Plotkin v. IP Axess, Inc.

168 F. Supp. 2d 899, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16665, 2001 WL 1217384
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Illinois
DecidedOctober 11, 2001
Docket01 C 3505
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 168 F. Supp. 2d 899 (Plotkin v. IP Axess, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Plotkin v. IP Axess, Inc., 168 F. Supp. 2d 899, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16665, 2001 WL 1217384 (N.D. Ill. 2001).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

ALESIA, District Judge.

Before this court is defendants IP Ax-ess, Inc. (“IP Axess”), Michael A. McDonnell (“McDonnell”), and James A. Scogin’s (“Scogin”) motion to transfer this case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, Sherman Division, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). For the following reasons, the court grants defendants’ motion.

I. BACKGROUND

In considering a motion to transfer for improper venue, the court accepts all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true unless controverted by defendants’ affidavits. QSN Indus., Inc. v. Sanderson, No. 95 C 3356, 1995 WL 743751, at *1 (N.D.Ill.Dec.13, 1995). 1

*901 Defendant IP Axess (formerly named Data Race, Inc.) d/b/a Data Race (the “Company”) is a Texas corporation with its executive offices and principal place of business located in Plano, Texas. It is registered as a foreign corporation with the Illinois Secretary of State’s office. The Company designs, manufactures and markets a line of communication products for remote access to the corporate environment. These products give teleworkers access to all elements of corporate communications networks, including the Internet, Intranet and PBX. McDonnell served as Chief Operating Officer for the Company throughout the relevant period. He also served as the Company’s President, Chief Executive Officer, and a Director for part of the relevant period. Scogin served as the Company’s Controller for the relevant period. He also served as the Company’s Senior Vice President for Finance, Chief Financial Officer, Secretary, Treasurer, and Acting Chief Executive Officer for part of the relevant period.

According to the complaint, from May 12, 2000 through September 1, 2000 (the “Stock Purchase Period”), the Company concocted and carried out a calculated campaign designed to attract potential investors to purchase the Company’s common stock, and to induce existing investors to increase the amount of their holdings of its stock. The Company carried out this campaign by issuing a series of false and misleading press releases which had as their purpose the portrayal of the Company as a vibrant, greatly growing company with tremendous prospects in the telecommunications field. In these press releases, the Company announced the signing of agreements with major customers who had agreed to purchase the Company’s products. According to the releases, just one of these agreements would net the Company millions of dollars. According to the complaint, the Company made these announcements without any reasonable basis for believing it would actually collect the amounts required to be paid under the agreements. After these releases, “the campaign ultimately collapsed and the true information about the Company’s poor financial condition, business and future prospects came out, causing the Company’s stock to be almost worthless.” (Am. Comp^ 28.) After the final press release, there was no further mention of the agreements by the Company anywhere — they were not included in the Company’s annual report nor in its filings with the SEC.

According to the complaint, plaintiff Robert Plotkin specifically relied on these press releases in purchasing or recommending the purchase of the Company’s stock. Robert Plotkin was in Chicago when he received and read these press releases, and most of the stock purchases were made in Chicago through brokers situated in Chicago. Plaintiffs purchased a total of approximately 97,100 shares of Data Race common stock. All plaintiffs suffered a loss in their investment.

As a result, plaintiffs instituted this seven-count security action, setting forth claims under sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Security Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) and 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a), and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder by the Securities and Exchange Commission, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. Also, plaintiffs allege violations of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, along with common law fraud claims. Defendants now move to transfer this case to the Eastern District of Texas pursuant to § 1404(a).

II. DISCUSSION

Pursuant to § 1404(a), a district court may transfer a civil action “[f]or the conve *902 nience of parties and witnesses [and] in the interest of justice ... to any other district or division where it might have been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Transfer is appropriate under § 1404(a) where: (1) venue is proper in the transferor district; (2) venue and jurisdiction are proper in the transferee district; and (3) the transfer will serve the convenience of the parties and witnesses and will promote the interest of justice. Id.; Coffey v. Van Dorn Iron Works, 796 F.2d 217, 219-20 (7th Cir.1986). It is in the sound discretion of the trial judge to determine the weight accorded to each factor. See Coffey, 796 F.2d at 219.

The parties do not dispute that jurisdiction and venue are proper both in the Northern District of Illinois and the Eastern District of Texas. What the parties dispute is whether the convenience of the parties and witnesses and the interests of justice weigh in favor of transfer. It is those two factors, therefore, that the court addresses.

A. Convenience of the parties and the witnesses

First, the court must consider the convenience of the parties and the witnesses. When evaluating the conveniences, the court considers five factors: (a) the plaintiffs’ choice of forum, (b) the situs of the material events, (c) the relative ease of access to sources of proof, (d) the convenience of the parties, and (e) the convenience of the witnesses. Amoco Oil Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 90 F.Supp.2d 958, 960 (N.D.Ill.2000). The court will consider each factor in turn.

1. Plaintiffs’ choice of forum

The court recognizes that the plaintiffs’ choice of forum is generally entitled to substantial weight, especially when it is plaintiffs’ home forum. See Vandeveld v. Christoph, 877 F.Supp. 1160, 1167 (N.D.Ill.1995). However, where the plaintiffs’ chosen forum is not the plaintiffs’ home forum or lacks significant contact with the litigation, the plaintiffs’ chosen forum is entitled to less deference. Bryant v. ITT Corp., 48 F.Supp.2d 829, 831 (N.D.Ill.1999). Although plaintiffs’ choice of forum is an important consideration in determining whether a motion to transfer should be granted, it is not absolute. Amoco Oil Co., 90 F.Supp.2d at 960.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
168 F. Supp. 2d 899, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16665, 2001 WL 1217384, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/plotkin-v-ip-axess-inc-ilnd-2001.