Pless v. State

Court of Appeals of Georgia

Pless v. State

648 S.E.2d 752, 286 Ga. App. 235, 2007 Fulton County D. Rep. 2246, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 747

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedJuly 3, 2007

DocketA06A1295

StatusPublished

This text of 648 S.E.2d 752 (Pless v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Pless v. State, 648 S.E.2d 752, 286 Ga. App. 235, 2007 Fulton County D. Rep. 2246, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 747 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007).

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Opinion

BLACKBURN, Presiding Judge.

In Pless v. State, 1 we affirmed the conviction of Christopher Pless with the exception of that portion of his sentence requiring him to reimburse the county for his court-appointed attorney fees, which we determined in a portion of Division 6 of our opinion (and in our addendum on motion for reconsideration) was unauthorized. We reasoned that the repeal of the statute (former OCGA § 17-12-10 (c)) in 2003 specifically authorizing such reimbursement indicated a legislative intent to withdraw the authority from the trial courts to impose such a condition in sentencing. Ga. L. 2003, p. 191, § 1. Because the express withdrawal of that authority in 2003 voided this provision of the 2005 sentence (for conduct occurring in 2004), we in May 2006 reversed that portion of Pless’s conviction.

In State v. Pless, 2 the Supreme Court of Georgia in 2007 reversed that holding of our opinion and ruled that the trial court was authorized to impose the reimbursement of attorney fees as part of the sentence. The Supreme Court determined that a new statute passed in the 2006 Georgia General Assembly (OCGA § 17-12-51 (a); see Ga. L. 2006, p. 710, § 6), which did not become effective until some weeks after the issuance of our opinion (and which was certainly not in effect at the time of Pless’s misconduct in 2004 and trial in 2005), indicated, apparently retroactively, that there was some legislative intent to authorize a trial court to impose such a condition in a sentence, and that even absent that new statute, such authority was in any case always inherent in a trial court’s broad sentencing powers, despite the repeal of that authority in 2003.

Accordingly, we vacate that portion of our opinion in which we reversed the imposition of attorney fees and adopt the Supreme Court’s opinion as our own. Our opinion in all other respects remains undisturbed. Thus, Pless’s conviction is affirmed in all respects.

Judgment affirmed.

Mikell and Adams, JJ., concur. *236 Charles A. Spahos, Solicitor-General, Leonard M. Geldon, Gilbert A. Crosby, Assistant Solicitors-General, for appellee.

1

Pless v. State, 279 Ga. App. 798 (633 SE2d 340) (2006).

2

State v. Pless, 282 Ga. 58 (646 SE2d 202) (2007).

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BLACKBURN, Presiding Judge.

In Pless v. State, 1 we affirmed the conviction of Christopher Pless with the exception of that portion of his sentence requiring him to reimburse the county for his court-appointed attorney fees, which we determined in a portion of Division 6 of our opinion (and in our addendum on motion for reconsideration) was unauthorized. We reasoned that the repeal of the statute (former OCGA § 17-12-10 (c)) in 2003 specifically authorizing such reimbursement indicated a legislative intent to withdraw the authority from the trial courts to impose such a condition in sentencing. Ga. L. 2003, p. 191, § 1. Because the express withdrawal of that authority in 2003 voided this provision of the 2005 sentence (for conduct occurring in 2004), we in May 2006 reversed that portion of Pless’s conviction.

In State v. Pless, 2 the Supreme Court of Georgia in 2007 reversed that holding of our opinion and ruled that the trial court was authorized to impose the reimbursement of attorney fees as part of the sentence. The Supreme Court determined that a new statute passed in the 2006 Georgia General Assembly (OCGA § 17-12-51 (a); see Ga. L. 2006, p. 710, § 6), which did not become effective until some weeks after the issuance of our opinion (and which was certainly not in effect at the time of Pless’s misconduct in 2004 and trial in 2005), indicated, apparently retroactively, that there was some legislative intent to authorize a trial court to impose such a condition in a sentence, and that even absent that new statute, such authority was in any case always inherent in a trial court’s broad sentencing powers, despite the repeal of that authority in 2003.

Accordingly, we vacate that portion of our opinion in which we reversed the imposition of attorney fees and adopt the Supreme Court’s opinion as our own. Our opinion in all other respects remains undisturbed. Thus, Pless’s conviction is affirmed in all respects.

Judgment affirmed.

Mikell and Adams, JJ., concur. *236 Charles A. Spahos, Solicitor-General, Leonard M. Geldon, Gilbert A. Crosby, Assistant Solicitors-General, for appellee.

1

Pless v. State, 279 Ga. App. 798 (633 SE2d 340) (2006).

2

State v. Pless, 282 Ga. 58 (646 SE2d 202) (2007).

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648 S.E.2d 752, 286 Ga. App. 235, 2007 Fulton County D. Rep. 2246, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 747, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pless-v-state-gactapp-2007.

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