfitters, Local 52 v. Alabama Dep’t of Envtl. Management, 622 So.2d 350 (Ala.Civ. App.1993). On remand from this court, the trial court entered a judgment in favor of the Alabama Department of Environmental Management (ADEM) and against the Plumbers and Steamfitters, Local 52 (Local 52), on April 7, 1994. The trial court held that the decision of the Alabama Environmental Management Commission (Commission) upholding ADEM’s issuance of permits to operate two additional boilers at a plasties manufacturing plant operated by General Electric Company (GE) in Burkville, Alabama, was “supported by substantial evidence.”

Local 52 appeals to this court, raising two issues: (1) whether the Commission erred in finding that ADEM had correctly determined that the pollution control device proposed by GE represented the “best available control technology” (BACT) for its boilers; and (2) whether the Commission erred in not requiring ADEM to perform an “air impact analysis” for arsenic and benzene before issuing the permits.

Judicial review of the Commission’s determination is guided by § 41-22-27(f), Ala.Code 1975, which provides, in pertinent part:

“Except as provided in [§ 22-22A-7(c)(6), Ala.Code 1975], judicial review of any order of the [Commission] modifying, approving or disapproving an administrative action of [ADEM] shall be in accordance with the provisions for review of final agency decisions of contested cases in [§§ 41-22-20 and 41-22-21, Ala.Code 1975].”

In Ex parte Plumbers & Steamfitters, Local 52, our supreme court clarified the interaction between § 41-22-27(f) and § 22-22A-7(c)(6):

“[W]e emphasize that § 22-22A-7(c)(6) prescribes the rules for perfecting appeals from the [Commission]. Thus, the ‘except as provided for in § 22-22A-7(c)(6)’ language found in the [Administrative Procedure Act] at § 41-20-27(f) would not apply to exclude the coverage of § 41-22-20 where it addresses questions unrelated to perfecting such an appeal. See, e.g., [§ 41 — 22—20(j), Ala.Code 1975] (which provides that ‘[t]he review shall be conducted by the court without a jury’).”

622 So.2d at 349. Therefore, because it concerns a matter unrelated to the perfecting of [795]*795an appeal, judicial review of a decision of the Commission is governed by §§ 41-22-20 and -21. See Ex parte Plumbers & Steamfitters, Local 52.

Pursuant to § 41-22-20(k), the trial court must give the Commission’s decision a presumption of correctness, and it may not substitute its judgment for that of the Commission as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The decision of the Commission must be upheld unless:

“substantial rights of the petitioner have been prejudiced because the [Commission’s] action is:
“1. In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
“2. In excess of the statutory rule of the agency;
“3. In violation of any pertinent agency rule;
“4. Made upon unlawful procedure;
“5. Affected by other error of law;
“6. Clearly erroneous in view of the rehable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or
“7. Unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, or characterized by an abuse of discretion or a clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.”

§ 41-22-20(k). In reviewing the determination of the Commission, this court’s standard of review is the same as that of the trial court. Dawson v. Alabama Dep’t of Envtl. Management, 529 So.2d 1012 (Ala.Civ.App.1988).

With this standard in mind, we address Local 52’s first issue, i.e., whether substantial evidence supports the Commission’s finding that ADEM correctly had determined that the pollution control device proposed by GE represented BACT for its two new boilers.

BACT is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 7479, a provision within the Clean Air Act, as follows:

“[BACT] means an emission limitation based on the maximum degree of reduction of each pollutant subject to regulation under this chapter emitted from or which results from any major emitting facility, which the permitting authority, on a case-by-ease basis, taking into account energy, environmental, and economic impacts and other costs, determines is achievable for such facility through application of production processes and available methods, systems, and techniques....”

The corresponding state provision, § 335-3-14-.04(2)(1), ADEM Admin.Code, formerly § 16.4.2.(1), Ala.Admin. & Proced.Code of Rules & Regs., tracks the federal definition almost verbatim.

Local 52 does not dispute that, in determining whether to issue the permits, ADEM took into account the “energy, environmental, and economic impacts and other costs” associated with GE’s two proposed boilers. Instead, Local 52 contends that ADEM did not require GE to use a “top-down” approach in approving GE’s proposed pollution control technology, “low NOx burners,” to limit the boilers’ emission of nitrogen oxide. Citing memorandums and other documents generated by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Local 52 contends that the “top-down” approach requires the permit applicant either to use the most stringent pollution control technology, or, if the applicant chooses not to use the most stringent control technology, to show with particularity why it opposes each more stringent control technology. According to a December 1, 1987, EPA memorandum, “[a] final BACT determination which still fails to reflect adequate consideration of the factors that would have been relevant using a ‘top-down’ type of analysis shall be considered deficient by EPA.”

In particular, Local 52 contends that “ADEM could not identify any factor which precluded GE from using [Flue Gas Recirculation (FGR) ], ammonia injection [also known as “Thermal DeNOx”], or [Selective Catalytic Reduction (SCR) ] technology” rather than low NOx burners as its nitrogen oxide control technology. However, the permit application for the two boilers, which GE submitted to ADEM in 1988, includes an analysis of all three alternative control technologies cited by Local 52 and an explanation as to GE’s decision not to use any one of those technologies. Furthermore, as Local 52 concedes in its brief, the EPA evaluated [796]*796and concurred with ADEM’s decision to approve low NOx burners as GE’s nitrogen oxide control technology.

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647 So. 2d 793, 1994 Ala. Civ. App. LEXIS 477, 1994 WL 528454, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/plumbers-steamfitters-local-52-v-alabama-department-of-environmental-alacivapp-1994.